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9INTRODUCTION
The Honourable J. A. R. Dowd, M.P.
Attorney General
 
It is a great deal of pleasure to me to_ open this seminar.
The task of sentencers today is an onerous one and it falls upon our
judges and magistrates to consider and evaluate the objective and subjective
material in each case—the competing and frequently conﬂicting interests of
offender, victim, and the community at large and a wide range of sentencing
options. Deciding upon the appropriate penalty to be imposed and then
correctly sentencing the offender is indeed a difficult task.
Judges are expected to tailor a sentence to ﬁt the crime as well as the
offender and at the same time satisfy the multitude of sentencing principles.
These principles as well as the range of sentencing alternatives available are
found in a body of law that is expanding at a prodigious rate, both in volume
and complexity. In its efforts to maintain the expertise of our judiciary and our
magistracy, the Judicial Commission is to be applauded.
There is no doubt my government was elected on a law and order
platform. There is a great concern about the level of crime in the community
today. There is also concern about the appropriateness of penalties being
imposed on offenders. Emotions can run high when issues of crime and
punishment are discussed. It is necessary however to step back from the fury
of the debate and to look carefully at the system as it exists and propose ways
in which it can be changed or improved. It~is this govemment’s commitment
to ensure as far as possible that sentences are not left to ﬂounder amongst a
plethora of sentencing principles and options. There is a real need for the system
of sentencing and punishment to be examined thoroughly and thoughtfully and,
where it is considered necessary or desirable, for reforms to be instituted.
I hope that this forum will present the opportunity for many of you to
raise issues and concerns which need to be addressed. Nowhere. more than in
the criminal justice system do you ﬁnd such a large number of competing
demands that need to be considered and, hopefully, satisﬁed. Often these
demands, particularly in the area of sentencing, are in conﬂict. The punishment
and rehabilitation of the offender and the deterrence of the individual offender
all need to be taken into account. Further the deterrence of criminal behaviour
generally must be a consideration whilst the protection of the community must
be uppermost in the minds of sentencers when they undertake this difﬁcult task.
Community views are also very important. The way the community
perceives the system, and how it affects each member of the community are
crucial. It is vital that the people of this state have conﬁdence in their criminal
justice system. It is clear that the community has developed a strong view—
the correct balance between the interest of the offender, the victim and the
community has not been properly struck and it is signiﬁcant that changes need
to be made. I consider that one of the reasons for this view is that the interests
and needs of victims in particular have for too long been ignored and that is
the view of both my ministerial colleague The Honourable Michael Yabsley,
M.P., Minister for Corrective Services, and the government.
My government has already acted swiftly to implement reforms to
protect victims and witnesses in a number of important areas. The Bail Act 1978
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has been amended to ensure that protection to victims and others is considered
when a decision is being made as to whether to grant bail to a particular
offender and when determining appropriate bail conditions. Legislation will be
introduced during the current session of Parliament to ensure that the addresses
and telephone numbers of victims and witnesses will not be disclosed pursuant
to the mandatory ‘paper committal’ system unless this information is materially
relevant to the case, or the court considers it is required in the interests of
justice. My government will continue to bring forward legislation that properly
takes account of the needs of victims and of witnesses without improperly
derogating from the rights of accused persons. In both,of the pieces of legislation
to which I have just referred, I consider the appropriate balance has been found.
As I have already mentioned there is now a large range of alternatives
to custodial sentences available. I consider it a signiﬁcant step forward that gaol
is now and should be a sentence of last resort. In the Summary Oﬂences Act
1988 imprisonment was introduced as an available penalty for a number of
offences created in that Act. In introducing the Bill into Parliament I made very
clear this penalty was only to be imposed after a sentencer had reached the
opinion that there was no other more appropriate alternative. Gaol is to be the
very last port of call—certainly not the ﬁrst. One of the aims of the criminal
justice system must be to divert offenders and to prevent them from becoming
integrated into the gaol culture. From the viewpoint of potential victims, the
actual criminals should not have their education in crime extended. The
effective use of alternatives to full gaol assists in achieving this aim.
Other pressing issues need to be addressed. Recidivism is a real problem.
The spectre of AIDS, its effect on the gaol environment, and its potential in
terms of harm to the community when the afflicted prisoner is released from
conﬁnement, cannot be ignored. Delay in the system is also a matter of great
concern to my government. A large number of measures to alleviate this
problem has already been implemented. This delay can often beneﬁt the accused
at the direct and the indirect expense of the community. By the time offenders
present for sentence they may have had the opportunity to change their lifestyle.
This inadvertently may operate as a mechanism for reform but the victims of
the crime and the community expect that an appropriate penalty be imposed.
The sentencer is left in a very difficult position. Alternatively delay may have
provided the offender with the opportunity of committing further offences. I
well remember one case in which I appeared for a young offender aged 19 at
committal proceedings, but by the time the case got to trial it was three and a
half years later, he had married, had a child, had permanent employment for
3'/2 years and would have presented, at that stage, a very difficult task for the
sentencing judge. But the jury in its wisdom or through perhaps some fault of
mine acquitted him anyway. It is not uncommon to find an offender being
sentenced at the same time for a number of similar offences, commonly break-
enter—and-steal, committed subsequently to the intitial offence for which he is
charged, which often happens when there is some protracted period of delay.
It is my govemment’s ﬁrm commitment to ensure that justice is
dispensed more speedily. The criminal justice system is made up of a complex
body of laws. regulations and procedures and requires constant ﬁne tuning to
guarantee it meets the many demands of a modern society. It is prudent to
remember that any alteration to it has far reaching effect and can impact on a
large number of aspects of the system. It is therefore essential that each reform
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is considered very carefully before it is implemented. I have indicated in several
pieces of legislation that I propose to do that, particularly in the Summary
Oﬂences Act and particularly in relation to the high incidence of convictions of
people of Aboriginal origin. '
This seminar is indeed timely. It is fortunate that .the speakers here
present a wide range of opinions and come from a variety of backgrounds. A
number of key issues need to be deliberated upon and they will be canvassed
by the speakers and I am sure discussion will be enthusiastic; It is the function
of this seminar to analyse the system as it is and raise workable
recommendations for change. I will be very interested to hear and consider the
matters that are raised and the points of views expressed at this seminar.
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GUIDING SENTENCING DISCRETION: THE APPROACH OF THE
AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION*
George Zdenkowski,
former Commissioner-in-Charge,
Australian Law Reform Commission
Sentencing Reference
Introduction
The Australian Law Reform Commission’s ﬁnal report Sentencing
(ALRC 44,1988)' has recently been tabled in federal parliament. Its
recommendations are directed to the punishment of federal and ACT.
offenders. Whether they are of interest to others is a matter for the responsible
authorities.
The organisers of this seminar asked me to focus on those aspects of
the report which deal with the desirability of guiding sentencing discretion.
Inevitably, my remarks will deal only partially and superficially with those
issues. The problem is compounded by the fact that the concept of discretion
is central to the sentencing process and pervasive in it, from prosecutorial
decision-making to various administrative decisions in the enforcement of
particluar sanctions. My comments will be illustrative rather than
comprehensive.
Preliminary Issues in Sentencing
Before the Commission’s approach to reforms relating to the exercise of
sentencing discretion is outlined, it is necessary to set out a brief overview of
some of the problems and issues which exist in relation to sentencing law and
practice as they affect federal and ACT. offenders.
Sentencing: What does it mean? A review of problems and issues related
to sentencing will inevitably be inﬂuenced by the scope accorded to the term
sentencing. For example a narrow deﬁnition of sentencing might be the
determination by a court of the legal sanction to be imposed on an offender
following a finding of guilt. A broader approach to the sentencing process might
hold that it includes any decision made within the criminal justice process that
has an impact on the ultimate disposition of a convicted offender. Such a
deﬁnition would include decisions relating to the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, the presentation of factual material, the choice of penalty and the
administration of that penalty including modiﬁcation and enforcement issues.
While the Commission recognises the impact of prosecutorial discretion on the
sentencing decision by a court (see ALRC DP 29, 1987), it has decided not to
‘ This paper inevitably draws upon the collective effort of Law Reform Commission staff and
upon publications issued in the course of the Sentencing reference. 1 present this material on
behalf of all those involved and gratefully acknowledge their efforts. I note however that the
opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the Law Reform Commission except
where speciﬁc recommendations are identiﬁed.
For earlier publications issued in the course of the sentencing references see: Sentencing: Reform
Options ALRC DP 10, I979; Sentencing of Federal Oﬂenders ALRC 15, 1980; Sentencing of
Federal Oﬂenders ALRC DP 15. 1980 (A summary of the interim report); Sentencing Procedure
ALRC DP 29, 1987; Sentencing: Penalties ALRC DP 30, I987; Sentencing: Prisons ALRC DP
31, 1987; The Commonwealth Prisoners Act. ALRC 43, 1988 and Freiberg, Fox and Hogan.
Sentencing Young Oﬂenders. ALRC RP 11, 1988.
 
 l3
make any recommendations in this area. This is a departure from the approach
in its interim report (ALRC IS, 1980). I personally favour the broader approach.
However, the Commission's approach to sentencing has been to regard it as the
decision by a court as to the imposition of a legal sanction on a person found
guilty of an offence and the legal procedures required to adminster the
punishment selected by the court.
What is a desirable sentencing system? In order to assess whether there
are any problems with the present sentencing system, and if so, make decisions
about appropriate means of removing or reducing those problems, it is necessary
to have some yardsticks as to the type of sentencing system which is considered
desirable. Arguably, a sentencing system should include the following features:
0 It should be understandable.
. Is should be fair.
. Is should be effective.
Each of these criteria is brieﬂy considered below.
Understandable. By this criterion it is intended to suggest that the aims
of the sentencing system should be clearly deﬁned, easily accessible and well
understood by the community. It also means that the effect of any order made
by way of sentence should be sufficiently explained so that it is fully understood
by all concerned, including by the offender. To put it another way, rather
simplistically, punishment imposed by the courts ought to make sense both to
the offender and to the community.
Fairness. The notion of fairness is intended to include fair procedures
for the making of the sentencing decision, fair results (equity) in the sense that
similar offenders convicted of similar offences in similar circumstances will be
dealt with in a similar way. In other words, there ought to be a consistency of
approach in relation to the sentencing of offenders. A further dimension of the
notion of fairness is that punishment should not be excessive. Sentences should
be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the responsibility of the
offender.
Eﬂectiveness. A sentencing system should, if possible, impose legal
sanctions which will have the effect of either preventing or reducing crime in
the community. While the criteria of understandability and fairness could be
said to be based on the notion of justice, the criterion of effectiveness could be
described as pragmatic or utilitarian.
Problems with the Existing Sentencing System
Structural problems. The great majority of the problems identiﬁed by the
Commission in the existing sentencing system are structural or policy problems
rather than problems associated with the personnel required either to make or
administer the decisions or the resources necessary to implement them.
Lack of sentencing policy. There is no intelligible legislative policy
regarding the principles to be applied in sentencing decisions. Nor are there
readily ascertainable common law principles. The courts have, from time to
time, made statements relating to sentencing principles. The situation is
unsatisfactory because there are at least five major purposes of sentencing
referred to by the courts, some of which are contradictory. There is no dominant
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principle and judicial ofﬁcers choose among the various purposes and combine
them as they see fit. There are no statutory or common law rules in relation to
the priority which should be accorded to the various purposes of punishment.
Conﬂict and confusion as to the aims of punishment are inevitable.
Lack ofguidance as to the criteria for the determination ofsentence. Just
as there are no clear rules as to the sentencing principles for the courts to apply,
there are no consistently applied statutory or other criteria to guide the courts
in relation to the factors relevant to the determination of sentence.
Lack ofguidance in relation to the procedure for determining sentence.
There are no adequate rules relating to the factual basis of a sentencing decision,
the ways in which the facts should be gathered, the rules of evidence which
ought to apply and the procedures for presentation of this material to the
sentencing tribunal.
An unsatisfactory penalty structure. The penalty structure bears no
consistent relationship to offences. The only parliamentary guidance as to
penalty levels is by way of maximum penalties. Many maximum penalties are
unrealistically high so that they are rarely if ever used. They do not reﬂect actual
sentencing practice and do not always reﬂect the relative seriousness of offences.
As a result, maximum penalties provide little if any guidance to the courts and
may in some cases be actually misleading. There is no guidance either in statute
or common law in relation to the type of penalty or the amount of penalty
which might be appropriate in particular circumstances. In other words, there
are not satisfactory rules in relation to choice of sanction. Another matter which
arises is the limited range of non-custodial options available to the sentencing
court for federal and A.C.T. offenders. Also speciﬁc problems arise in relation
to the inadequacy of penalties for the sentencing of corporate offenders.
Lack of information. There is an inadequate information base for
sentencing decisions and the formulation of sentencing policy. Problems include:
lack of judicial training; lack of systematic information concerning offenders and
offences; lack of adequate feedback about penalties imposed; lack of information
about sentencing practice; inadequacy of and distortion of information in media
reports of sentencing decisions.
Conditional release. Parole and early release programs have created an
element of uncertainty in sentencing and do not appear to have achieved the
goals upon which they were originally based. This has caused particular
problems in terms of the lack of public conﬁdence in sentencing system.
Excessive use of imprisonment as a sanction. Imprisonment is the
cornerstone of the punishment system in Australia. Although it is not the most
frequently used penalty it is regularly stipulated as a potential penalty and, as
indicated above, the maximum term of imprisonment is often very high. It is
a most severe and expensive sanction. Although it clearly punishes offenders,
in terms of crime prevention, it achieves very little apart from temporary
segregation of offenders from society.
It is also known to cause considerable harm to the individual offender
and, ultimately, to the community. It has long been argued that imprisonment
should be used only as a last resort. However, effective rules to achieve this
objective have not been introduced.
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Undermtilisation of non-custodial sanctions. Because there has been
signiﬁcant reliance on imprisonment as a sanction, non-custodial sanctions have
not been used as frequently as they might be. Apart from an excessive reliance
on imprisonment, there is also to be considered the lack of range for non-
custodial sanctions which makes them less appropriate for serious offences.
There is also a problem in relation to community perception of non-custodial
sanctions as being ‘lenient’.
Disparity. Another potential cause for concern is inconsistency by
sentencing tribunals in the treatment of like cases, the so-called problem of
disparity. Mr Justice Mason (now Chief Justice of the High Court) summarised
it this way:
Just as consistency in punishment—a reﬂection of the notion of equal
justice—is a fundamental element in any rational and fair system of
criminal justice, so inconsistency in punishment, because it is regarded as
a badge of unfairness and unequal treatment under the law, is calculated
to lead to an erosion of public conﬁdence in the integrity of the
administration of justice. It is for this reason that the avoidance and
elimination of unjustiﬁable discrepancy in sentencing is a matter of abiding
importance to the administration of justice and to the community. (Lowe
v. R. (1984) 58 ALJR 414 at 415).
The general concern which is simply stated (but not easily solved) is that
equity and fairness demand that the criminal justice system should administer
similar punishment to similar cases. But before one considers the difﬁculties
involved in achieving consistent sentencing practices a number of threshold
questions arise.
Should a distinction be drawn between justiﬁable and unjustiﬁable
disparity? If so, where the line is drawn depends on how one characterises, ‘like’
cases. At one extreme, it could be said that the number of like cases is zero
because no case is like any other with the corollary that each case should be
given individualised treatment and that there is no such thing as unjustiﬁable
disparity. Although it may not be a dominant view, this is an opinion which is
commonly expressed by judicial officers. A less extreme view would hold that
it is possible to extract common features from cases and that sentencing
principles can be formulated in response to such features. The position taken
in relation to these matters is inﬂuenced by the emphasis which is (or is not)
placed on the offence and/or the offender as a factor in assessing penalty.
A further problem which arises is the difﬁculty of establishing
empirically the existence of disparity given the lack of research in this area to
date in Australia. The research of the Canadian Sentencing Commission
indicates that there is abundant evidence of unwarranted disparities.2 The
debate in Australia has generally been conducted at the level of assertion.3
Although there is little available research within Australia on the subject of
disparity, there is a considerable body of literature in other jurisdictions
pointing to the existence of widespread disparities in sentencing practice in
1 Canada, Report of the Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Reform: A Canadian
Approach, Canadian Government Publishing Center. Ottawa, 1987 page XX".
3 see criticism of ALRC 15 in Potas and Walker, Sentencing the Federal Oﬂender Australian
Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 1983.
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relation to ‘the same case’.‘ It is, of course, only possible to test a multiple
response by judges to precisely the same case in a hypothetical situation. When
this has been done widespread disparities in the penalty imposed have been
found. Similar results have been obtained during the conduct of sentencing
exercises at magistrates’ conferences in Australia.s
The existence of disparity is not surprising given the divergent views of
sentencing aims and the different weights attributed to different factors. Even
in the absence of detailed empirical evidence to sustain the allegation of
widespread unjustifiable disparity it could be argued, provided that one is
prepared to make the assumption that every case is not inherently different from
every other case, that exploration of ways of improving consistency in
sentencing practice is a legitimate enterprise.
There is a series of levels at which one can consider the ‘disparity
problem’: internally to the sentencing practice of an individual judge or
magistrate;6 as between judges and magistrates within their own court; as
between judicial ofﬁcers within courts of any particular state; and ultimately,
on a national basis. Disparities may also exist in relation to unexplainable
variations in sentencing patterns of co-accused defendants and inconsistent
patterns in prosecutorial decision-making. But sentencing disparity cannot be
addressed in a vacuum. The information base for making such comparisons is
not currently available. Moreover, in the absence of a guiding rationale it would
be surprising if consistency could be achieved given the invocation of
contradictory aims.
Public perceptions of the sentencing process. In the light of matters
referred to above it is perhaps unsurprising that the community is critical of
the sentencing process yet at the same time it does not have adequate
information or a clear understanding of. many matters related to sentencing. In
its widespread public consultations, the Commission heard a wide range of
complaints about the sentencing process from members of the public. However,
recurring themes included:
0 confusion and resentment about the purposes of punishment;
. concern about unjustiﬁable disparity between penalties imposed in
similar cases;
. concern about problems of victims in the criminal justice system;
. concern about penalty levels being either too harsh or too lenient;
. a concern that a sentence does not mean what it says—a criticism
which arose largely in the context of various forms of conditional
release and early release schemes.
‘ see Zdenkowski in Chappell and Wilson (ed) The Australian Criminal Justice System—the mid
1980's, Butterworths, I986. footnote l7. 2l8.
5 see K. Anderson, ‘The Role of the Magistrate in the Sentencing Process‘, in Potas (ed)
Sentencing in Australia: Issues. Policy and Reform. Australian Institute of Criminology and
Australian Law Reform Commission, Canberra I987.
“ Ashworth A. Genders E. Mansfield G, Peay J and Player E, Sentencing in the Crown Court:
Report of an Exploratory Study. Occasional Paper No. 10, Centre for Criminological Research.
University of Oxford, 1984.
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No doubt it could be said that some of the lack of conﬁdence and the
perceptions of problems by the public are not soundly based because of lack of
information or misunderstanding. This in itself points to a problem and has
been referred to above. However, it is not simply a lack of information or
understanding which finds expression. in these views. The lack of public
Conﬁdence in sentencing is soundly based.
Victims. A number of concerns about the sentencing process have been
expressed by victims. Victims feel that the criminal justice system does not
adequately respond to their problems. As far as sentencing is concerned, victims
feel that sentences do not reﬂect the gravity of the offences and do not reﬂect
the sentence handed down by the court. They hear of an offender receiving a
sentence of imprisonment for a particular time but do not know what portion
of that sentence will actually be served in prison. Victims are not consulted
about decisions in the sentencing process or kept informed about them. The
system is currently not designed to encourage the making of restitution by
offenders to victims in all relevant situations. Some of the concerns expressed
by victims relate to other elements of the criminal justice system and cannot
be addressed by reforms to the sentencing process.
. Public opinion and the media. Reference has already been made to the
need to collect accurate and reliable information about the sentencing process.
Intimately related to the issue of sentencing information is the role of public
opinion and the media. There is a need for a well informed public debate about
sentencing. The administration of justice is carried out in public and the orders
made by judicial ofﬁcers should be the subject of public discussion and
appraisal. However, because of the lack of adequate information, it is not
possible fairly to appraise sentences imposed by the courts. The lack of adequate
information inevitably inﬂuences the manner in which public opinion about
punishment policy is formed. The primary vehicle for transmitting information
to the public is of course the media. Accordingly, even if substantial
improvements can be achieved in the area of the collection, recording and
analysis of sentencing information, serious obstacles still lie in the path of
adequate dissemination of such information to the community unless the media
co-operates in the exercise.
So inﬂuential is the media in shaping ‘public opinion’, which largely sets
the limits of reform, that media regulation and accountability are central
issues for penal reform . . . that a socially responsible and non-
sensationalist approach to criminal justice issues in the media is possible
is illustrated clearly in the Dutch experience. Considerable restraint is
exercised: a comparatively small amount of space is allocated to crime in
general and to individual crimes. Location, format and placement is low-
key, and the treatment restrained, with an absence of rhetorical and
emotive language. All these factors clearly assist in the creation of a mature,
humane climate of public opinion in Holland, within which low
imprisonment rates, short sentences and relatively liberal prision regimes
by international standards are not just tolerated but understood and
supported. Of course this climate of public opinion has complex national,
historical and cultural roots and cannot be ‘copied’ in an entirely different
national context . . . But for our purposes the Dutch experience shows
the possibility of another way. It shows that ‘public opinion” is not ﬁxed
or inherently punitive and is inﬂuenced by media treatment of issues.7
7 D. Brown ‘A Changing Climate for Penal Reform‘, Australian Society. July 1986. 24.
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Limits to sentencing reform. At a general level, it ought to be said that
the court sentencing decision is relatively marginal to the crime rate despite the
greater expectations which are often held in relation to it. This striking and
uncomfortable fact of life should be acknowledged at an early stage in any
discussion of sentencing reform so that the suggested impact of any reform
proposals not be given an inﬂated value.“ Having recognised the limited impact
of the sentencing decision and any reform proposed in relation to it, it should
also be noted that there are a number of important considerations thrown up
by the research literature as to the limited impact of law reform in general and
sentencing reform in particular.9
Opening up the system. Sentencing policy and practice change over time
since sentencing is a social, as well as legal process. A sentencing system should
include institutions which can accommodate policy changes in a rational
manner without over-responsiveness to the pressures of publicity, political
grandstanding or lobbying. As the sentencing decision is a unique exercise of
power by the state over the individual, public interest in sentencing will remain
strong. Mechanisms should be constructed to allow open and informed debate.
Legislation setting out sentencing goals and procedures should provide clear
guidelines for both those directly involved and the public. The articulation of
these rules will assist the process of identifying problem areas and the need for
change. A Sentencing Commission could play an important role in problem-
spotting and the provision of research and policy guidance to keep the system
responsive to change.
The need for an integrated approach. In my view, a consideration of
sentencing reform must look beyond the sentencing decision of the court. It is
likely to be misleading and unhelpful to focus exclusively on one stage of the
sentencing process—the dispositional decision by the sentencing tribunal. The
sentencing process is affected by the apprehension of an offender for an offence
deﬁned by law, the selection of a charge, the trial of that charge, the imposition
of a penalty by a court following a ﬁnding of guilt and the actual application
of that penalty to the offender. All these elements are interconnected and the
output at one stage of the process becomes the input at another stage.
Accordingly it is desirable to examine the system as a whole and to recognise
the impact of one element upon another if it is intended to pursue a rational
and consistent sentencing policy. It is not possible to achieve total integration
in the penal proCess and to eliminate inconsistency, conﬂict and the pursuit of
different attitudes and practices. Nevertheless, it is argued that sentencing justice
is more likely to be attained by the pursuit of overall goals.
Discretion: a key issue in the sentencing process. Every stage of the
sentencing process calls for the exercise of important judgments. Such judgments
involve the exercise of discretion. A threshold issue is whether the discretionary
nature of decisions in the sentencing process constitute an asset or a liability
in terms of capacity to generate just decisions.‘o Some would argue that the
3 A. Ashworth, ‘Criminal Justice, Rights and Sentencing: a Review of Sentencing Policy and
Problems‘ in I Potas (ed) Sentencing in Australia: Issues, Policy and Reform. Australian Institute
of Criminology and Australian Law Reform Commission, Canberra 1987; see also the remarks
of Mr Justice Wells in R v Kear (1978) 2 Crim.L.J. 40.
9 see J. Chan, ‘Limits of Sentencing Refonn' in Zdenkowski, Ronalds and Richardson (eds). The
Criminal Injustice System: Volume 2, Pluto Press. Sydney 1987.
'° see K. C. Davis Discretionary Justice: a Preliminary Enquiry, Baton Rouge, Louisanna State
University Press, 1969, 3; Sentencing: Procedure ALRC DP 29, I987.
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existence of a very broad discretion at various stages in the sentencing process
is eminently sensible and desirable because of the total ﬂexibility it provides to
make the appropriate decisions in each particular case. In essence the defenders
of this position assert the primacy of individualised justice and minimize the
signiﬁcance of so-called disparity inconsistency in relation to prosecution,
disposition, or treatment decisions on the basis that no two cases are ever alike.
On the other hand, the existence of such a broad discretion has often been the
target of trenchant criticism on the basis that it allows and perpetuates the
existence of an irrational system of justice which is unaccountable and which
is largely responsible for disparity in sentencing decisions. The solution offered
is to eliminate discretion.
The Commission’s Broad Approach
The need for guided sentencing discretion. Both positions referred to
above represent unsatisfactory extremes. In the Commission’s view the existence
of very broad sentencing discretions are troublesome but attempts to mandate
rigid rules with respect to decisions at every stage of the sentencing process are
equally fraught with problems. Attempts to eliminate discretion or to reduce it
drastically often result in a shift in the discretion to another point in the
sentencing process rather than the intended effect. In the Commission’s view,
the issue is how best to structure or guide discretion rather than how discretion
is to be eliminated. The desirable goal is to eliminate unnecessary discretionary
power not to eliminate discretionary power altogether. The crucial step, once
the broad discretionary nature of the various decision—making stages in the
sentencing process as it is presently constituted has been conceded, is to set
about developing mechanisms which fairly structure or control discretion in a
manner which will not unduly impinge on those responsible for decision-making
at those various stages. Key goals which should be aimed at are consistency,
openness and accountability.ll This would include publicly accessible laws,
policy statements, reasons and procedures at all stages of the process. While a
certain degree of openness presently attends the sentencing decision made by
courts, the discretionary decisions taken at other stages by police, prosecutors
and corrections authorities have, generally speaking, been hidden from public
view.‘2 The actors in the criminal justice system, those responsible for
formulating and implementing sentencing policy and the community at large
would all beneﬁt from the greater accountability of decisions in the sentencing
process.
Some Proposed Reforms Related to Guiding Discretion
Tosuggest that sentencing discretion be structured or guided leaves
unanswered key questions as to the manner in which this is to be done. This
is well illustrated by the recent efforts to deal with this issue in Canada”,
“ see P. Sallmann and J. Willis, Criminal Justice in Australia, O.U.P.. Melbourne 1984.
'2 This matter was emphasised by the Commission in ALRC 15, I980. Unfortunately, the ﬁnal
report did not make recommendations which would increase the accountability of prosecutorial
decision-making. Interestingly, the ﬁrst step in this direction, the publication of prosecution
guidelines. recommended by the Commission in ALRC 15, 1980 has been welcomed by various
prosecution authorities. Federal guidelines were ﬁrst published in 1982 and revised in 1986.
State jurisdictions are gradually following suit.
'3 Canada, Canadian Sentencing Commission. Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach. Report
of the Canadian Sentencing Commission, Canadian Government Publishing Centre. Ottawa
I987.
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Sweden,M the United States and, closer to home, in Victoria.” In each case the
solution suggested was different. There is not space and time adequately to
compare these approaches in this paper. The Commission had to confront a
signiﬁcant number of issues in this area because discretion arises throughout
the sentencing process. Some of the issues and some of the responses are set
out below:
Desirability ofa comprehensive and integrated set ofreforms. The reforms
proposed should be regarded as an integrated package because of the manner
in which different aspects of the sentencing process interconnect. It would not
be news to anybody here that the history of law reform is replete with examples
of dismembered ‘integrated packages’ once the implementation phase is reached.
This is not, of course, a reason to decline to propose such packages.
An Australian approach. The feedback received in the Commission’s
consultations indicated support for sentencing reforms which are suitable for
an Australian context—that is, reforms which can build on existing Australian
institutions, rules and practices where possible rather than reforms which
require transplanting sentencing reforms from other jurisdictions. There has
been considerable resistance, for example, to sentencing ‘grids’ or ‘matrices’
introduced in some North American jurisdictions.
Sentencing legislation. One important issue relates to the desirability of
sentencing legislation. Should there be comprehensive sentencing legislation
relating to the determination of punishment including the purposes of
punishment, sentencing procedure, available sanctions, rules as to choice of
sanction and as to the administration of all sanctions? Arguably, such legislation
would lead to more clearly deﬁned and more readily accessible rules. It would
not be the end of debate about meaning of the rules but a sounder beginning
for a sentencing jurisprudence which could be pursued by appellate courts.
Against this it has been said that it would be foolhardy to specify punishment
purposes, for example, in legislative form. Others have argued that legislation
would inhibit the ﬂexibility of the common law and runs the danger of
producing injustice where problems have not been anticipated by the legislation.
At the heart of this debate, it seems, is the degree of discretionary decision-
making power which should be granted to sentencing tribunals. At the end of
the day, the Commission declined to propose comprehensive legislation.
Sentencing principles. The report recommended that sentencing
discretion should be limited or guided by various principles including:
o Punishments imposed by the criminal justice system for offences
must be just, that is they must be of an appropriate severity, having
regard to the circumstances of the offence and the offender. This
should be the primary goal.
. Consistently with a just punishment, rehabilitative goals and
restitution for victims may also be pursued. However, these goals
should be secondary.
” Sweden, Committee on Imprisonment. Report of the Committee on Imprisonment. Department
of Justice. Stockholm, 1986. For a discussion of the implementation of this report see: A. von
Hirsch. ‘Principles for Choosing Sanctions: Sweden‘s Proposed Sentencing Statute'. (1987) 13:2
New England Journal on Criminal and Civil Conﬁnement 17 l.
'5 Victoria, Victorian Sentencing Committee, Sentencing. repon of the Victorian Sentencing
Committee. Attomey—General‘s Department. Melbourne, I988.  
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.Inhumane, cruel or vengeful punishments such as capital
punishment, corporal punishment, and torture should in no
circumstances be permitted.
0 Goals such as the incapacitation of the offender or general deterrence
should not be objectives of the imposition of punishment.
o Punishment mustbe consistently applied. This implies not only that
offenders should be punished for the crimes they commit but also
that similar offenders who commit similar crimes in similar
circumstances should be punished in similar ways. It further implies
that offenders who commit more serious offences should be punished
more severely than those who commit less serious offences.
Even when agreement is reached on the relevant principles there is
considerable scope for disagreement about the manner in which such principles
are made relevant to the sentencing process. The suggestion in one discussion
paper'6 that punishment aims should be speciﬁed by statute and the priorities
should be allocated provoked considerable debate, for example. The tentative
adoption of just deserts as a primary goal engendered some opposition from
those who argued it unfairly displaced rehabilitation and others who objected
to just deserts on the basis that it was a movable feast—according to the values
of the proponents. In response it was argued that (a) speciﬁcation of aims and
priority was desirable for clarity, justice and educative reasons; (b) failure to
specify such matters would leave fundamental issues unresolved and underwrite
the current incoherence in sentencing aims; (c) rehabilitation is not completely
excluded and that just deserts does not stand in a vacuum—it must be given
signiﬁcance for the relevant punishment system precisely by articulating relevant
value judgments about offence seriousness and corresponding punishment levels
in the sentencing legislation. The approach adopted in the ﬁnal report is to seek
to reﬂect the values referred to in the sentencing principles outlined earlier in
speciﬁc reforms but not to recommend general statutory declarations of these
principles.'7 It could also be argued that the report may ultimately be used to
assist in clarifying any ambiguities in sentencing legislation based on its
recommendations in the light of recent developments in statutory interpretation.
Use of imprisonment. A major aspect of the Commission’s inquiry
related to the desirability of reducing the emphasis on prison as a sanction. The
view of the Commission was that severe punishments can be imposed without
resorting to imprisonment as frequently as current law and practice do at
present. Reasons for using prison less frequently include:
. The experience of imprisonment is negative and destructive for the
offender. In nearly all jurisdictions prisons are overcrowded, leading
to stress for prisoners and staff and severe management problems.
The lack of useful activities, including work experience, in many
prisons leads to boredom and frustration for prisoners
.The cost of imprisonment is enormous and the returns few. For
example, in 1985—86 the Commonwealth paid New South Wales
$2,419,000 for the recurrent costs of accommodating about sixty
Australian Capital Territory prisoners.
'° ALRC DP 29, 1987.
'7 of Canadian Sentencing Commission Report, note 13.
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o The severity of prison as a sanction is underscored by reserving it
for the most serious cases. The value of imprisonment as a
punishment option will be enhanced by its being used more
sparingly.
o It is the policy of all Australian correctional administrations.
Techniques for reducing imprisonment should include the following:
. Legislation should specify that imprisonment should be the
punishment of last resort. No federal offence should be stated in
legislation to be punishable only by imprisonment.
o Prescribed minimum periods of imprisonment should be eliminated.
The arbitrariness of mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment
tends to undermine consistency in the consideration by sentencers
of aspects of offences, or the particular characteristics of the offender.
They may also result in unduly harsh sentences being imposed.
oConsideration should be given to removing imprisonment as an
available sanction for some categories of offences.
0 Maximum periods of imprisonment should be rationalised so that
a limited number of categories are available. Existing and future
offences should be assigned to appropriate categories.
. A wide range of non-custodial orders of appropriate severity should
be available.
.Imprisonment should not be an automatic consequence of ﬁne
default.
Conditional Release. In its interim report (ALRC 15, 1980), the
Commission recommended the abolition of parole. This proposal met with
widespread disapproval. Discussion paper 30 (ALRC DP 30, 1987) advanced
the tentative recommendation that a form of conditional release be retained but
the release be automatic at a time ﬁxed by statute. In other words, the parole
authority would be restricted to setting conditions and dealing with revocation.
In general terms, there was approval for this approach in principle during the
Commission’s consultations although some favoured automatic release at a time
fixed by the court in its discretion (the system recently adopted in South
Australia). However, not suprisingly, there was some controversy about the
proportion of the time to be served in custody speciﬁed by statute. Should the
rule by universal? Should there be a discretion to depart from it and, if so,
vested in whom? What should the relevant proportion be: 30 per cent? 50 per
cent? 75 per cent? What would the impact of remission schemes be? At the
centre of these debates is a concern about ‘truth in sentencing’ as to which there
has been considerable public disquiet. Judicial officers have described current
early release procedures as an ‘elaborate charade’. Another issue which arises
in our federal system is the possibility of disparity between conditional release
schemes proposed for federal offenders and different schemes which apply to
state offenders. The report recommends an automatic date of release upon
parole, speciﬁcally after completion of 70 per cent of the total length of the
sentence imposed subject to allowance of earned remission not exceeding 20
per cent of the total length of the sentence. Automatic remission should be
abolished. These recommendations are conditioned on the acceptance of the
Commission’s recommendation for an overall reduction of maximum sentences
made elsewhere. The aim is to produce a greater harmony between the sentence  
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imposed and the sentence served, not to increase actual periods in custody.
Truth in sentencing does not necessarily mean, as is sometimes claimed, harsher
sentences.
The Sentencing Hearing. The Commission considered a number of ways
of limiting discretion during the sentencing hearing to improve fairness of the
relevant procedure and made the following recommendations:
0 There should be no requirement that the rules of evidence be applied
in the sentencing hearing. However, the court should be able to
apply, as appropriate, the rules of evidence to the proof of facts that
in the court’s view are or will be signiﬁcant in sentencing.
. The standard of proof required to determine a fact in dispute should
depend on the importance of the fact in establishing the offence.
There must be an appropriate balance between flexibility and the
need, in some circumstances, to prove important and signiﬁcant facts
to a higher standard of proof than less signiﬁcant facts.
. The quality and reliability of reports about the offender should be
improved. Pre-sentence reports need not be mandatory.
.The role of the victim in the sentencing hearing should not be
changed to allow either direct participation or separate legal
representation. Taking the victim’s views into account may lead to
unjustiﬁed disparities in sentencing. Mandatory victim impact
statements are not recommended.
oThC prosecution should play a more active role in ensuring an
appropriate penalty is imposed on the offender. The published
guidelines of the federal Director of Public Prosecutions on this
matter provide a suitable basis for counsel to address on sentence,
and should be brought into line with other recommendations in the
report.
Determining the sentence. The laws and precedures surrounding the
sentencing decision should be structured so as to lead to consistency of
treatment of offenders. The present role of the courts in exercising the
sentencing discretion should remain but the procedures surrounding the exercise
of the sentencing discretion should be such that consistency of treatment
between offenders and offences is enhanced. The report makes a number of
proposals to promote consistency. They include the following:
. More extensive requirements for the giving of reasons for the
decision should be introduced. These will make it clear what factors
the courts considered relevant and what weight was given to those
factors. They are also needed to explain the process by which the
court came to choose a particular type of sanction of the severity of
sentence.
oThere should be a statutory list of factors regarded as relevant to
the exercise of the court’s discretion. Under the present law, there
is no statement as to what matters should be regarded as relevant,
although the report identiﬁes a number of factors which courts
currently take into account and notes a variety of ‘aggravating’ and
‘mitigating’ factors. The court should not be under an obligation to
consider all or any of the matters in the proposed list.
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o A ‘discount’ on the sentence for a plea of guilty is proposed. Since
the plea has no bearing on the circumstances of the offence or the
offender‘s characteristics, the proposal may be seen as a signiﬁcant
departure from the just deserts model. Nevertheless, practical
considerations, in particular the need to reduce court delays, justify
courts being able to take account of the fact that the offender pleaded
guilty to the charge. The Commission was divided on this
recommendation. Providing information to the authorities should be
treated on the same basis.
0 There should be a statutory list of factors to which courts may not
have regard. The proposed list relies heavily on the current law, but
also includes the defendant’s choice to plead not guilty and the
prevalence of the offence in the community.
In an earlier paper (ALRC DP 30, 1987) the Commission raised the
possibility of restrictions on choice of sanction type or amount of sanction and
set out tentative proposals for a hierarchy in terms of sanction severity. In its
earlier deliberation the Commission also considered presumptive rules for
custodial and non-custodial sanctions.l8 The final report did not pursue these
options.
Sentencing Commission
The North American Sentencing Commission. One mechanism which can
potentially limit sentencing discretion signiﬁcantly—depending on tis
composition and its powers—is the sentencing commission. This body has
become a familiar feature of the North American landscape. In essence the
North American model is an independent, expert rule-making body, vested with
the function of proposing guidelines for the imposition of criminal sanctions.
Generally speaking, it is composed of judges, prosecutors, defence lawyers,
scholars and citizens and is supported by a full time professional staff.
Sentencing tribunals are required to abide by the prescribed guidelines in their
sentencing decisions unless they can justify appropriate deviations from the
guidelines. Such deviations are reviewable by appellate courts. The guidelines
are usually self-executing in the sense that they become law immediately they
are approved by the Commission unless they are disallowed. Alternatively,
guidelines can be submitted to the legislature for approval. Once the guidelines
are in operation, the role of the Sentencing Commission is to collect and
disseminate information on the implementation of the guidelines and make
recommendation as to changes to the guidelines on the basis of research and
experience.[9
The Australian experience. The debate about the possible introduction
into Australia of a body bearing such a name is relatively recent. A Sentencing
Council was suggested by the Commission in 1980 (ALRC 15, 1980). However,
in that case, and subsequently (eg ALRC DP 30, 1987), the focus of the debate
has primarily centred on an advisory body whose major tasks might be collecting
and disseminating information about sentencing and providing judicial
education. Clearly these tasks are likely to have a less signiﬁcant impact on
sentencing discretion than prescriptive guidelines. There has been a relatively
steady resistance to prescriptive guidelines in Australia and the report has
recommended against them.
”‘ See. for example, Criminal Justice Act 1985 (NZ) and Canadian Sentencing Commission Report.
note 13.
"’ For a detailed discussion, see Von Hirsch A, Tonry M, & Knapp K. The Sentencing
Commission: and its Guidelines. Northeastern University Press, Boston. 1987.
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Sentencing information. The important change that has occurred in
Australia is that the proposal for an advisory body (to be sharply distinguished
from the North American model), originally greeted with considerable
scepticism and doubt, now commands fairly widespread support. The lack of
adequate sentencing information is now well recognised. Areas which arguably
require attention include:
o the collection, analysis and dissemination of information about the
sentencing process;
0 liaison between various components of the criminal justice system
concerning sentencing issues;
0 the need for independent advice to government.
The Commission received strong support for an advisory Sentencing
Commission or Council and the report recommends the establishment of such
a body to undertake the tasks mentioned above and to become involved in
judicial education.
Judicial Education. The notion of judicial education is less controversial
than it used to be. What was once considered to be an encroachment on the
independence of the judiciary is now being perceived as a potential benefit.
Sentencing is a complex task. It requires knowledge of sentencing principles,
law and procedure and the capacity to select and evaluate relevant facts from
a potentially wide range of facts about the offence and the offender. If sentencing
is to be consistent, individual judicial ofﬁcers must also have an understanding
of their colleagues’ sentencing practices. Most judicial ofﬁcers learn about the
intricacies of sentencing in the course of their daily duties. Especially at
Supreme Court level, many judicial ofﬁcers do not come to criminal work with
an extensive background of criminal practice at the Bar.
Sentencing education for judicial ofﬁcers is now well established in
England. There, a Judicial Studies Board runs induction and refresher courses
for judges each year. Every judge in England must attend on appointment and
every 5 years for a week-long course on developments in sentencing and other
aspects of criminal justice. The Board publishes a quarterly bulletin
summarising leading sentencing decisions and, occasionally, reporting research,
developments. Recently appointed judges must spend a few weeks “sitting-in”
with an experienced judge engaged on sentencing. Sentencing education is also
well established in North America, through, for example, the Federal Judicial
.Center. Within Australia there have been several developments. The Judicial
Commission of New South Wales, established in 1987, has as one of its
functions the organisation and supervision of continuing education for judicial
ofﬁcers. The Victorian Sentencing Committee has recommended a Victorian
Judicial Studies Board broadly modelled on the English Board. During the
Commission’s consultations judicial ofﬁcers have indicated support for formal
sentencing conferences and training as a means of promoting uniformity in
sentencing.
The primary focus of sentencing education must be on judicial ofﬁcers
as they have principal responsibility for sentencing decisions. However, this is
not to suggest that education programs for members of other groups who have
an impact on sentencing is not desirable. Prosecution and defence lawyers,
correction, probation and parole ofﬁcers and police can also beneﬁt from
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involvement with sentencing education. In addition, the press and other media
representatives can beneﬁt from a detailed working knowledge of sentencing law
and practice: improved reporting of sentencing issues would improve the quality
of the public’s understanding of sentencing and the criminal justice system as
a whole. '
Concluding Remarks. This account of the issues being considered by the
Commission relating to reforms which might serve to structure sentencing
discretion is by no means comprehensive. Nor have I dealt with the sentencing
reform activities of colleagues in other Australian jurisdictions. However I
cannot leave without drawing attention to the important contribution of the
Victorian Sentencing Committee, chaired by Sir John Starke, in its ﬁnal report
published earlier this year. The N.S.W. Law Reform Commission is now turning
to sentencing as part of its extensive inquiry into Criminal Procedure. It is likely
to be an active period in this area in Australia over the next few years.
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Apart from emphasising the point that I did not write any of the material I am
about to present to you, the other preliminary point I should make is that the
task that George Zdenkowski has set out to achieve is really to illustrate the
issues rather than to provide a comprehensive analysis of them.
The paper commences at a fairly logical starting point by seeking a
deﬁnition or an explanation of the term sentencing. He concludes that there
are two separate approaches that might be taken providing a broader or
narrower view, and notes that “the Commission’s approach to sentencing has
been to regard it as the decision‘by a court as to the imposition of a legal
sanction on a person found guilty of an offence and the legal procedures
required to administer the punishment selected by the court”.
The paper then goes on to consider what a desirable sentencing system
might be and concludes by saying that it should have three outstanding features.
ﬁrstly, that it should be understandable, secondly, that it should be fair, and
thirdly that it should be effective.
If I can break away from Mr Zdenkowski’s paper for a moment and
compare that conclusion with the conclusion reached by the Victorian
Sentencing Committee only a few months earlier than the Australian Law
Reform Commission presented its report. The Victorian Committee concluded
that the three important features of a sentencing system were that it should be
ﬁrstly, just, secondly, efficient, and thirdly, and I think perhaps this is an
important departure from what the Australian Law Reform Commission
suggested, that it should be honest.
He goes on to explain the meaning of the three features that have been
identiﬁed. Firstly, understandability. It is said that “by this criterion it is
intended to suggest that the aims of‘the sentencing system should be clearly
deﬁned, easily accessible, and well understood by the community”. Or “to put
it another way, rather simplisticly [perhaps], punishment imposed by the courts
ought to make sense both to the offender and to the community”. In respect of
fairness, the paper notes, that “the notion of fairness is intended to include fair
procedures for the making of the sentencing decision”, and fair results in the
sense that there ought to be a consistency of approach in relation to the
sentencing of offenders. So far as effectiveness is concerned “a sentencing system
should impose legal sanctions which will have the effect of either preventing or
reducing crime in the community”.
The paper then goes on to identify some of the problems which exist so
far as the Australia Law Reform Commission was concerned with the current
system of sentencing. The ﬁrst of those is that there is a lack of sentencing
policy, secondly, there is a lack of guidance as to the criteria for the
determination of sentence. Thirdly there is a lack of guidance in relation to the
procedure for determining sentence. Fourthly, the penalty structure that exists
at the moment is unsatisfactory. Fifthly, there is a lack of information. This
feature is contributed to by the fact that there is, in the opinion of the
Commission, lack of judicial training, lack of systematic information concerning
offenders and offences, a lack of adequate feed-back about penalties imposed,
a lack of information about sentencing practice, inadequacy of and distortion
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of information in media reports of sentencing decisions. The sixth matter
identiﬁed as a signiﬁcant problem is that parole and early release programmes
have created an element of uncertainty in sentencing and did not appear to
achieve the goals upon which they were originally based. This has caused
particular problems in terms of lack of public conﬁdence in the sentencing
system. The seventh major ﬂaw in the current system identiﬁed by the
Commission is that there is, in its opinion, an excessive use of imprisonment
as a sanction and the obvious ﬂip side of that argument. The eighth problem
is that there is an underutilisation of non-custodial sanctions. The ninth major
problem identiﬁed is that of disparity and in the paper there is a quote from
Mr Justice Mason, now the Chief Justice of the High Court, in Lowe's case
which has become something of a classic statement very commonly referred to
in the judgments of the Courts of Criminal Appeal which says in effect that
inconsistency in punishment is a badge of unfairness and the avoidance and
the elimination of unjustiﬁable discrepancy in sentencing is a matter of abiding
importance in the administration of justice and to the community.
The paper then goes on to deal with a numbers of issues related to the
speciﬁc topic of disparity and asks the question should there be a distinction
drawn between justiﬁable and unjustiﬁable disparity. It then goes on to identify
more speciﬁc problems in relation to disparity and notes that in studies, and
there have only been relatively limited studies according to the paper in
Australia, those studies have revealed that there is an unacceptable level in
disparity in the approach made by sentencers in criminal cases. He refers to an
article written by the former Deputy Chief magistrate in New South Wales, Mr
Kevin Anderson. It is not noted in the paper but what Mr Anderson did was
to give a group of magistrates collected together at the magistrates’ annual
conference a hypothetical set of facts, a hypothetical set of personal
characteristics relating to an offenderand asked the magistrates present what
sort of penalty they would have imposed. It is interesting that the results go
really quite fully across the spectrum of options available, at least in New South
Wales courts. The hypothetical offender was a young mother who had pleaded
guilty to a shoplifting offence stealing goods to the value of precisely $38.94. In
the hypothetical example she had a prior record of similar offences. Among the
magistrates 25 per cent of them would have imposed a sentence of
imprisonment, 15 per cent of them would have imposed a sentence of
imprisonment, to be served by way of periodic detention, 37 per cent would
have used the option of a community service order and 23 per cent would have
granted a recognizance. So it was fairly evenly divided between the four major
forms of disposition and that experiment the paper cites as a clear example of
the unacceptable level of disparity in the approach which judicial ofﬁcers take
towards the problem of sentencing.
The paper then goes on to examine public perceptions of the sentencing
process. It notes that the Commission heard a wide range of complaints about
sentencing but there were various recurring themes, ﬁve in number. They
included ﬁrstly, that there was confusion and resentment about the purposes of
punishment, secondly there was concern about unjustiﬁable disparity between
penalties imposed in similar cases, thirdly, concern about the problems of
victims and we have already heard the Attorney General say that his
government is of the same view that victims have not been given a fair hearing
to date in the criminal justice system. The fourth matter which the Commission
noted is that there was a concern about penalty levels being either too harsh or
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too lenient. Fifthly, a concern that a sentence does not mean what it says, and
perhaps that goes back to what the Victorian Report identiﬁed as one of its
major objectives—that there should be honesty in the sentencing process. The
Australian Law Reform Commission concluded that the lack of public
conﬁdence in sentencing was, in its opinion, soundly based.
In regard to publc opinion and the media, George Zdenkowski cites from
an article written by his colleague at the University of New South Wales, David
Brown, in which he says something of the experience in Holland. The Dutch
experience is that considerable restraint is exercised by the media, a
comparatively small amount of space is allocated to crime in general and to
individual crimes in particular. The location, the placement and the format of
that coverage is low-key. The treatment is restrained and there is an absence of
rhetorical and emotive language. The author concludes that all these factors
clearly assist in the creation of a mature humane climate of public opinion in
Holland in which low imprisonment rates, short sentences, and relatively liberal
prison regimes by international standards are not just tolerated but understood
and supported. Of course, that climate of public opinion has complex national,
historical and cultural roots and cannot be copied in an entirely different
national context but the point is made that this is not an impossible thing to
achieve.
A further issue dealt with in the paper is the prospect of creating a
Sentencing Commission. I will deal with that a little bit later but, at this stage,
I go to what George Zdenkowski has identiﬁed as really the major issue which
the Australian Law Reform Commission dealt with and that was the question
of discretion.
He notes that some would argue that the existence of a very broad
discretion at various stages in the sentencing process is eminently sensible and
desirable because of the total ﬂexibility it provides to make the appropriate
decisions in each particular case. In essence the defenders of a broad discretion
assert the importance of individualised justice and minimise the significance of '
so-called disparity. On the other hand the existence of such a broad discretion
as exists in the current system has often been the target of criticism on the basis
that it allows and perpetuates the existence of an irrational system of justice
which is unaccountable and which is largely responsible for disparity in
sentencing decisions. The solution offered by those opposed to the existence of
discretion is to eliminate it. The Commission’s approach to that particular
dilemma was to go somewhere down the middle of the road. They concluded
that there was a need for a guided sentencing discretion. In their view the
desirable goal was to eliminate unnecessary discretionary power not to eliminate
discretionary power altogether. The key goals which should be aimed at are
consistency, openness and accountability. To that end in developing a system
where there was guided discretion the Commission concluded that sentencing
discretion should be limited by various principles including five which it
nominated as the most important. Firstly, punishment imposed by the criminal
justice system for offences must be just, i.e., they must be of an appropriate
severity having regard to the circumstances of the offender. This should be the
primary goal. Secondly, consistently with the just punishment, rehabilitative
goals and restitution for victims may also be pursued. Thirdly, inhumane, cruel,
or vengeful punishments such as capital punishment, corporal punishment, and
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torture should in no circumstances be permitted. Fourthly, goals such as the
incapacitation of the offender or general deterrence should not be objectives of
the imposition of punishment, and ﬁfthly punishment must be consistently
applied.
The major themes identiﬁed in George Zdenkowski’s paper on guiding
discretion are these. Firstly, on the use of imprisonment. The view of the
Commission was that severe punishments can be imposed without resorting to
imprisonment as frequently as current law and practice do. The second major
theme was in relation to parole or conditional release. The paper notes that in
its Interim Report published in 1980 which was produced when Duncan
Chappell was the Commissioner in charge of the reference (he is now the
Director of the Australian Institute of Criminology in Canberra). When that
Interim Report was prepared, produced, published in 1980 the Commission
then recommended that parole should be abolished. They have withdrawn from
that position in the Report just recently published and now recommend an
automatic date of release upon parole, speciﬁcally after completion of 70 per
cent of the total length of the sentence imposed, subject to an allowance of
earned remission not automatic remission which should never exceed 20 per
cent of the total length of the sentence, and the paper notes that there was an
express recommendation by the commission that automatic remissions should
be abolished.
Just departing from the paper for a moment it can be seen that that
recommendation of the Australian Law Reform Commission is not signiﬁcantly
different from the approaches in New South Wales, the so—called 75 per cent
rule in relation to parole.
The third major theme concerned with limiting the exercise of discretion
dealt with the sentencing hearing and. there were nine areas examined. Firstly,
the rules of evidence, secondly, standard of proof, thirdly, the quality and
reliability of reports presented to the court for the purpose of making a
determination as to sentence. The fourth was the examination of the role of the
victim, the ﬁfth was a proposal that the prosecution should play a more active
role in ensuring that an appropriate penalty is imposed. Sixthly, there should
be more extensive requirements for the giving of reasons for sentence.
Seventhly, there should be a statutory list of factors regarded as relevant to the
exercise of the court’s discretion and on the other hand there should be a
statutory list of factors to which courts should not be entitled to have regard
for the purpose of sentencing. The last matter referred to under this broad
heading was the so-called ‘discount on the sentence’, of a discount being given
on the sentence where the person to be sentenced has pleaded guilty. The
Commission was fairly evenly divided on that issue but in the ultimate the
majority came down in favour of proposing that there should be a discount for
the plea of guilty.
The paper then goes on to examine the question of a Sentencing
Commission looking at the North American model where there is an
independent expert rule making body vested with the function of proposing
guide-lines for the imposition of criminal sanctions.
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It is noted that there has been a steady resistance in Australia over the
years to the establishment of what are called prescriptive guidelines for
sentencing and that the approach that the Commission recommends is pure
guide-lines which are not binding on the sentencer but merely provide some
assistance in determining the appropriate penalty. It is noted that the
Commission received strong support for an advisory Sentencing Commission
or Council established along those lines and they ultimately made a
recommendation that such a body should be established.
Again departing from the paper I should note, as the Attorney General
has already noted, that the Judicial Commission in New South Wales is in many
senses fulﬁlling the functions that the proposed Sentencing Commission might.
They are very heavily involved in the general areas of judicial training and in
the provision of information particularly, at the stage it has reached at the
moment, for magistrates in the sentencing process.
The paper then examines some alternative structures for assisting in
judicial education. It examines the system that exists in England and notes that
a similar body was proposed by the Sentencing Commission in Victoria.
There are a couple of things that I would like to mention that have been
obliquely referred to through the body of the paper. The ﬁrSt is that there has
been a number of other reports produced in relatively recent times by, mostly
importantly, the Sentencing Commission in Canada and, secondly, the
Sentencing Commission in Victoria. Among the major recommendations of
those reports in Canada, in what is in my opinion a persuasive argument, there
was a recommendation for the abolition of parole. In Victoria, again in my
respectful opinion in a fairly persuasive argument, there was a recommendation
for the abolition of automatic remissions, as indeed the Australian Law Reform
Commission has recommended. Both of those reports note, as does the report
of the Australian Law Reform Commission, that if either of those initiatives
are to be pursued they must come in tandem with a general reduction in the
overall magnitude of sentences that are to be imposed.
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APPELLATE REVIEW AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN
SENTENCING*
Dr Don Weatherburn
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Introduction
The object of this paper is to discuss the conventional role assigned to
the system of appellate review as a means of structuring judicial discretion in
sentencing. The discussion proceeds in ﬁve parts. The ﬁrst part provides some
historical background on the development of a statutory framework of
sentencing in New South Wales. The second part describes the role of appeal
courts in structuring judicial discretion within that statutory framework. The
third part attempts to show that the system of rules enunciated by appeal courts
is intrinsically incapable of ensuring that ‘like cases are treated alike’. The fourth
part discusses some empirical ﬁndings which suggest that the practice of
appellate review, in any event, does not conform to the description of it
commonly encountered in legal discussions on the subject. The ﬁfth and ﬁnal
part sets outlines some implications for reform of the system of appellate review.
Development of a Statutory Framework of Sentencing
At the end of a trial process in which an accused person has been
convicted of one or more indictable offences, the trial judge must decide what
sentence to impose upon the offender. With few exceptions the range of
penalties open to the judge is very wide. In New South Wales it includes various
bonds, ﬁnes, diversion and community service orders, periodic detention and
imprisonment. Within most of these penalty categories there is a broad choice
as to the quantum of penalty which may be imposed. For the most part the
legislature has conﬁned itself to the provision of a range of sentencing
dispositions accompanied by statutory maximum penalties which exert only
very broad constraints on the discretion available to the sentencing judge.
It has not always been so. Up until the mid-nineteenth century in
England, the common law allowed judges no discretion in sentencing other than
in. cases involving the reprieve of a capitally convicted offender.‘ According to
Thomas,2 in England:
It was not until the major reforms enacted between 1827 and 1840 had
substantially diminished the scope of capital punishment, and had
substituted terms of transportation ﬁxed by the sentencing judge in the
exercise of a statutory discretion, that judges began to perform a sentencing
function resembling in any way their modern role in the sentencing process.
‘ The ﬁrst three pans of this paper are adapted from two recent publications: Appeals against
Sentence Severity. N.S.W. Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research 1988.. and my paper.
‘Sentencing Principles and Sentence Choice’. Criminal Law Journal. Vol. 11. No. 4. pp.
213~228.
' D. A. Thomas. Principles ofSentencing. Second Edition. Heinemann. London, 1979, Chapter
1. p.’ 6.
2 (bid.
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Transportation gave way in turn to penal servitude in the 18505, and the
Consolidation Acts of 1861 established a statutory foundation for
sentencing which remained intact . . . until the beginning of the revision
of the substantive criminal law in the late 19603.
Fox and Freiburg, in their comprehensive work on sentencing in
Victoria, point out that imprisonment was available as a sanction in New South
Wales from its inception as a colony. In fact:3
One of the earliest steps taken by the (N.S.W.) Legislative Council, when
it came into existence in 1824 was to deal with the inadequacy of the
public gaol by designating the hulk of the ship Phoenix in Sydney Harbour
as a ﬂoating prision.
By 1870, New South Wales had begun the process of consolidating the
criminal law it had inherited from England along lines similar to those of the
English criminal law consolidation Acts. In that year the N.S.W. Legislative
Council appointed a Royal Commission to:“
. ensure into the state of the Statute Law of (the) Colony, and submit
proposals for its revision, consolidation and amendment; and also to make
a like inquiry into the practice and procedure of the Colonial Courts.
The Commissioners5 considered that the most pressing of these tasks was
the consolidation and amendment of the criminal law, especially that part of it
associated with punishment“. They recommended (with some difﬁdence) a
system of statutory maximum-periods of penal servitude and inprisonment7
based on:8
. . the enormity of the crime in itself or its injurious consequences to
individuals, or to the public.
The periods of penal servitude were to be life, 14 years, 10 years and 5
years. The 7 year multiple owed its origins to periods of transportation which
penal servitude had replaced. The 5 year multiple appears to have been
introduced in the. belief that the maximum penalty in English law for certain
offences was too high9. In devising this scheme of statutory maximum penalities,
though, the Commissioners were not unmindful of the need to provide sufficient
scope for the exercise of judicial discretion:'°
The old and trusted servant, who deliberately avails himself of his position
to steal some article of value, and the girl who, under sudden temptation,
pilfers a ribbon, are necessarily in the same category; but the‘ two offences
differ so widely in every other aspect, as obviously to require the allowance
of extreme latitude to the tribunal which apportions punishment to them.
3 R. Fox and A. Freibcrg, Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria. Melbourne. Oxford
University Press. 1985. Chapter 9, p. 338. ,
‘ New South Wales Legislative Council. Consolidation of the Criminal Law. First Report from
the Commissioners appointed to Enquire into Law Report: together with a Draft Bill. 1871.
p. 3.
5 C. J. Stephen, W. C. Windeyer. S. (3.. W. M. Manning. Q.C.. E. Butler, Thos. Iceton, and
W. M. Barker.
6 op. cit.. ref. 4., p. 6.
7 Penal Servitude at this time generally meant hard labour on the roads or other public works
of the Colony. See 5. 399. Criminal Law Amendment Act (1883).
“ op. cit. ref. 4., p. 6.
" ibid.
'0 ibia’. p. 7.
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Nevertheless the Report of the Commission did not recommend the
breadth of judicial discretion afforded judges in England. Considering that
discretion “perhaps too unfettered’, they recommended supplementing the
system of statutory maximum penalities with a complementary system of
statutory minimum penalities. The argument put forward for the latter system
was that”
When legislative authority has thus set its mark on an offence, by assigning
to the offender (in respect at least of the worst examples) his due place in
the scale of crime, the Court can have no right to reduce that offence
practically to a lower one, by awarding him a punishment prescribed for
offenders of a stated less degree. We propose therefore to establish uniform
rules for the guidance of Judges in this respect, limiting their discretion
considerably. . . Thus where the ﬁxed period is Penal Servitude for life,
the minimum proposed is 7 years; and, where servitude for 14 years to 10
years is prescribed, the minimum periods are 5 years and 4 years
respectively.'2
The argument of the Commissioners must have seemed convincing to
the N.S.W. Legislative Council. Section 8 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act
of 1883 carried into effect the recommendations of the Royal Commission
Report on minimum and maximum penalities. The Act itself consolidated the
criminal law in similiar terms to the English criminal law consolidation Acts,
though with a number of new offences and a generally reduced scale of
maximum penalities for offences drawn from Imperial and local Statutes.”
There were no major changes to this system of minimum and maximum
penalties in New South Wales until 1924. The Crimes Act (1900) carried over
into 5. 442 (l) the basic terms of s. 8 of the earlier Criminal Law Amendment
Act. It did, however, extend the alternative of imprisonment to offences
attracting a maximum penalty of penal servitude for life and it created new
sections (c.f. ss. 443 and 447) empowering courts to impose additional or
cumulative sentences on repeat offenders. Apart from the periodic creation of
new or redeﬁnition of old offences the next major development in the area of
sentencing came with the passing of the Criminal Appeal Act in 1912.
That Act, modelled substantially on its English counterpart passed some
three years earlier, established a right of appeal against conviction on any
ground involving law alone. It also established a right of appeal, conditional
upon leave being granted by the new Court of Criminal Appeal, against
conviction or sentence on any grounds involving mixed questions of law and
fact. The Act attracted considerable parliamentary debate but very little of it
centred upon the creation of a system of appellate review of sentences, as such.
Instead, most of the debate concerned the composition of the Court of Criminal
Appeal and the desirability or otherwise of including members of the District
court bench within that appellate tribunal". The argument in favour of their
inclusion was eventually lost and the Court of Criminal Appeal was established
as a division of the N.S.W. Supreme Court.
" ibid. p. 6.
'2 Corresponding minima were assigned for sentences of imprisonment.
'3 op. cit. ref'. 4.. p. 7.
" See. for example, the N.S.W. Parliament Hansard. 5/l2/l9l l, P. 2.304.
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In 1924 the minimum penalty provisions of the N.S.W. Crimes Act were
dropped, signiﬁcantly widening the scope ofjudicial sentencing discretion. The
Crown was also given a right of appeal against sentence”. The reforms attracted
no parliamentary debate, perhaps because of Parliament’s preoccupation with
other aspects of the amending legislation, most notably the extension of the role
and powers of magistrates‘ courts."
These changes were to be the last signiﬁcant alterations to the structure
of sentencing discretion until the passage of the Parole of Prisoners Act 1966.
That Act gave somewhat belated recognition to the zeitgeist of rehabilitation
which had earlier come to dominate American penal philosophy. The notions
of parole it advanced are now too well known to deserve rehearsal here, though
it is worth observing that the introduction of parole in New South Wales came
at the time of its decline in those countries which had ﬁrst introduced it.'7 The
importance of the N.S.W. Parole ofPrisoners Act derived from the fact that it
markedly increased the complexity of the sentencing decision process but failed
to deliver any statutory guidance either on the objects the Act sought to achieve
or the way in which the new discretion in sentencing was to be exercised. In
this respect the Act reﬂected the sort of legislative deference to judicial
sentencing discretion which had coloured the creation of statutory maxima in
the Crimes Act.
The legislative mood of interest in rehabilitation which had led to the
introduction of parole in New South Wales gave way in the 19705 to a quest
for alternatives to imprisonment (other than ﬁnes and bonds for various
descriptions). The Periodic Detention ofPrisoner Act, passed by State Parliament
in 1971, introduced the possibility of weekend detention on the argument that
there was a clear need for a greater array of sentencing options.” This Act was
followed in 1979 by the Community Service Orders Act and, in 1981, the scope
of the Periodic Detention ofPrisoners Act was widened.l9
All of these changes naturally enhanced the scope of judicial discretion
in sentencing. As Freiberg and Fox have argued20 they also complicated the
process ofjudging which penalty was appropriate to what offence. None of the
acts embodying the changes provided anything but implicit guidance on the
objects meant to be served by the new penalties or upon which offenders and
in what circumstances they were to be used. As with the choice of non-parole
period and sentence, these were matters left to the exercise ofjudicial discretion.
That discretion as bounded only by the maximum periods of periodic detention
or community service orders prescribed generally by the Acts in question.
These were not the only legislative changes to alter judicial discretion
or perhaps more importantly, its effects. The enhancements to that discretion
'5 Both changes were introduced under the Crimes (Amendment) Act (1924) No. 10.
'6 op. cit. ref. 14, p. 7.
'7 see F. Rinaldi. Parole in Australia. Penology Monograph. No. 5, Australian National University,
I975, Chapter 2, p. ll.
“‘ see N.S.W. Parliament Hansard. Vol. 90, 24th November, 1970. p.8. I46.
‘9 The scope was widened by extending the power to grant Periodic Detention to all courts, by
increasing the statutory maximum length of a periodic detention sentence and by libemlising
the legal threshold for use of the disposition.
1" see A. Freiberg and R. Fox, ‘Sentencing structures and sanction hierarchies‘, Criminal Law
Journal, 1987 10/42216-235.
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just described were taking place against a backdrop of ever more determined
efforts to control prison costs and prison overcrowding.“ The most notable of
these efforts was the development of a system of remissions and the connection
of that system to the parole process with the passage of the Probation and Parole
Act in 1984. These changes, though, were less concerned with altering the
substance of discretion in sentencing than they were with undoing some of the
consequences of its exercise.22 Indeed, the application of remissions to non-
parole (and non-probation) periods, though it represented the most substantial
alteration to the eﬂect of judicial discretion since the advent of parole, took
place on the assumption that:23
The courts must retain their ﬂexibility and discretion.
Thus in over 100 years the statutory framework of sentencing discretion
in New South Wales (and Australia) had not moved greatly from its origins.
The primary approach of the legislature remained (and remains) the
speciﬁcation of the maximum penalty associated with each new offence. In
company with the discretion thus afforded them, sentencers may choose to
specify a mimimum period in custody. Beyond this, the major legislative
initiatives affecting sentencing have been the creation of the Court of Criminal
Appeal and the development of new kinds of penalties. The problem of how to
approach the task of sentencing has been left entirely to the courts.
Development of Sentencing Principles
The evident reluctance on the part of legislatures in England and
Australia to propound principles of sentencing to guide the exercise of judicial
discretion has not been matched by any corresponding reticence on the part of
the courts. The establishment of appellate courts in both countries accelerated
the development of case law surrounding sentencing. In England, according to
Thomas:24
From its earliest days, the predecessors of the Court of Appeal (Criminal
Division) recognised that ‘while no invariable tariff can ever be ﬁxed, the
task of the court was by the revision of sentences . . . to harmonise the
views of those who pass them, and so ensure that varying punishments are
not awarded for the same amount of guiltiness’.
This recognition of the need to revise sentences in the interests of
uniformity was later accompanied by a declared duty on the part of the Court
of Appeal (Criminal Division) to lay down principles and guidelines to assist
sentencers in the exercise of their discretion.25 These principles and guidelines,
though lacking the force of law, where nonetheless intended to be binding on
judges of the Crown Court and, where applicable, magistrates exercising
summary jurisdiction.26
1' see D. Weatherbum, ‘Reducing the N.S.W.’ prison population, sentencing reform and early
release‘, Criminal Law Journal. 1986, lO/3:l 19—138.
22 ibid.
’3 See N.S.W. Parliament Hansard. 24th November l983, p. 3,461.
1‘ op. cit. ref. 1., pp. 3-4.
1’ op. cit. ref. 1, p. 4.
' 1" op. cit. ref. 1, p. 4.
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The cumulative effect of this appellate involvement in the regulation of
judicial sentencing discretion is claimed by Thomas to have been the creation
of two systems of sentencing reﬂecting different penal objectives and governed
by different principles. As he puts it"
The sentencer is presented with a choice: he may impose, usually in the
name of general deterrence, a sentence intended to reﬂect the offender’s
culpability, or he may seek to inﬂuence his future behaviour by subjecting
him to an appropriate measure of supervision, treatment or preventative
conﬁnement. In some instances both objects may be pursued
simultaneously and find expression in the same sentence, but more
frequently this is not possible.
Of the two systems, the most developed is undoubtedly that associated
with deterrence. The tariff system of sentencing, as it is often called, is based
on the assumption that:28
The overwhelming majority of offences which come before the criminal
courts arise from factual situations which conform to a recurring pattern
and which can be categorised by reference to particular elements. This
recurring pattern of factual situations provides a basis for a corresponding
pattern of sentences, which can be adjusted to accord with detailed
variations of particular cases. The conventional relationships between
frequently encountered factual situations and corresponding levels of
sentence constitute the foundations of the tariff.
The task of the sentencer, in the majority of cases, according to
Thomas29 is:
. . to relate the facts of the incident with which he is dealing to the
established pattern, determine what sentence would be apprOpriate for that
particular set of facts considered in the abstract andthen turn his attention
to the question of mitigating circumstances peculiar to the offender. The
governing principle is that the gravity of the particular incident in the
abstract. . . determines the upper limit of permissible sentenCes in that
case.
The task of appellate courts is to adjudicate upon which facts may be
considered relevant to sentencing, what the objects of sentencing in particular
classes of case are meant to be and how the relevant facts of an offence are to
beiinterpreted in relation to those objects. The large body of decisions which
results from the adjudications constitutes the principles of Sentencing and their
violation provides the main basis of appellate intervention. Compliance with
the principles is claimed to provide:30
u 7
u U
20
)0
. a framework by reference to which the sentencer can determine what
factors in a particular case are relevant to his decision and what weight
should be attached to them. Properly used, they offer a basis for
maintaining consistency of sentencing different offenders, while observing
relevant distinctions, making appropriate allowances for individual factors
and preserving adequate scope for the exercise of judicial discretion.
op. cit. ref. 1. p. 8.
op. cit. ref. 1. p. 30.
op. cit. ref. 1, p. 35.
op. cit. ref. l, p. 92.
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Australian appellate courts, while clearly stopping short of
acknowledging two systems of sentencing ‘each with its own penal objectives
and governed by different principles’, have fully embraced the common law
approach to the regulation of sentencing discretion.
Street C. J. has spoken of the ‘cool reason’ which should characterize
sentencing and, in R. v. Rushby, acknowledged that:3|
The doctrines and principles established by the Common Law in regard
to sentencing provide the chart that both relieves the judge from too close
a personal involvement with the case at hand, and promotes consistency
of approach on the part of individual judges.
It is doubtful, nonetheless, whether the N.S.W. Court of Criminal Appeal
(or other comparable courts in Australia) ever accepted quite the supervisory
role in sentencing described by Thomas as true of courts in England. The
general approach of the N.S.W. Court of Criminal Appeal has been to intervene
only where ‘it is shown that there is some error in the approach of the Court
below.’32 In R. v. Nicholls and Anon, the N.S.W. Court of Criminal Appeal
quoted with approval the observations of Halse J. in R. v. Jenkins ((1938) 38.
S. R. 298 at 301):33
. in my opinion, it is a sound general rule that this Court should not
interfere with a sentence unless, in its view, it is quite disproportionate to
the offence, or unless the presiding judge has fallen into some error of
principle. This rule is not of universal application. But, generally speaking,
the Court does not alter sentences on other grounds than those mentioned,
and certainly not on the ground that the members of the Court would have
passed a different sentence if they had presided at the trial . . .
Where a sentence appears unduly excessive or lenient but no manifest
error of sentencing principle presents itself, the tendency is to argue that the
sentence ‘discloses’ an error of principle.“ This line of argument, though
patently circular, shows the extent to which the justiﬁcation for appellate
intervention is based on the assumption of correction violations of sentencing
principles. In contrast the Engish Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) has
shown itself rather more willing to intervene to give effect to sentencing policies
in relation to specific offences of one kind or another.35
The commitment in Australia to altering a sentence only on the basis
of a violation of sentencing principles extends to Crown appeals, though (as
earlier noted) these do not exist in England. Generally, however, Courts of
Criminal Appeal in Australia have been reluctant to treat such appeals on the
same footing as defence appeals. The decision of the N.S.W. Court of Criminal
Appeal in R. v. Didham and Dennison36 is instructive in this regard. After
3' R. v. Rushby(l977), l N.S.W.L.R. 594 at 597.
’2 R. v. Lanfranchi. Unreported N.S.W. Court of Criminal Appeal, l8/2/77.
’3 R. v. Nichol/s and Anor. Unreported. N.S.W. Court ofCriminal Appeal. 2l/9/78.
3‘ See. for example, ref. 3, p. 98
’5 R. v. Aramah (I983). 4 Criminal Appeal R. (8) 407; [I983] Criminal Law Review 27l. R. v.
Bibi (1980) 2 Criminal Appeal Report. (5) I77; 7l Criminal Appeal Report, 380.
3" R. v. Didham and Dennison. Unreported N.S.W. Courts of Criminal Appeal 3/3/78.
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acknowledging that the detection of error was ‘fundamental‘ to appellate
intervention in both Crown (i.e., 5. 5D) and Defence (i.e., 5. 6(3)) appeals the
Court quoted, with approval, the judgment of Jacobs J. in R. v.Gr1jfﬁ1hs:-‘7
Under 5. 5D the court has a wide discretion whether or not to interfere.
even though it may reach the conclusion that another sentence should have
been passed. in this respect 5. 5D gives a wider discretion than 5. 6 (3)
where the court is bound to interfere once it reaches the conclusion that
the sentence was not both warranted in law and one that should have been
passed. The trial judge is given a wide discretion from the circumstance
that a court on appeal will not lightly conclude that another sentence
should have been passed. The incorrectness of the sentence must be
manifest: see House v. R. (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505. But if it does so
conclude it must interfere in the case of a defendant’s appeal; it may in
its discretion interfere in the case of an appeal under a 5D.
These differences aside, the basis on which appellate intervention in
sentencing is meant to proceed does not differ markedly between England and
Australia. The routine work of the Court of Criminal Appeal in sentence
matters, if its own account of its activity is accepted, basically involves a search
for errors of judgment on the pan of the sentencer.
Though these errors are occasionally manifest only in the sentence under
review, ordinarily they should appear as violations of sentencing principles. The
judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in a successful appeal, then, will
identify the error of principle involved and record a new sentence which lies
within the range for the offence in question. Thus it is clear that the Court of
Criminal Appeal has a crucial role to play in ensuring uniformity, not only in
the alternate sentences which are imposed upon offenders, but in the general
approach of the courts to factors potentially relevant to sentence. The Court of
Criminal Appeal may not deal with the bulk of appeals against sentence (appeals
against Local Court penalties being far more frequent) but the cases with which
it does deal are just those where the discretion of the sentencing court is at its
widest and the concomitant risk of sentencing disuniformity at its greatest.
Appellate Review in Theory
The notion that the discretion of sentencing and appeal courts is
exercised according to a complex system of legal principles is beguiling, to say
the least. What at first glance appears to be a domain of judicial authority
fraught with the risk of capricious and emotional judgment, emerges against the
backdrop of sentencing jurisprudence as a process which is no less rational or
orderly than any earlier part of the trial process. This is both reassuring and
instructive. Reassun‘ng because the common law system of rules and
conventions governing the trial process is justiﬁably the object of general
admiration as an instrument of principled decision making. Instructive because
the perennial cry for greater regulation of the exercise of judicial discretion
would seem to be prompted by an incorrect grasp of the facts pertaining to the
exercise of that discretion.
A close scrutiny of sentencing law and practice reveals that this
comforting picture (in which the exercise of sentencing discretion is seen to be
on a par, jurisprudentially, with the exercise of judicial discretion during the
37 R. v. Grifﬁths l5 A.L.R. l at p. 30.
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trial process) may be less than veridical. Some indication of this may be gleaned
from the simple fact that, unlike the principles of evidence, for example, which
constrain the courts in the admission of evidence, the application of sentencing
principles to the facts of any case carries no implications regarding the choice
of sentence. Consider, for example, the class of sentencing principles concerned
with the general function of the sentence or the coordination of its diverse aims.
The leading case on this question, so far as Australian law is concerned,
issues from New Zealand. In R. v. Radich the court stated that:
. one of the main purposes of punishment, . . . is to protect the
public from the commission of such crimes by making it clear to the
offender and to other persons with similar impulses that, if they yield to
them, they will meet with severe punishment. In all civilised countries, in
all ages, that has been the main purpose of punishment, and it still
continues so. The fact that punishment does not entirely prevent all similar
crimes should not obscure the cogent fact that the fear of severe
punishment does, and will, prevent the commission of many that would
have been committed if it was thought that the offender could escape
without punishment, or with only a light punishment. If a court is weakly
merciful, and does not impose a sentence commensurate with the
seriousness of the crime, it fails in its duty to see that the sentences are
such as to operate as a powerful factor to prevent the commission of such
offences. On the other hand, justice and humanity both require that the
previous character and conduct, and probable future life and conduct of
the individual offender, and the effect of the sentence on these, should also
be given the most careful consideration, although this fact is necessarily
subsidiary to the main consideration that determines the appropriate
amount of punishment.
The argument of the court in this case seems to be that the sentence
must always be proportional to the gravity of the offence; all other aims are
subsidiary to this one. The appearance of constraint suggested by Radich,
however, carries with it an obvious problem. If the sentence must always be
proportional to the gravity of the offence, in what meaningful sense can any
other aim of the sentence find expression? The problem was identiﬁed in
R. v. Willscroft and 0rs33 where Adam and Crockett JJ. observed that:
For our part, we are bound to say that we gain only limited assistance from
this passage. To say that a sentence imposed must be commensurate with
the seriousness of the crime leaves it unclear whether what is meant is a
reference to the category of crime of which the offender has been convicted
or the particular act of wrongdoing committed by the offender. If the
former, then the statement simply cannot, at least as a generalisation, be
correct. For instance, manslaughter per se is a serious crime but it is
notorious that the circumstances of its commission can attract sentences
so widely disparate as 12 years’ imprisonment to release upon a good
behaviour bond. If the latter, then, with all respect, the proposition is only
stating the obvious. Moreover, if the effect of the sentence on the probable
future life of the offender is, as we apprehend it is, a reference to the
prospect of reformation, then we ﬁnd it difficult to accept that such a
consideration must necessarily be subsidiary ‘to the main considerations’;
a difficulty rendered no less since the judgment, with the exception of
3" R. v. Mr’il/scrqf! and Ors [1975] V.R. 292 at 299.
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deterrence both general and particular and, possible, retributive
punishment, does not reveal what are considered to be ‘the main
considerations'. We should have thought that in any case where an offender
is released upon probation or granted a good behaviour bond for an
indictable offence, ex hypothesis, it is implicit that in the circumstances
the offence is sufﬁciently lacking in heinousness as to permit all other
considerations to be rated as subsidiary to the prospect of the offender’s
rehabilitation.” '
A solution to this problem might seem to lie in R. v. Dixon,“0 in which
Fox J. in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory held that the
primary sentencing aim of protecting society embraced ﬁve subsidiary aims:
These are (a) the deterrence of the particular offender; (b) the deterrence
of others who might be inclined to commit similar offences; (c) the
reformation of the particular offender; (d) the exaction of retribution, or
the manifesting of denunciation, on behalf of society; and (e) the securing
of society from further harm by the detention of the offender. In
considering what punishment‘to impose courts give their main attention
to these factors, but sometimes others intrude, which do not readily ﬁt
under any of the ﬁve heads. In their application some of the objects stated
will be in a greater or less degree of conﬂict with others. In any event they
are not mutually exclusive. A function of the judge is to decide which of
them should predominate in the particular case. The particular case takes
account of the circumstances and personality of the particular offender.
The approach taken by the Court in Dixon certainly constitutes a step
away from the unduly restrictive formulation in Radich. However we are back
with the problem of determining how, on any principled basis, the aims of the
sentence are to be balanced in the treatment of any individual case. The
suggestion of Dixon would appear to be that this is purely a matter of discretion
best left to the individual judge, an impression conﬁrmed further on in this case
where Adam and Crockett JJ. remark:
. it is proﬁtless (as it was thought to be in Kane’s case) to attempt to
allot to the various considerations their proper part in the assessment of
the particular punishments presently under examination. It is sufﬁcient to
say that the learned judge did not in the cases before him give to the
aspects other than reformation the weight that ought to have been allotted
to them.“1
Yet if the choice of punishment aims or the determination of their
absolute or relative importance is purely a matter of discretion for the sentencer
in each case, what sorts of material constraints do general sentencing principles
impose on the exercise of sentencing discretion? However closely tied an
individual aim might be to some sentence range for a particular sub-class of
offence the arbitrariness in the weight assigned to sentence aims implies an
arbitrariness in the choice of sentence ranges for that class of offence.
No help in this matter is to be found in the much-cited judgment of
R. v. Rushby according to which
3" ibid. at 299.
‘0 R. v. Dixon (I975) 22 A.C.T.R. 13.
" supra. n. 14 at 300.
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The determination in any given case of the appropriate sentence involves
an adjudicative balancing of a number of different and not entirely
consistent elements,“2
because no useful rules are laid down to guide the ‘adjudicative’ process. Rushby
does acknowledge, via its citation of Radich, that punishment is paramount
among the aims of the sentence, but this generalisation takes us no further than
the observations of Adam and Crockett JJ. in R. v. Dixon. Construed narrowly
the generalisation is almost certainly false; construed broadly it leaves the
problem of adjudication among conflicting aims unresolved.
It might be thought that some passage out of this dilemma might be
found in the distinction between the ‘head’ sentence and the non-parole period.
Perhaps support can be found for the view that the role of the sentence is simply
that of punishment (construed narrole) whereas that of the non-parole period
is to carry the weight of sentence aims such as rehabilitation. Thus the
co-ordination of divergent sentencing aims is, on this argument, to be regulated
through differing rules for determining the lengths of these two periods.
Something like this notion appeared with the decision of the N.S.W.
Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. Portolesi.“3 Jacobs J. in that case advanced
the view that:
The ﬁxing of the non-parole period is an additional duty imposed upon
the trial Judge. It represents mtich more than any kind of tariff, as writers
on the principles of sentencing have described the scale which invariable
must be adopted in weighing up the gravity of the offences committed. The
tariff or scale is established by the sentence; the fixing of the non-parole
period is the ﬁxing of the time which not only reﬂects the community
attitudes on the minimum retribution called for but represents also the best
assessment of the earliest time that can be made by an experienced person,
namely a Judge, of how the particular individual may\ be likely to react to
parole . . .44
This point of view was later extended in R. v. Sloane."5 It came to a full
stop, however, with the judgment of the High Court in Power v. The Queen.“6
The Court in that case ruled that:
Conﬁnement in a prison serves the same purpose whether before or after
the expiration of a non-parole period and throughout, it is punishment,
but punishment directed toward reformation. The only difference between
the two periods is that during the former the prisoner cannot be released
on the ground that the punishment has served its purpose sufficiently to
warrant release from conﬁnement, whereas in the latter he can. In a true
sense the non-parole period is a minimum period of imprisonment to be
served because the sentencing judge considers that the crime committed
calls for such detention.“7
‘1 supra. n. 8, at 597.
‘3 R. v. Porto/esi [1973] l N.S.W.L.R. 105.
“ Ibid. at 110.
‘5 R. v. Sloane (1973) l N.S.W.L.R. 202 at 209.
‘6 Power v. the Queen (I974) l3l C.L.R. 623.
‘7 Ibid. at 627.
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Power's decision effectively means that all those considerations of aim
which go to create indeterminacy in the choice of head sentence, go to create
the same indeterminacy in the choice of non-parole period. The two, in short,
are subject to the same principles of general policy. Vagueness in the application
of one applies, ipso facto. to the other.
These considerations suggest that general sentencing principles provide
little or nothing in the way of materialconstraint on the exercise of judicial
discretion. There are, of course, a secondary class of principles which prescribe
which' case facts may used as a justification for greater leniency or severity of
sentence. By themselves these principles do not assist a court in determining
what sentence may be appropriate to any given combination of case facts. But
it might be argued that the real locus of constraint is to be found when general
principles of sentencing are applied to the facts of a case in company with these
interpretative principles.
There is some merit to this argument. The N.S.W. Court of Criminal
Appeal, for example, has dismissed the relevance of mitigating circumstances
when dealing with offences which are committed on bail or offences which are
organised, costly or complex. It has downplayed the signiﬁcance of personal
factors and the absence of a prior criminal record in cases of drug-trafﬁcking.
It has also called for strong deterrent sentences in cases involving attacks upon
taxi-drivers or persons affected by alcohol, robberies involving chemists or motel
proprietors, escapes, crimes of frequency, and cases of culpable driving to name
a few.
Each of these judgments might be said to impose constraints on the
sentencing discretion of courts, at least for the kinds of case which are the
subjects of those judgments. Whether they constitute examples where sentencing
principles constrain judicial discretion is another matter. The guiding force of
these judgments depends more on the sentence which is upheld or substituted
by the appeal court than it does on any speciﬁc statement concerning the
irrelevance of mitigating factors or the need for deterrent sentences and so on.
Indeed it might fairly be said that such statements borrow their practical
meaning from the statement of sentence they are appended to. Supposing for
the moment, however, that such statements, whatever their status, provide the
backbone of constraints upon the exercise of judicial discretion one might
inquire how frequently they are relied upon in the routine processes of appellate
rev1ew.
This is an empirical question and one which must be answered through
a scrutiny, not of ‘leading’ decisions, but of appeal judgements in the ordinary
course of the Court of Criminal Appeal’s work. If the process of appellate review
involves an application of such principles to the facts of each case, then one
would expect to see frequent reference to them and to the case law which
establishes them. Moreover, if sentencing principles provide the modus operandi
of appellate intervention (and not the appeal court’s own predilections as
regards sentencing practice), then one would not expect to see appeal decisions
favour any one kind of case over any other.
Appellate Review in Practice
It was this task, in the main, which I sought to address in the study of
appeals against sentence severity recently published by the Bureau of Crime
Statistics and Research.
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There is no need here to review all of the details af that study. In essence
it involved a content analysis of some 500 judgements dealing with appeals
lodged against sentence severity. The contents examined included details of the
offence, offender and sentence, the appeal court’s decision, the number of prior
cases referred to and the principles which features in the court’s judgement. The
object of the study was to determine, if possible:
(a) what role sentencing principles play in determining the outcome of
an appeal;
(b) with what frequency different sentencing principles (and the cases
establishing them) feature in the routine work of the court of
Criminal appeal;
(0) to what extent, if any, the Court of Criminal appeal might be said
to be substituting its own descretion for that of the original
sentencing court.
Before turning to a consideration of evidence directly relevant to these
issues it is worth pausing to examine some general features of the cases coming
forward on appeal. These cases, it must be remembered, provide the Court of
Criminal Appeal with its only direct cource of information about the pattern
of cases ordinarily encountered by the sentencing courts.
Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of different offences among
the appeal sample (dotted bars) and among cases generally dealt with by the
higher Criminal Courts (black bars). It would appear that theft-related offences
are far less common and robbery, drug supply and drug importation cases far
more common in the appeal sample than in the general population of cases
concluded in the Higher Criminal Courts. Tables 1 and 2, respectively, show
the average lengths (in months) of sentences and non-parole periods for each
of these categories of offence. They are generally much longer for the appeal
sample than for cases dealt with at ﬁrst instance. In fact, non-parole periods,
within a given category of offence, are usually twice as long in the appeal sample
than they are in the population of cases dealt with at first instance.
There is nothing odd in this. It would be surprising, indeed, if cases dealt
with by the Court of Criminal Appeal were a representative sample of cases
coming before the Higher Criminal Courts. The unrepresentativeness of the
appeal sample, however, provides an indication of the degree to which
information currently available to the Court of Criminal Appeal provides a
distorted picture of the proﬁle of cases dealt with by the Higher Criminal
Courts. An accurate understanding of this proﬁle is important because the Court
of Criminal Appeal rejects approximately 70 percent of the defence appeals
which it hears, presumably on the grounds that the sentences concerned are not
outside the normal pattern of sentencing for that offence. Since one leg of the
justification for appellate intervention is the observation that a sentence is
outside the ‘appropriate range’ there is reasonable cause for concern that an
appellate court’s decision making is biased by the pattern of cases coming before
11.
This point assumes greater importance when regard is had to the basis
on which appeals against sentence severity are usually mounted. Figure 5 shows
the frequency with which different kinds of justiﬁcation were advanced as the
basis for the appeal. Even on the very broad deﬁnition of the notion of a
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Distribution of Offence Type in Higher Criminal Courts and Court of Criminal Appeal Sample
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Table 1*
Median sentences for selected offences (in months)
Appeal sample and general population compared
- Median sentence
Median sentence ~
Oﬂence category range
(appeal) (higher courts)
Assault (general) .................... 106.7 84-96
Sexual assault ...................... 84.0 48-60
Robbery .......................... 95.7 36-48
Theft ............................. 36.9 24-36
Fraud ......................... . 36.3 24—36
Drug supply ....................... 60.2 36-48
Drug importation ................... 107.8 48—60
Table 2* .
Median non-parole period (NPP) for selected offences (in months)
Appeal sample and general population compared
Median NPP Median NPP
Oﬂence category (appeal) (higher courts)
Assault (general) .................... 47.6 20.7
Sexual assault ...................... 48.0 21.3
Robbery .......................... 47.9 21.4
Theft ............................. 23.8 10.2
Fraud ............................ 24.0 1 1.1
Drug supply ....................... 27.0 20.7
Drug importation ................... 48.0 21.6
‘ibid. .p. 18.
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sentencing principle employed in this study, over 50 percent of cases involve
no issue of principle but rely instead on the claim that a sentence imposed was
outside the ‘appropriate range’ for, the offence in question. It is hard to see on
what evidentiary basis such claims could rationally proceed. Even if defence
counsel tendered examples of cases to guide the court they would of necessity
present a selective picture. Moreover it must be doubted whether any evidence
of sentencing practice played a role in the Court of Criminal Appeal’s judgments
since, as indicated in Figure 6, in over 85 percent of appeal judgments there is
no reference to any other case at all.
Figure 5 also shows that, where the appeal judgment nominally involves
a reference to sentencing principle, the references commonly involve just four
different types of argument, three of which are better understood as range
arguments than as strict applications of sentencing principle. Just under 20 per
cent of the cases involved arguments about sentence disparity between co-
offenders, approximately 5 per cent of cases involved arguments about the
proximity of the non-parole period expiry date to that of the head sentence and
approximately 4 per cent of cases involved arguments about the proximity of
the sentence imposed to the statutory maximum for the offence in question.
Arguments over facts which should or should not have been considered in the
original sentencing decision (and which manifestly involve issues of sentencing
principle) apeared in only 3 per cent of cases whereas ‘Other’ (i.e.’, not coded)
principles were referred to in just 10 per cent of the cases in the sample. On
this data the notion that appellate courts sift sentencing appeals through an
elaborate network of sentencing principles in search of ‘errors’ would seem, at
best, misleading and, at worst, simply false.
What factors determine the outcome of an appeal? This is a difﬁcult
issue to assess since the only source of evidence readily available to address the
issue is the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal itself. Given that the
court’s judgment is supposed to provide the reasons for its decision one might
reasonably expect it to contain all the information necessary to resolve the issue.
On the other hand the court’s stated reasons might not provide a complete
account of the factors affecting its decision making if only because it may be
unaware of all of them. Perhaps the only methodologically satisfactory approach
to the problem is to try to determine which factors mentioned in appeal
judgments can be shown to be independently related to the appeal outcome.
Given the categorical nature of the variables involved the most appropriate
choice of statistical tool for this purpose is logistic regression.
The use of the technique in the Bureau study produced findings which
confirm the legal account of the appeal process at one point and run against it
at two others. The confirmatory ﬁnding was that, regardless of the nature of the
argument involved, if an issue of principle was mentioned in the judgment, the
appeal was approximately two to two and a half times more likely to succeed
than if the case only involved references to a sentence range. Against this there
is the fact that when the judgment contained references to the prior criminal
record of the defendant the appeal was between two and two and half times
less likely to succeed. Also damaging to legal doctrine surrounding the appeal
process was the finding that cases in which the appeal was successful were not
marked by sentences systematically longer (within a given category of offence)
than those in respect of which the appeal was unsuccessful.
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Of the two negative ﬁndings the more serious is that concerning the
apparent bias of the Court of Criminal Appeal decisions against cases in which
the appellant possessed a prior criminal record. The reason for this is that
sentences within a given category of offence might be shorter in the case of
successful appeals but still arguably too long in relation to the facts presented
by those cases. The argument has the ﬂavour of an ad hoc hypothesis designed
to save theoretical face but it must nevertheless be admitted as a possibility. In
contrast there is no obvious explanation of the ﬁnding in relation to criminal
record which would render it consistent with the legal doctrine of appellate
review. On the contrary, it suggests that the Court of Criminal Appeal may
wittingly or unwittingly be ‘resentencing’ on the facts of the cases with which
it deals.
If this is true at the stage of appeal outcome there is no doubt that the
reverse is occurring at the point when the court imposes a new sentence, as the
next two ﬁgures show.
Figure 7 shows the size of the adjusted sentence (vertical axis) as a
function of the size of the original sentence (horizontal axis). Figure 8 shows
the corresponding relationship for the non-parole period. The correlation
between the two sets of variables is + .96, indicating that the size of the
adjusted sentence or non-parole period in a successful appeal is very closely
related to size of the old sentence or non-parole period, regardless of the offence
or the offender involved. In fact it would appear from the two ﬁgures that the
Court of Criminal Appeal, in a successful appeal, takes a standard 25 per cent
off the length of the old sentence and non-parole period regardless of the details
of the case involved. ’
However much this result suggests a determination on the pan of the
court to avoid substituting its own discretion for that of the original sentencing
court, it also runs counter to conventional wisdom regarding the basis of
appellate intervention. According to legal writers, such as D. A. Thomas,
appellate courts operate with deﬁned sentence ranges which they use to assess
the merits of appeals against sentence severity. If this were true one would
expect to see a variable adjustment to sentence in the case of successful appeals
depending on the extent to which the original sentence exceeded the appropriate
range. The evidence of Figures 7 and 8 shows extraordinary lack of variability
in the proportional adjustments made. Either the legal theory regarding
appellate intervention is wrong in at least one of its essential assumptions or
sentences which exceed the deﬁned sentence ranges reliably do so by 20 per
cent of their length.
Implications for Reform of Sentencing
What explanation may be given of these results? The ﬁrst thing to note
is that, while of necessity they derive from the study of a single court, it is highly
unlikely that they are unique to that court. To suppose otherwise is to fail to
appreciate the circumstances which give rise to them.
Sentencing‘principles do not ﬁgure prominently in Court of Criminal
Appeal judgments because, for the most part, they are not helpful to the practice
of appellate review. Considerations of general principle, as we saw in the section
Development of Sentencing Principles (pages 36-39) provide no speciﬁc guidance
on the choice of penalty. Thus appeal courts, reviewing the sentencing appeals,
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are unlikely to ﬁnd a consideration of general principles useful in determining
whether or not a particular sentence is too severe or too lenient. This is not to
deny either that appeal courts enunciates sentencing principles or that they seek
violations of them when endeavouring to justify their intervention. That, after
all, is‘the name of the game. The point is rather that sentencing principles,
where they play any substantial role in the process of appellate review, for the
most part simply provide a vehicle for justifying decisions implicitly made on
other grounds.
Those ‘other grounds’ are probably an appeal court’s understanding of
sentencing practice in respect of the patterns of offending with which it deals,
supplemented by whatever tendencies it has to substitute an exercise of its own
discretion for that of the original sentencing court. An appeal court’s
understanding of sentencing practice, however, is necessarily impoverished. The
sentencing patterns it encounters almost certainly present a distorted picture of
the sentencing patterns normally found in the higher criminal courts. Yet it lacks
access to information which would remedy this deﬁciency.
The discovery of evidence that the N.S.W. Court of Criminal Appeal is
inclined to some degree to substitute an exercise of its own discretion for that
of the original sentencing court, therefore, is hardly surprising. It has little
reliable material to go on other than its own instincts in determining the merits
of most appeals against severity. The same lack of information colours its
response when the question of an adjustment arises. Lacking any objective
standard by which to assess the extent to which a sentence departs from that
imposed in other similar cases, the Court of Criminal Appeal is forced into
imposing a ﬁxed quantum reduction in all cases where it feels intervention is
warranted.
It is tempting to suppose that all this could be rectified simply by
providing appeal courts with the requisite information. If they were able to
determine, for any given combination of case characteristics, the range of
sentences normally handed down in cases possessing those characteristics, they
would be in a much better position to appreciate the merits of an appeal against
sentence severity or leniency. The provision of such information, though, is only
a partial solution to the problem of ensuring a more rational sentencing and
appeal process. Lying at the heart of the unwarranted variation in sentencing
is confusion over what purposes sentencing decisions are meant to serve and
how those purposes are meant to be expressed in individual cases. The
provisions of information on sentencing practice, no matter how detailed, will
do nothing to resolve this confusion.
We may safely assume that, supplied with the appropriate information,
an appeal court could identify cases in which the sentences involved lie outside
the range of sentences normally encountered for that class of case. The trouble
is that the intervention would proceed on an uncritical acceptance of ‘normal
sentencing practice’ as the standard by which sentencing appeals should be
judged. Under this ‘rotten apple’ theory of appellate intervention, the sentences
disposed of are those which depart from the norm, whatever their intrinsic
merits and whatever the latent defects of those which are upheld. Clearly a
satisfactory system of appellate review must not only ensure that sentencing an
appeal courts are able to determine variations in the exercise of sentencing
discretion under different combinations of case conditions. It must also include
a system of rules which ensures that the general approach to sentencing adopted
by the courts is jurisprudentially defensible.
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How should such a system of rules be introduced and what form should
it take? There is no space here to deal with the question, though there is an
abundance of potential answers now emerging in the reports of law reform
commissions on the subject. It is clear that the common law has failed to resolve
the question of what purposes sentencing is to serve in any unambiguous way.
To a large extent sentencing jurisprudence on the topic simply mirrors the
uncertainties and conﬂict found within the community. The courts cannot be
criticized for this. It is wrong to expect them to resolve conﬂicts of public
opinion on the purposes of sentencing. It is equally wrong to expect them to
mirror the,silence of the legislature on the subject. It is the task of the legislature
to prescribe the purposes sentencing is meant to serve and to establish a
sentencing structure which balances the conﬂicting social demands for
retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and containment. The task of the courts
is to apply and articulate that structure when dealing with individual cases.
In establishing a system of principles for guiding judicial discretion the
legislature must steer a careful course between forcing the courts into unnatural
or indefensible sentencing decisions, on the one hand, and speaking such vague
terms as to offer no useful sentencing guidance, on the other. To date the error
has clearly been on the side of vagueness. In pursuing greater speciﬁcity,
however, it is not necessary that the legislature forsake the conventionally
accepted justiﬁcation for sentencing in pursuit of some single, all-pervading aim.
Sentencing aims which conﬂict when applied to all cases may be reconciled
either by ensuring that they apply to separate classes of case or by stipulating
the relative priorities to be assigned to them in cases where they are found to
conﬂict. This does not mean that every sentencing aim traditionally
countenanced ought to ﬁnd expression. There may be good reason (empirical
evidence, considerations of equity) why some traditional sentencing aims should
be declared1mproper bases of sentencing.
Legislative clariﬁcation of the basis for sentencing is just the ﬁrst part
of the reform process. The difﬁcult steps are to be found in the process of
determining how those aims are to be expressed or reconciled in particular
classes of case. Even if everyone agreed that every offender should receive no
more or less than his or her ‘just deserts’ there would be ample room for
argument as to what this implies in particular cases. The situation is made more
complicated where we are prepared to countenance a multiplicity of sentencing
aims in some circumstances. The problem, however, is not insoluble. In recent
years parliament has shown a greater willingness to outline the occasions on
which penalties of various kinds should be imposed and what purposes they
are meant to serve. The process needs to be made an essential ingredient in the
deﬁnition of every offence.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Dr Don Weatherbum
My paper is essentially about the system of appellate review as a means of
structuring judicial discretion in sentencing and I want to put forward two
heretical propositions, heretical for lawyers and you might think also for judges
but in recent times I have begun to wonder whether or not judges share all the
views possessed by lawyers.
The two heretical propositions are essentially that sentencing principles
do not materially constrain the discretion of sentencers in courts and that, as a
consequence, sentencing principles do not play an important part in the system
of appellate review.
The paper presents detailed reasons for those two points.
The ﬁrst part of the paper essentially traces out the evolution of the
legislative structure that governs sentencing in New South Wales, and I am
deeply indebted to Reg Blanch, Q.C., Director of Public Prosecutions, for that
because he passed to me about 12 months ago a little circulated copy of the
Royal Commission (1871) which had within it, to my surprise, a record of the
fact that in New South Wales at that time there was in existence a
comprehensive system of statutory maximum and minimum penalties. So at
that time judicial discretion was fairly sharply constrained and certainly more
constrained than it was in England at the same time. Since then there has been
a progressive liberalisation in judicial discretion in sentencing. Firstly, and most
immediately, parliament dropped the comprehensive system of statutory
minima, but over time, parliament began to assume a role of simply stating the
statutory maximum penalty and leaving judges and magistrates broad discretion
underneath that statutory maximum to impose the offence. Of course, in more
recent times that discretion has been broadened still further with the creation
of new sentencing options which judges and magistrates can use.
There are some isolated exceptions—s. 556A at least canvasses in some
detail the sorts of circumstances in which the penalty might be used. The same
cannot be said for many of the other options. By and large historically the
legislature has left the field to the courts. One of the many reasons for that is
that it has been considered that the circumstances of offenders vary so
considerably that it would produce anomalies and inconsistencies if the
legislature were to endeavour to spell out with any degree of precision what sorts
of penalties apply to which sorts of patterns of offending.
The reticence which has marked the legislature in constraining judicial
discretion has been said, mainly by legal writers and sometimes by courts, not
to constrain them. The system of appellate review, it is said, takes up where
the legislature leaves off and the role of appellate courts, it is said, in reviewing
sentences which are imposed by the sentencing courts is to formulate sentencing
principles and those sentencing principles do two things: ﬁrstly, they provide a
basis for judges subsequently or magistrates subsequently when imposing
sentence to use what Chief Justice, Sir Laurence Street, has called a “chart”, a
means by which to arrive at a better idea of the sort of sentence which might
be appropriate to an offence, a means by which to promote consistency. The
other function of sentencing principles is more or less to act as a stick for the
Appeals Courts. It is said, mainly again by lawyers, that when an appeal is
mounted the Appeals Courts do not substitute their own discretion for that of
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the original sentencing court, they are not just substituting their own judgment
for that of the original sentencing court, but are instead applying a body of
principle. It is not an entirely deductive process but it is supposed to be a
rational process, according to this theory. There are variations on that theory.
For example David Thomas' allows that in some circumstances, though there
be no manifest violation of a sentencing principle, the sentence itself may be
manifestly out of the range and it is sometimes said this alone indicates that
some sentencing principle has been violated; an argument which I am sure you
will all agree is patently circular.
The second part of the paper (pages 36-39) essentially outlines the way
in which the courts have approached that process of taking up control over
judicial discretion in sentencing.
The third part (pages 39—43), which is drawn from an article2 I wrote a
while ago on sentencing principles and sentence choice, endeavours in a
philosophical or a jurisprudential way to show that all of that is essentially false;
that it is not the case that sentencing principles constrain judicial discretion in
any material sense. I do not want to rehearse all the arguments here. I have
gone through the leading cases if you are minded to read them, but, in brief,
the argument is if they did constrain judicial discretion then the application of
sentencing principles to the facts of the case would reduce the range of options
open to a judge or magistrate. In other words if sentencing principles regulate
or structure judicial discretion in sentencing you ought to have a different range
of things open to you when you apply those principles to a case than you would
have if you did not apply those principles to a case. I think most judges and
magistrates (but perhaps I am wrong and they will jump up and correct me)
would agree that the contrary is true. In fact, you can justify just about any
sentence under any of the principles of sentencing which apply. That is not to
say, and I will get on to this point, that the Court of Criminal Appeal does not
provide guidance in sentencing other than by way of sentencing principles. For
example, when the court upholds a sentence for 15 years for an armed robbery,
whatever else it says that 15 year sentence being upheld gives some indication
of the sorts of sentences which it considers appropriate. But that is a different
class of thing altogether from saying that the body of principles which have been
developed over the years plays some role in constraining judicial discretion in
sentencing.
The most interesting part of the paper, certainly from my point of view,
was to get away from sheer speculation on what you can and what you cannot
do with sentencing principles, and actually do some empirical analyses of
sentencing judgments. So, being born and bred in empiricism, I took 500 of
the jugments and began essentially with the question of “How does any Court
of Criminal Appeal do its work in the routine process ofjudging appeals against
sentence severity?”. I picked sentence severity, rather than appeals by the
Crown, because appeals by the Crown are too infrequent to justify the sorts of
statistical analysis that I wanted to conduct. Nevertheless, I think that is an
important area of empirical research that needs looking at—perhaps somebody
else can take over where I have left off. The analysis of the 500 judgments might
' D. A. Thomas in Principles ofSentencing. See footnote l, page 2. N.S.W. Bureau of Crime
Statistics & Research Appeal against Sentence Severity 1988.
1 Don Weatherbum, "Sentencing Principles and Sentence Choice". Criminal Law Journal, Vol.
II, No. 4 pp 2|3-228.
55
best be described as a content analysis but not in the narrower sense that
psychologists have become used to. I was interested in collecting material on
those judgments across a whole range of things such as the offence committed
by the person, the reference to prior criminal record in the judgment, the plea
of the person, the aggregate sentence—a great body of things—I will not go into
them now. '
The interesting questions from our point of view were: ﬁrstly, how
representative are cases coming forward on appeal, or cases dealt generally
within the higher criminal courts; secondly, how frequently do references to
sentencing principles ﬁgure in the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal;
thirdly, what factors mentioned in the courts judgment, if any, affect the
outcome of the appeal; and lastly, what sorts of adjustments are made to
sentence in circumstances of a successful appeal? Those four questions bear
centrally on the adequacy of conventional views about the role of sentencing
principles in structuring judicial discretion, and I will explain why they do that
very quickly.
Starting with the ﬁrst question—“how representative are cases coming
forward on appeal of cases dealt generally within the higher criminal courts?”
which, of course, is where most of them come from. If you have a look at Figure
1 and Tables 1 and 2 (following page 45) you will get some indication of that.
Figure 1 shows the relevant frequency of different kinds of offence within the
sample of cases coming forward on appeal and generally within the higher
criminal courts. The most noteworthy thing is that some of the offences are far
more likely to turn up in the appeal judgments than are others. Robbery, drug
supply, drug importatiOn cases are far more likely to be found among appeal
judgments than they are in general matters dealt with by the higher courts. More
importantly, if you look at Table 1 and Table 2 you will see that for each of
those offence categories the average sentence or the median sentence and the
median non-parole period are generally about twice as long within a given
category of offence in cases coming forward on appeal to cases dealt with at
ﬁrst instance. Now, of course, that is hardly surprising. It would be surprising,
indeed, if there was a representative sample of cases coming forward on appeal.
Nevertheless cases coming forward on appeal provide the only picture that the
Court of Criminal Appeal gets of activity within the lower courts, and even if
the Court of Criminal Appeal knows that it is getting a biased picture it has no
other basis on which to form an assessment of the events of each appeal. That
ought not to matter if the legal theory is correct because, according to that
theory, Courts of Criminal Appeal decisions are based only on sentencing
principles.
So the next question to address is: “To what extent do appeal judgments
rely upon sentencing principles in coming to a decision?” That depends of
course on how broadly you deﬁne the term “sentencing principle”. To be fair
to the theory I tried to deﬁne it as broadly as possible and generally I took it
to encompass practically any generalisation whatsoever about a case. I took it
to include references to factors which should have been taken into account but
were not, references to factors that were taken into account but should not have
been, any generalisation about sentencing procedure, any reference to a principle
involving statutory interpretation. Now under'that broad deﬁnition you ﬁnd
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about 50 per cent of the judgments involved a reference to sentencing principle
and this, on the face of it, seems to provide some support for the conventional
legal theory, at least until such time as you break down the pattern of references
to principles into different categories. You will ﬁnd those shown on Figure 5‘
on page 48.
The majority of references to sentencing principles, where they do occur,
are references to just four different things: references to disparity of sentence
between co-offenders; references to the proximity of the non-parole period to
the expiry date of the aggregate sentence; references to the proximity of the
sentence to the statutory maximum for that offence; and lastly, and perhaps
more clearly as a sentencing principle than any other kind of reference;
references to the facts surrounding the original offence. In my view references
to disparity between co-offenders, non-parole period aggregate sentence
proportion, and proximity of the sentence to the statutory maximum are
essentially disguised references to or arguments about sentence range, and not
really arguments about sentence principles as such. If you take that view you
come to the conclusion that only about 18 per cent of judgments of the Court
of Criminal Appeal involve a reference to sentencing principles at all.
For those of you who ﬁnd that kind of argument distasteful and would
prefer to rely on something a bit harder, something, for example, that involves
references to prior decisions of other courts which I think is perhaps the
hallmark of a reference to a principle, reference to authority; I counted up the
proportion of judgments in which there was a reference at all to any earlier
decision of any court about any sentencing matter and you ﬁnd then that only
about 13 per cent of the judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeal involve
reference to any case at all.
I think in the circumstances it is hard to escape the conclusion that
sentencing principles whether considered by way of the ﬁrst line of attack, i.e.,
arguments within the judgment, or by way of the second, references to cases,
do not play an important part in the practice of appellate review That raises
the question “What does play an important part in shaping the outcome of the
appeal?”. Once again, that is~a difﬁcult thing to assess simply because all you
have on hand, or all I had on hand since I was determined to stay at my desk
when doing the study, although I\did spend considerable time at Court of
Criminal Appeal watching it as well,\but doing the study I stayed with the
judgments themselves and I had to rely upon what appeared1n those judgments.
That15 OK—after all, the judgments are supposed to provide all of the reasons
for the decision of the court. If a great many things occur that do not ﬁnd their
way into those judgments the system of appellate review is not working in the
way in which it is supposed to. I collected informafion on a great many
judgment characteristics, I put them into a logistic regression (for those of you
who want more technical detail—the method essentially tries to ﬁnd which thing
or combination of things best predict, if any do, the outcome of the appeal)
and two things came out very clearly. The ﬁrst thing conﬁrmatory of
conventional legal theory is that where there was a reference to a sentencing
principle the chances of a successful appeal increased by about two-fold.\The
second result, far from expected, was that where there was any reference to the
prior criminal record of the offender, the chances of a successful appeal dropped
about 2V2 times. ,)
It seems to me, that this provides pretty clear evidence that, wittingly
or unwittingly, some degree of substitution of the original sentencing discretion  
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of the court is going on. It seems as if the Court of Criminal Appeal, perusing
the in-coming cases, is more inclined to grant a successful appeal where there
is nothing in the prior record of the offender which it finds difficult, problematic,
or in some way not justifying an alteration to sentence. Before you leap to the
conclusion that the Court of Criminal Appeal is busily substituting its own
discretion for that of the original sentencing court I think it is interesting to
have a look at the pattern of adjustments it makes when it judges an appeal to
warrant its intervention.
The importance of this, I should remind you, is that the conventional
legal theory says that the court brings with it to each case a range of sentences,
or a set of ranges which apply to different patterns of offence. If you read
D. A. Thomas3 any Court of Criminal Appeal is a clever body indeed. For each
different pattern of offence within break-enter-and-steal, within the various
categories of offence, the court carries an implicit sentence range. The question
it asks itself, while looking for violations of sentencing principles, is “Does the
sentence it is looking at fall outside the range which it holds dear?” If that were
true you would expect the adjustment on the case of a successful appeal to vary
according to an amount by which that sentence moved outside of the range. Of
course, you would not know precisely how much it would have to come back
because sentence ranges are not explicit things. I know the Court of Appeal in
England has made some steps towards actually defining sentence ranges in the
case of BB and RMA, the courts actually suggested ranges for drug importation,
but by and large those things, if they exist, are pretty implicit so although we
would not know quite by how much the sentence ought to come back we would
expect some variable adjustment in the sentence according to the amount by
which it exceeded the range the court considered appropriate.
' Well then, I refer you to Figures 7 and 8 (page 50). The first graph shows;
along the bottom, the aggregate sentence, and along the ordinate; the size of
the aggregate sentence after the adjustment was made. The second graph,~Figure
8, shows along the bottom; the size of the non-parole period and, along the
ordinate; the size of the new non-parole period when the adjustment was made.
Quite obviously there is a very strong relationship between the size of the
adjustment, whether it be of the head sentence or of the non-parole period, and
the size of the original sentence or non-parole period. In fact what is happening
is that regardless of the offence, regardless of the offender, regardless of the
circumstances of the case, the Court of Criminal Appeal takes a standard 25
per cent off the sentence.
At face value sentence adjustments look like a fairly mechanical process.
On reﬂection, though, I do not think you will ﬁnd the result too surprising. The
Court of Criminal Appeal is not privy to the facts surrounding the original
offences. It is loath, as it says, to substitute its discretion for the original
sentencing court and if you were placed in that circumstance and you considered
that some intervention was warranted there is probably nothing more sensible
you can do than apply a percentage reduction. Clearly a given quantum
reduction would be inappropriate—you do not achieve the same effect when
you take one year off a two year sentence and take one year off a 15 year
sentence. A proportional reduction is probably the best thing the court can do
in the circumstance.
3 op, cit.
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Clearly, however, this does not provide too much evidence for the
conventional legal doctrine surrounding appellate courts. It is hard to justify
such a result unless you take the view that when sentences exceed the putative
ranges applied by the Court of Criminal Appeal, they reliably do so by 25 per
cent of the original sentence length. I think that that idea is entirely implausible
and I think the evidence points to the fact that the Court of Criminal Appeal
cannot rely at all (or heavily) on sentencing principles as the means to justify
its intervention.
In saying this, I do not mean to suggest that it does not go looking for
principle violations. I am sure it does. That is the name of the game. But those
sentencing principles are not the most important consideration when the Court
of Criminal Appeal looks at a case and decides whether or not it warrants
intervention. The most important thing must be either its assessment of the
sentence in question in relation to other similar cases, or its assessment of what
sentence it would have imposed in the circumstances. If it is the former, and I
come back now to that earlier point that I made, clearly the court’s judgment
is tarnished or misled if for no other reason than because the pattern of cases
coming forward on appeal presents a very biased picture of what is going on in
the courts. I am delighted to say the Judicial Commission proposes to change
this but the fact of the matter is that, historically, the Court of Criminal Appeal
has not had detailed information on the sentencing practices of the higher
criminal courts. If, on the other hand, what the court is doing is substituting
its discretion for that of the original sentencing court, in other words not
worrying too much about sentencing practice but instead setting broad
boundaries and saying “Well, we can’t toleratea bond for a ten time break-
enter-and-steal offender; the community won’t wear it” then clearly the Court
of Criminal Appeal is substituting its discretion for that of the original
sentencing court.
What is the point of it all? I guess the point of it all is that the legal
theory surrounding appellate intervention is what underpins all resistance to
attempts to structure judicial sentencing discretion by legislative means, and I
think if we can show that the legal theory surrounding judicial discretion is, if
not bankrupt, at least suspect, then we have got good reason for thinking again
about the way we approach the deﬁnition of offences and prescription of
penalties for those offences. I think it is time the legislature took a closer look
when they fashion a new penalty, or when they preseribe a new penalty fdr an
old offence, about the circumstances in which that penalty might be appropriate.
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SENTENCING: CRIME, RECIDIVISM AND DISCRIMINATION
Paul Ward
Senior Lecturer in Criminal Statistics,
Sydney University Law School
SUMMARY
This article attempts to analyse the various aims of sentencing and to
propose the sorts of research projects which should be carried out to assess
adequately the effectiveness of a sentencing policy in achieving these aims. The
research projects would involve expenditure far higher than that usually
allocated to criminological research in Australia but it is argued that a more
reasoned approach to crime would be more likely to result in smaller amounts
of serious crime in a community rather than the present ‘knee jerk’ reaction (if
more prisons and longer sentences.
Introduction
Sentencing is a social process which attempts to achieve several aims.
These aims are not all capable of being optimised at one time, e.g., the need to
give an accused adequate chance to defend himself or herself, and be tried
within a reasonable time, conflicts with the need for the criminal justice system
to keep within a budget allocated by the government of the day.
Aims of Sentencing
The aims of sentencing can be categorised thus:
(a) The aim of achieving ‘justice’.
(b) The aim of discouraging guilty people from committing further
crimes (i.e., Sentencing and Recidivism).
(c) The aim of deterring potential law breakers (i.e., Sentencing and
Crime).
(0) Achieving ‘Justice’
The main requirements under this heading are the need for consistency
and the need for the sentencing policy to be one which does not discriminate
because of apparently irrelevant factors such as ethnic or social class.
WalkerI illustrates the need for consistency by an example in which an
offender who had elected to be tried in a higher court received a much heavier
sentence than his confederate who had pleaded guilty and had been tried
summarily. Although on appeal the court ruled that they did not consider the
higher penalty excessive, in the interests of consistency the appellant’s sentence
was reduced to the same as the sentence imposed by the court of summary
jurisdiction.
Discrimination, On the other hand, is a far more difﬁcult concept to
analyse. It is an unassailable fact that black men, poor men, and young men
form three (overlapping) groups who are far more prone than average to be
arrested, convicted and sentenced for criminal activity. To what extent this
situation is the result of these groups being more prone to break the law and
to what extent it arises from biassed processing of the police and the judiciary
is not an easy question to answer.
' Walker, N. (1969), Sentencing in Rational Society (Penguin Press. London). pp. 6—7.
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One method of assessing whether biases are occurring in the arrest
process is illustrated by the research of Martin Gold2 who interviewed a
randomly selected group of 522 children in the city of Flint, Michigan.
From replies to an interview concerning their criminal behaviour which
was aimed at eliminating all events which were unlikely to be considered serious
enough to investigate by the» police, Gold found:
(i) that young males whose parents were in the most poorly paid jobs
or were unemployed admitted committing relatively more serious
crimes more often than young males whose parents were better off;
(ii) that offenders who admitted committing more serious or more
frequent offences were more likely to have been booked at least
once by the police;
(iii) based on this information, Gold concluded that ofﬁcial records
should have about 15' records of a boy from the poorest groups for
'each record of a boy with more afﬂuent parents.
In fact the ofﬁcial records showed ﬁve records of boys in the poorest
group to each record in the other groups. Such a ﬁnding indicates a marked
bias in recording detected criminal behaviour by young males from poor
families.
A more extensive study, comparing the results of reports of sentenced
prisoners with ofﬁcial statistics was carried out by Joan Petersilia.3 Using ofﬁcial
data on the processing of cases involving serious crime in California, Petersilia‘1
found that while 60 percent of white persons arrested were convicted only 49
percent of black persons arrested were convicted. This disparity occurred
because of the higher proportion of failures to ﬁle a charge after arrest.
Petersilia5 analysed the arrest data and concluded that police faced a more
difﬁcult task after making an arrest in obtaining cooperation of minority group
victims and witnesses.
As far a sentencing was conc'emed, Petersilia found that:
After conviction, the system treats blacks and Hispanics more severely than
it does whites. If they are convicted of misdemeanour charges, blacks and
Hispanics are much more likely to go to jail while whites are more likely
to receive probation. If convicted of felony charges, blacks and Hispanics
are more likely than whites to receive prison sentences. In either case, they
are likely to receive longer sentences.6
This disparity appeared to Petersilia7 to be the result of less attractive
plea bargains being offered to black accused, resulting in more black accused
opting for a jury trial with a subsequent greater chance of a heavier penalty.
The possibility that the black accused were receiving higher penalities because
2 Gold. M. (1966). J. Res. Crime & Delinq. l3/l, pp. 27—46.
Petersilia, J. (I983) Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System (Rand Corp., Santa
Monica). .
‘ ihid. pp. 20—33.
ihid. pp. xxxi-xxxii.
" ibid. p. 32.
7 ibid. at xxxii.
'4  
 6|
they had longer previous records seems not very likely as Blumstein and
Graddy;R have found that the recidivism rate for index offences is approximately
the same for both whites and non whites. Thus the difference in involvement
in arrest rates must be attributed to differences between the two groups in the
proportion of each group ever becoming involved in crime at all and not to a
greater tendency of those blacks participating in criminal activity to be arrested
more frequently than whites.
As some prison based systems in the USA. notably the Federal System,
base their decision to release on tables predicting the likelihood of recidivism,
Petersilia" concluded that the greater prevalence of crime among blacks can
become confused with greater proneness to recidivism and hence lead to black
offenders serving longer sentences.
. . . because prevalence of crime is so much higher than incidence of crime
(or recidivism) among minorities, characteristics associated with prevalence
of crime among blacks (e.g., unemployment, family instability) may
overwhelm indicators of prevalence for the entire criminal population.
They may also mask indicators of recidivism common to both blacks and
whites. . .
This is a real vicious circle: As long as the ‘black experience’ conduces to
crime, blacks will be identiﬁed as potential recidivists, will serve prison
terms instead of jail terms, will serve longer time, and will thus be
identiﬁed as more serious criminals. . . Analysts will need a methodology
that permits them to control for homogeneity in the minority (largely
black) half of the criminal population.
Petersilia’s study has important implications regarding the treatment of
the aboriginal population in Australia. Aborigines as a group have at any time
probably a larger proportion of their population serving a prison sentence than
any other minority group in the world. Whereas black Americans make up 12
per cent of the general population and 48 per cent of prison population in the
U.S.A., a census by the Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research N.S.W.l0
indicated that they represented 0.3 per cent of the general population and 5.3
per cent of the prison population on 30th June, 1971.
Aborgines in Moree made up the vast majority of convictions for “bad”
language although the frequency of usage of the most usual swearword involved
in such cases showed that aborgines used the word no more frequently than the
rest of the male population of Moree." The N.S.W. Bureau of Crime Statistics
and Research reports on sentencing indicated that the treatment of persons
arrested for drunkenness in towns with high aboriginal populations was vastly
different with relatively few drunks being released on nominal bail which was
then estreated with no further action being taken. This was common practice
in areas with low aboriginal populations. A study on the lines of Petersilia’s
should be carried out in Australia to ascertain to what extent the greater
R Blumstein. A. and Graddy. E. (1982) Law and Society Review 16/2
9 op.ci!. at xxviii
'0 Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. N.S.W. (1974) Aborigines in NS. W. Prisons—30m
June 197].
H Wilson. P. R. and Braithwaite. J. (1978) The two Faces ofDeviance (Qld. Univ. Press. Brisbane)
pp. 46-57.
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proportion of aborigines in prison results from discrimatory practices rather
than from differences such as seriousness or crime of longer prevrous record
which can be validly considered in setting a sentence.
(b). Sentencing and Recidivism
As well as trying to punish an offender, a sentence is given with the hope
that the unpleasant consequences of the sentence may make the punished
persons alter their manner of behaving and that they may either become law-
abiding or at least channel their activities into less serious forms of criminal
endeavour. As a piece of anecdotal evidence that such an outcome is possible,
Mr George Freeman'2 in his autobiography indicates that it was fear of
subsequent convictions which convinced him that thieving was a career which
was not worth continuing in.
In the 1960’s and the early 1970’s the concept of deterrence was
superseded especially in the United States by the concept that serious offenders
should be ‘treated’ not punished. In some States such as California, release from
prison was made contingent not on the seriousness of one’s offence but on the
recommendation of an ‘expert’ that the offender had been ‘cured’ of his
propensity to commit crime.
This rehabilitative rationale for sentencing was replaced by a concept of
‘just deserts’ with a re-imposition of the traditional relationship between
seriousness of offence and quantum of punishment. This change was largely
inﬂuenced by a study by Lipton, Martinson and Wilkes‘3 which indicated that
(a) most studies of the effectiveness of ‘treatment’ programs were incapable of
reaching any valid conclusion, and (b) those studies which included sufficient
controls to allow a valid conclusion nearly always indicated that the treatment
program was generally no more efficient at reducing recidivism than the
traditional mode of dealing with offenders. This led to a change in many
American States to a ‘just deserts’ model of sentencing, akin to the New South
Wales system but including mandatory minimum prison terms for many types
of offence.
The introduction of the new sentencing programs, as pointed out in the
section on ‘Sentencing and Crime’, made a huge difference to the proportion
of the American population held in custody without making any great difference
in the rate of serious crime. At the same time the amount of research money
being spent in evaluating treatment programs appears to have almost dried up.
This is a pity because, as the study of Mecham" shows, sometimes one type of
sentence does appear to have better results than another. Mecham managed to
get his sentencers to agree on four penalties of about the same degree of
‘punishment value’ and found that the group receiving one particular sentence
responded with a lower rate of recidivism and a longer average time before the
next conviction than the other groups.
'2 Freeman, G. (1988) George Freeman: an Autobiography (The Book Printer, Maryborough)
p. 69.
'3 Lipton, D.. Martinson. R., and Wilkes, J. (I975), The Eﬂ'ectiveness ofCorrectional Treatment
(Praeger, New York).
" Mecham. R. (1968), Crime and Delinquency l4/l, pp. l42—l 50.
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While ever judges and magistrates continue to hold some belief that their
function is not merely to punish but to try to pick a sentence likely to deter or
rehabilitate the offender, it will be necessary to continue research into this aspect
of sentencing.
To reach unambiguous conclusions with slight chance of error,
sentencing programs with some element of random allocation involved is
essential. As an example of a program which was a complete waste of money
because no random allocation was included, I would advise the reader to peruse
the Report on the N.S.W. Drug Diversion Program.'5
In this program all the ‘worst risk’ cases were placed on the methadone
maintenance program while other programs received ‘better risks’ cases. As
might be expected the proportion of people reconvicted who received
methadone maintenance was higher than the proportion in other treatment
groups. The whole ‘experiment’ was useless as it provided no information about
whether it was a good policy, or a bad policy to allocate offenders in this way.
Sentencing may not be a process exactly analogous to medical treatment,
but the concept of rehabilitation does carry with it the moral duty to behave
in a rational manner as doctors do when considering a new treatment. The
doctors give, at random, some cases the old treatment and some the new in
order to see which, if any, gives better results. Until sentencers recognise this
fact and stop trying to play their own hunches in giving sentences or to rely on
conventional wisdom, there is no hope at all of achieving better results in terms
of lower recidivism rates.
(6) Sentencing and Crime
Since Beccarial6 wrote his famous essay De Deletti e Delle Pene in 1767,
built into the framework of legal thinking is the concept that sentencing is_ a
matter of choosing a sentence of appropriate severity to deter those disposed
to break the law from doing so. Newspapers and radio commentators regularly
ask for heavier penalties for offenders and especially for the conditions of
imprisonment to be made more severe.
The theory is that heavier penalties will deter at least a proportion of
potential criminals from offending. In advocating longer prison sentences, it also
seems to be obvious that many prisoners are restrained for the period of their
sentence from committing crimes involving victims outside the prison walls and
so this should lead to a diminution of the crime rate by an “incapacitative”
effect. For the incapacitative effect to be a substantial one in reducing crime,
prisoners must make up a large proportion of offenders. Those who argue for
increased penalties are not aware that the experiment has been tried in the
U.S.A. and the evidence for increased rates of imprisonment giving lower rates
of serious crime is slight to say the least.
New South Wales is now tending to follow a policy which hasoccurred
in most of the states of the United States since 1973. Table 1 shows the change
in the rate of imprisonment in the U.S.A. from 1973 to 1983.
'5 Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, N.S.W. (I982): Research Report I I. The Sydnev Drug
Diversion Program: Iheﬁrst two years.
’° Beccaria. C. De Delem' e Del/e Pene, trans. Paolucci (1963) (Bob Merrill, Indianapolis).
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Table 1*
Prison and Jail Populations in US.
P . J ”I Rate/100 000
"SO" pop. at total pop
Year on 3001 June pop. . .
Prison Jail
1973 204 211 n.a. 96 n.a.
1978 294 396 156 783 132 70
1983 * 419820 221815 179 95
‘ From Source books ofCriminal Justice Statistics, 1975, 1979, 1984, Tables 1.94 and 6.22.
It is readily seen that over this period, the proportion of the United
States population held in prison rose to nearly double the initial proportion.
This represents a substantial rise in the cost of the prison system, especially as
the United States Constitution gives prisoners rights to expect some minimum
conditions to apply while they serve their sentences. Several states have been
ordered by the Supreme Court to reduce overcrowding in their prisons and jails
and only increase their numbers in custody when they have built new facilities.
This has led to some private enterprise custodial institutions being established
which relieves the state government of having to find the capital but still
requires a considerable outlay to pay the private companies to take over, as the
companies are obviously out to make a proﬁt in this enterprise.
Has this considerable increase in incarceration rate led to marked drop
in the crime rate? From 1973 to 1982 the answer would have been that the
drop in crime rate was very little, as perusal of Table 2 will show.
Table 2
Rates of Crime in US. as determined by Victim Surveysl7
. Year
Type of Offence 1973 1982
Rape ............. , ...................................... 181 143
Robbery ..................... , ............................ 690 ‘ 708
Serious Assault ............................................ 2597 2638
Larceny with Contact ...................................... 317 306
Larceny without Contact .................................... 9029 7945
Burglary ................................................. 9267 7820
Household Larceny ........................................ 10934 11390
Motor Vehicle Theft ....................................... 1916 i 1616
There is, since 1982, a tendancy for the crime rate to drop which might
lead proponents of higher imprisonment rates to claim that at last their policies
were working. What the drop since 1982 indicates is that more factors are
probably involved in the level of crime in the US. than the proportion of
detected criminals who are imprisoned. Important other factors to be considered
are the ageing of the population and economic conditions.
'7 From Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1975 and 1984. (US. Dept. of Justice,
Washington DC.) Table 3.25.
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The ageing of the polulation
It is a well known universal phenomenon that young males are more
prone to be detected in committing serious criminal offences than other types
of person in any community. Since the more freely available information
concerning contraceptive methods and the social attitudes favouring smaller
families have resulted in the proportion of young males in US. society
becoming progressively smaller, the crime rates ought to fall. However, the
adequacy of the calculation can be called into question on several grounds.
Firstly, one cannot assume that because the rate of arrest of young males
is ‘x’ times the rate for older age groups that young males commit ‘x’ times as
many offences. Zimringl3 points out that young males (teenagers) are more likely
to be arrested after a crime involving a group of offenders and so while it is
true that the one crime incident thus involved several criminal offences, it
usually represents only one victimisation. Also it is probable that younger males
are easier to detect committing crimes, more ready to admit their offence and
more suspected by the police. These factors will overestimate the contribution
of young males to the crime rate in a community.
Secondly, self-report studies indicate that although young male children
of parents who are reasonably well off admit as many minor crimes as 'young
male children of poor parents, it is the second group who admit the majority
of the more serious offences which are likely to initiate a serious police
investigation. So in order to assess the contribution of ageing to the drop in
crime rate for ‘serious’ crime, an allowance has to be made for possible
differences in the drop in the birthrates of the poor and the more affluent groups
in society. As the drop in birthrate in the more affluent groups might be greater
than the poorer groups, the fall in the crime rate dueto ageing would be lower
than that predicted by Steffensmeier and Harer, who calculate that about half
of the decrease in the crime rate in the U.S.A. in the mid-1980’s can be ascribed
to this ageing effect.”
Economic Conditions
When criminologists make an econometric study of penalties and crime
they usually include measures of the economic conditions such as the
unemployment rate and the proportion of the population earning an income
below some definable ‘poverty line’ into their mathematical model. For example,
in his famous studies of the effect of the death penalty upon homicide rates in
the U.S.A., Ehrlich20 found that, from 1933 to 1969, such measures were highly
positively correlated with homicide. In fact, as McGahey2| points out in his
critique of Ehrlich’s work, the effect of poverty and unemployment are very
important and a 1 per cent drop in the unemployment rate should have a larger
effect on the murder rate than re-introducing executions back into the U.S.A.
to the average rate during the Ehrlich study period (if one admitted the accuracy
of Ehrlich’s analysis).
" Zimring, F. (1981).]. Criminal Law & Criminology 72/3, pp 867-885.
‘9 Steffensmeier, D. J. and Harer, M. D. (I987) J. Res, Crime and Del. pp. 23—48.
2° Ehrlich, 1. (1975) American ’Economic Review pp. 397—417.
1' McGahey, R. M. (I980) Crime and Delinquency 26/4. pp. 485—502.
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It cannot be expected that the relationship between such economic
conditions and homicide will be identical for other types of criminal activity,
however it does seem likely that, generally speaking, Some reductions in most
types of crime generally regarded as most serious, e.g., assault, robbery, burglary,
and vehicle theft would be less if the proportion of the population who are poor
and/or unemployed were to be reduced.
The implications for the study of the crime rates for the period
1973—1983 in the USA. is thatfunemployment rose in the first part of the
period and then fell. The failure of the crime rate, as measured by victims
survey, to follow this trend may indicate that without the higher proportion of
people incarcerated the crime rates might also have risen. The fall in rates after
1982 would also support the hypothesis that the improvement in the
unemployment rate was the factor which caused the drop.
Unfortunately, the data supplied in the Sourcebooks of Criminal Justice
Statistics in the U.S.A. do not allow one to make an accurate assessment of the
relative effects of higher rates of imprisonment and unemployment in the
community. Let us look at the kinds of data that would ideally be required to
make such an assessment.
Let us suppose some government were seriously considering between two
policies. The first would be to double the number of cells in prisons and the
size of the staff of the prison system. The second would be to spend the same
amount of money to try to reduce unemployment. How would one assess which
policy would benefit the community most?
Let us suppose this government were willing to spend say 5 per cent of
the projected cost of doubling the prison system on evaluative research, what
information should be collected, if one were to have a reasonable chance of
making a rational decision about the relative merits of the two policies? The
problem is far more difficult than the usual simplistic theorising which
masquerades as common sense would have us believe.
The data which should be collected can be grouped into three classes of
data: ‘
(a) Analysis of which choice(s) of the various strategies of producing a
higher prison population would be implemented.
(b) An analysis of data concerning careers of prisoners.
(c) Victimisation and Public Attitudes to Crime.
Only with information concerning what policy is actually being
considered, data to relate this to the likely effect of such policies by observing
the present incapacitatiVe effect of prison and data on which crimes are
considered more serious and what the real rates of crime in the community are,
can one even start to decide rationally what return, other than the symbolic
one of showing that one is ‘getting tough’, is likely to be attained.
(a) Analysis of alternative methods ofachieving higher imprisonment rates
Higher prison populations can be obtained in two ways: One can
increase thetime spent in prison of those detected offenders who are presently
being sentenced to prison and/or one can sentence offenders to prison who are
presently receiving non-custodial sentences and/or police manpower resources
can be increased in the area of investigation of serious crime with the possible
result of catching some offenders who presently are not being detected, who will
then be more likely to be imprisoned. l
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The effect on the rates of various crimes of different mixes of the above
policies would be an important variable to consider in evaluation of a ‘best‘
policy.
(b) An analysis ofcriminal careers of imprisoned detected offenders
This analysis should produce two sorts of data:
(i) a prediction of likelihood of recidivism; and
(ii) a crime-switch matrix indicating not only the likelihood of being
detected committing a similar type of offence but also the likelihood
of being detected committing other types of offence.
Recidivism studies which attempt to assess the potential reduction in
violent crime rate arising from a policy of detaining prisoners convicted for a
particular type of crime for a longer period show that detaining only those who
have been convicted of a violent offence once before makes only a small change
in the predicted number of violent offences, so a crime-switch matrix is
necessary to assess the potential drop in violent offences of non-violent offenders
are imprisoned for longer periods.
An example of this type of study is that of Petersilia and Greenwood22
who showed that a policy of imposing a ﬁve year sentence on any person
previously convicted of at least one adult violent offence would have reduced
the violent crime rate by less than 7 per cent.
However, if the proposed policy is to increase the length of sentence for
all prisoners, then the effect of detaining prisoners whose last offence was not
of the particular type which you are interested in must also be considered. For
example, Ward and Porritt23 found that when one compared a group of
prisoners whose last offence was a violent one with another group whose last
offence was not violent that 10 per cent of the violent group were reconvicted
of a violent offence within the three year period after release while 3 per cent
of the non-violent group were similarly convicted.
As many more prisoners are released after having committed a non-
violent offence, paradoxically, the number of violent offences delayed by
increasing the length of sentences generally will be more greatly affected by an
increase in the sentences of prisoners whose last sentence was non-violent than
simply increasing the sentences for violent crimes.
The reduction in violent crime can be substantial if all prisoners,
whatever their previous record, are imprisoned for 5 years. Petersilia and
Greenwood24 estimate about one third of violent crime would be stopped during
these 5 years. However, this was at the cost of building extra prisons to house
four and one half times the then existing prison population.
It should be noted that increased sentences do not eliminate crimes but.
may simply delay them. If prisoners who normally would be released in 1988
are held and not released until 1990, then the crime rates in 1988 and 1989
22 Petersilia, .l. and Greenwood, P. W. (1978) J. Crim. Law and Criminology 69/4 pp. 606-615.
13 Ward. P. G. and Pon'itt. D. (1982) ‘Violent Offences and Recidivism’ Research Bulletin,
(N.S.W. Department of Corrective Services).
2‘ op. cit. q.v. graphs on pp. 609-6l3.
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may be lower but, if the longer sentences have no deterrent effect, the crime
rates in 1990 will rise. It is true that over the life-time career of the detected
offenders, being imprisoned longer each time they are sentenced would reduce
the number of crimes committed in one career (unless there is an attempt on
the part of such offender to “catch up" by committing more offences each time
they are freed). However the overall drop in the violent crime rate predicted
by Petersilia and Greenwood would probably have to be discounted by some
amount to allow for more violence after release of long term prisoners.
(c) Data from Survey of Victimization and Public Attitudes to Crime
While it is often necessary to use official statistics, eg, for arrest, and
conviction rates for assessing the effects of a penal policy, official statistics are
less useful for assessing the total amount of serious crime in a community. Not
only is there the problem of people failing to report crime to the police, but
changes in policy practices such as crackdowns in certain areas of crime can
create artiﬁcial ‘crime waves’ because of a sudden increase in the number of
detected crimes during the crackdown period. Also the recent offer of re-
instatement of Sergeant Arantz is an acceptance of the fact that police statistics
can be inﬂuenced by political pressures to present a particular picture of crime.
The United States is the only country which has made any serious
attempt to rectify the problem by instituting an annual survey of a large sample
of randomly selected households since 1973. Unfortunately from Australia’s
point of view, the fact that Australia has a much smaller population than the
USA. does not mean that an equally accurate estimate of the amount of crime
can be obtained with a proportionately smaller sample. In fact, a sample of
almost equal size is required. This makes the cost of getting an accurate estimate
much more expersive per taxpayer in Australia than in the USA.
So far only two victim surveys have been carried out in Australia and
there were so many differences in sampling and in the questions asked that most
of the data obtained in the second survey could not be validly compared with
the data obtained in the ﬁrst. The major requirement for any future surveys
here is that the techniques should be standardised and repeated so that the
results of two surveys can be compared.
Conclusion
Ideally then, if one were to have all the data which I have outlined
above, one could project the \likely long term effect on crime by increasing
imprisonment and compare it with variations in crime rates of various kinds
with variations in unemployment. It may turn out that increased imprisonment
might be useful for some crimes while a policy of providing useful long-term
employment for more people could be more cost—effective for other crimes. At
the moment, we simply do not have the basic information to make a meaningful
decision as to what would be the better policy.
I am not really too hopeful that any government will provide the funds
necessary to have a reasonable chance of correctly picking an efficient policy
for crime reduction. From past experience, crime policy is more likely to be
inﬂuence by ‘knee-jerk’ reactions to sudden (probably random) occurrences
which grab the public attention. A wet holiday weekend with consequent high
accident rate is more likely to change penalties for traffic offences than any
examination of the long-term trends in accident rates, although such a short
term occurrence provides no rational basis for action.
 
 69
A recent set of horriﬁc occurrences where women were abducted from
an area near a railway station, sexually assaulted, and killed seems to have been
met with a policy of providing special carriages for female passengers at night
on the train. Such a policy does not really seem to be a feasible way of stopping
these occurrences although it may lessen assaults occurring on the train itself.
One area of crime, which does‘ not require quite the degree of
SOphisticated data collection to analyse and is relevant today, is car theft. This
crime is the one serious offence which is shown by US. evidence to give
comparable results between victim surveys and official ﬁgures. So long as the
police maintain the same practices in recording car theft the ofﬁcial ﬁgures
should be a reliable indicator of the frequency of this offence.
The present New South Wales government has recently made changes
in the law concerning car theft aimed at giving larger sentences to such
offenders. Many media personalities and interest groups have applauded the
action, conﬁdently claiming that such a policy will reduce this sort of crime.
This conﬁdence has about the same level of rational underpinning as that of
the medieval sinner who kissed a piece of the true cross believing that it would
cure him of the pox.
I certainly cannot say that tougher penalties will not have the desired
effect in deterring car thieves but, from what I have written before concerning
the American experience, one can see that longer imprisonment does not
automatically imply lower crime rates.
If car thieves do start to receive higher sentences and police ﬁgures of
car theft start to reduce, I will be pleased but still skeptical. The action of the
present government in reinstating Sergeant Arantz indicates the acceptance of
the proposition that police statistics are suspect and can be inﬂuenced by
political considerations.
If the insurance companies ﬁnd that they can reduce premiums and the
car repairers report a mild decline in business (many stolen cars are damaged)
I will be more likely to accept that the new policy has worked (always assuming
that other factors have not intervened such as a Federal requirement that new
cars be ﬁtted with more thief-proof devices).
I wish the government the best of luck with its policy and as a car owner
hope that it works. But it is wishful thinking in the extreme to think that it
must work. Car theft is the one offence where ofﬁcial ﬁgures in the US. and
victim survey ﬁgures come anywhere close to giving the same results. This
means that the complicated research I have outlined earlier is probably not so
necessary. Careful analysis is required however and a rejection of the present
“religious fervour” with which the belief that higher penalties must solve all
crime problems is presently held.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Paul Ward
What I wanted to put forward in my paper was several points. I suppose the
main point I really wanted to put to you was that I have grave misgivings about
the sorts of public attitudes that are incited to some extent by the press today
about the amount of crime in the community and especially the sort of blind
faith that seems to be implicit in many of the articles that are written. These
imply'that simple legislation to increase effective sentences either by gettingrid
of the remissions or reducing parole, or by increasing parole periods to greater
proportions of the sentence mandatorily—these sorts of things simply are
believed, I think blindly, in a sort of religious fervour by many people, to be
the key to solving the crime problem and reducing it. So, in my article I have
gone to some trouble to try and give an historical account of what happened in
the USA.
There is clear evidence that, in a country where you are worried about
crime, like the USA. you can make vast changes in your judicial system and
yet, while these changes can double the proportion of the population you are
keeping in prison, this is without any marked effect at all on the amount of
crime in the community. I think that you know in one sense, my paper is not
really about sentencing.
I do not think that changing sentencing is going to make all that much
difference in the particular area of decreasing crime in the community. I can
see all sorts of policies, way outside the sorts of legislation to change sentencing
that might do something about crime in the community.
I think, for example, one thing that never gets discussed concerning its
tendency to increase criminal activity is the sort of frustration that young people
must feel in the community today. If you are working along in the system and
trying to save up to buy a house and the cost of the house rises faster than you
can save for the deposit you need: if the deposit now to buy a house is more
than you have managed to save in the last 6 months, what do you feel? It is
faced with this sort of frustrating situation which I am quite sure must create
a great temptation for anybody to turn to some form of getting extra cash which
is not legal and, if they do not do that, there must be dangers of letting off steam
in violent behaviour.
I am quite sure that some attempt to stabilise the society so that these
sorts of frustrations were reduced (although it would be a very difficult problem
to achieve) would be far more likely to do things about reducing the amount
of crime of many sorts in the community than trying to change sentencing in
any way. So that is the first major point I wanted to make about my paper. It
is simply an attempt to indicate the sort of common wisdom today, i.e. the
solution to the crime problems in any country is simply to change your
sentencing patterns and people will react in the old classical deterrent theory
style. I do not think there is very much evidence that this will really go any
way towards solving your real problems of criminal activity. I have been fairly
lavish in proposing some sorts of research projects that might be carried out
which I think might help better understanding of the various processes in
sentencing. I suppose as I am on the brink of retirement and will not have to
do anything about it they are probably much more lavish than I think will ever
be achieved. But I think is is worthwhile looking at the sorts of research that I  
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put foward here and especially at the call for looking at independent estimates
other than the ofﬁcial police ﬁgures which get trotted out in the newspapers
every now and again to try and indicate how bad things have got, while
completely ignoring all the problems of comparing ofﬁcial statistics from one
time to another.
There was an article in the Sydney Morning Herald on 24th October,
most of which I thought dealt fairly reasonably with the statistics. However, I
was interested you know in points that were not brought out in the paper. It
started off something like “There have been 99 murders this year” not exactly
explaining in the article whether those murders were in the Sydney metropolitan
area, or New South Wales as a whole. If it were the whole of New South Wales
there were many more than 99 murders in the previous 12 months before.
Therefore, if it were the case that there were only 99 this year in the last 12
months from wherever he was taking his ﬁgures, then we were doing quite well
in terms of decreasing violence for a particular year. The fact is these sorts of
articles just quote ﬁgures which are usually big numbers, Sydney (or New South
Wales) has a fairly high population so that the number just frightens people.
The fact is that there are all sorts of problems in interpreting these ﬁgures. The
article also quoted that there are l 800 or morerapes in the same very loosely
deﬁned area in the same twelve month period and if he had liked to he could
probably have looked back in the distant past there were only 36 recorded in
New South Wales 30 years ago. That is a massive change. Obviously I think
you would be very hard put to say that the change in behaviour of the
community in terms of rape has changed to that vast extent. There are all sorts
of explanations for this vast change in the ﬁgure. One of them is the change in
the category ‘rape’ to ‘sexual’ assault. What he probably should have said is that
there are 800 or more sexual assaults. Now sexual assault is not co-extensive
with what used to be called rape. Lawyers know far better than I that there is
a greater range of potential victims and a greater range of potential offenders
involved in these acts, and also a greater range of behaviour covered.
So simply quoting a ﬁgure of l 800 and calling them rapes is to muddy
the situation up and scare people considerably. I am not saying it wouldn’t be
nice if one could have fewer of these statistics in any year but the major point
Lam trying to make is simply that sentencing to my mind does not necessarily
provide the answer. I was glad to hear Mr Dowd saying the present government
really regarded prison as the last resort for sentencing. I hope that the message
does get through because it does seem to me it is a reasonable message to
receive.
72
SENTENCING AND PENAL POLITICS: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW SOUTH WALES
Russell Hogg,
Law School, Macquarie University
This paper has the fairly modest aim of sketching some of the current
developments and proposals relating to sentencing and the penal system in
N.S.W. My concern is to make some critical assessment of the general directions
in which debates about law and order and punishment have been heading rather
than necessarily go into any of the reforms or proposals in detail.
One of the principal views that is advanced in this paper is that current
debates about sentencing and punishment cannot be conﬁned to the terms of
either a philosophical analysis about the justiﬁcations of punishment and the
objectives of sentencing on the one hand (moral philosophy) or the technical
efﬁcacy of particular penalties on the other (administrative penology). Most
penal debate tends to take place in terms of one or the other, or some
combination, of these two types of analysis.l
There is a need for political and social analyses of punishment which
recognise that the conditions underlying particular sentencing and penal
practices, and hence also their reform, are complex and not conﬁned to any
speciﬁcally penological realm, whether philosophically or institutionally deﬁned.2
The conditions for penal reform are as much economic and political in nature
as they are narrowly legal and penological.
This is apparent in the juggling acts being performed by Governments
in N.S.W. and elsewhere with a variety of conﬂicting demands, most obviously
ﬁscal pressures to contain public expenditures on the one hand and well-
orchestrated public demands for, and political commitment to, tougher penalties
on the other. In this paper I am concerned primarily with this more political
level of penal debate. Whatever proposals for reform one comes up with, their
ability to be realised as operative policies depends on their being able to be
translated into political programmes and strategies that will be publicly and
politicly supported, ﬁnanced, etc.
When we look to the penal policies of the major political forces in
N.S.W. it is clear that there is both bi-partisan support for a greater use of
imprisonment and attempts to simultaneously keep this under some control for
ﬁscal reasons. At the same time there is an appalling shallowness to the level
of debate and analysis of law and order problems, an absence of detailed
policies, strategies and objectives, a heavy reliance on vacuous slogans and a
tendency to opportunisticly exploit isolated events (especially exceptional crimes
of a particularly horriﬁc and tragic nature).
Penal Policy in the 1988 N.S.W. Election
At the N.S.W. state election earlier this year both the ALP and the
Coalition treated law and order as one of the major issues in the campaign.
And the proposals of both were focussed to a considerable extent on sentencing
and punishment.
' See D. Garland and P. Young (I983) The Power to Punish. Heinemann.
3 D. Brown (1987) “Some Preconditions for Sentencing and Penal Reform" in G. Wickham (ed)
Social Theory and Legal Politics, Local Consumption.  
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Amongst the Labor Government’s proposals were the following:
0 An accelerated prison building program to provide six new prisons
and 1600 new cells.
0 A crackdown on drugs in the gaol system and the provisions of drug
rehabilitation services.
c An extension of prison industries.
The Coalition also promised many tough measures in the penal area,
including the following (see in particular Coalition Press Release 22/2/88):
o A review of “all existing maximum sentences to ensure they are a
real deterrent and properly reﬂect community opinions".
. Raising the maximum penalty for ‘rape’ from seven years to twenty.
o The reintroduction of the mandatory life penalty for murder and this
to be “. . . legislated to mean not less than 20 years . . . ”
oThC creation of a speciﬁc offence of car theft with a maximum
penalty of 12 years.
0 The use of habitual criminals legislation against repeat offenders.
o Judges to have power to order that a prisoner never be released.
0 Police to have power to appeal against inadequate sentences in the
local courts.
0 Additional mandatory gaol sentences for offences committed whilst
carrying a ﬁrearm, regardless of whether it is used.
.To “ . . . restore truth in sentencing . . . ” by abolishing
remissions off the non-parole period, ensuing the non-parole period
was at least 75 percent of the head sentence, and making all
remissions earned.
. A crackdown on drugs in prison, including compulsory weekly urine
testing of all inmates.
o Restrictions on contact visits.
. Removal of legal aid for gaol disciplinary charges.
. The reopening of Katingal maximum security prison.
0 The building of a new 400 person gaol at Lithgow.
o Removing gaol as the primary means of dealing with ﬁne defaulters.
o The reintroduction of the Summary Oﬂences Act.
. The abolition of the juvenile cautioning program.
Since taking government the Coalition has implemented a number of
these proposals, afﬁrmed others and introduced or announced further measures.
The major initiatives have been as follows:
. Increases in the powers to detain juveniles over 16 in prisons.
o A new Summary Oﬂences Act which creates several new offences,
punishable by terms of imprisonment of three or six months.
0 The curtailment of the juvenile cautioning scheme.
oA substantial overhaul of prison administration, including the
abolition of both the Corrective Services Commission and the
Corrective Services Advisory Council
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. The introduction of random mass urine testing of prisoners.
oThe attempted (unsuccessful) removal of the right of prisoners to
appeal to the District Court from the ﬁndings of a Visiting Justice
in prison disciplinary hearings.
o The termination of the Bauer Inquiry on the wages and industrial
conditions of prison ofﬁcers and initation of a recruitment program
to attract prison officers (although it does not appear to involve any
material improvement in wages and conditions).
.The introduction of measures (licence and vehicle registration
cancellation, community service orders) to avoid or limit
imprisonment of fine defaulters.
.Proposed legislation to create an offence of car stealing with a
maximum penalty of 10 years.
0 Proposed building of two new prisons and upgrading of an unused
detention centre to create a third.
0 The passing of the Justices (Sentencing) Amendment Act 1988 which
requires a justice not to impose a sentence of imprisonment without
considering all possible alternatives.
oConsideration of greater use of non-custodial penalties such as
community service orders and foreshadowing of a possible home
detention scheme (possibly embodying electronic surveillance) as an
alternative to prison.
These actual and proposed changes reﬂect a mix of concerns, one for
the Government to be seen to be acting tough on punishment in accord with
its electoral promises, another an awareness of the cost implications of many
of their law and order promises. Many of its sentencing reforms—such as those
on car theft—are largely symbolic and at least in the short term will not cost
anything. Many of its other measures are directed at saving money in the
prisons and penal area. The recruitment program for prison ofﬁcers appears to
be relying very heavily on tough rhetoric about discipline in the gaols rather
than any promise of genuinely improved wages and conditions for prison
ofﬁcers. Imposing restrictions on overtime has in fact had the opposite effeCI
and prison officers appear to be resigning in large numbers. The exploration of
alternatives to custody, such as home detention, also reﬂect a recognition of
the need for fiscal stringency.
These fiscal concerns, coupled with the severely overcrowded and
understaffed state of the prisons, appear to have resulted in some cautious
reappraisal of some of the major election proposals of the Coalition. One of
the central slogans of the Coalition was that of “truth in sentencing”, the
“restoration” of which was to entail a radical effective increase in the length of
time served by prisoners as a result of extending the length of non-parole periods
across the board to 75 per cent of the head sentence, removing remissions from
the non-parole period and reintroducing the mandatory life penalty for murder
with a provision to ensure that it would entail a minimum of 20 years prison.
The present fate of these proposals is unclear. As regards the position of life
prisoners the Corrective Services Minister signalled some months ago to the
Release on Licence Board that its approach was unacceptably lenient by
 
 75
rejecting a number of its recommendations. However, no explicit Government
policy or set of legislative proposals has been published by way of an alternative
at the time of writing.
Even within the constraints of a general policy of ﬁscal discipline the
Government is committed to substantial real increases in the level of public
expenditure on law and order. In 1988—98 capital expenditure will increase by
about 160 per cent across all the law and order portfolios. This has to be
considered in the light of the ﬁscal discipline being imposed on most other areas
of state responsibility by the Coalition government. Moreover, the Commission
of Audit Report on the State’s Finances3 indicated that whilst in all the other
major areas of State expenditure (education, health and public transport) the
relative increases during the eighties have only just exceeded the CPI increase
(by about 3 per cent, 4 per cent and 4 per cent respectively), the relative increase
in law and order expenditure has been considerable at almost 25 per cent in
excess of CPI (1988: 14—21). The Premier has on a number of occasions said
that the Government will continue to increase law and order expenditures—to
build more prisons, for example—in so far as it is necessary to “restore public
conﬁdence” in the system of justice.
Some idea of the overall ‘philosophy’ of the Government and of the
place of punishment within it can be derived from the Commission of Audit
Report (hereafter the Curran Report). This document adopts an essentially free~
market view of the role of the State: “The initial and general presumption . . .
should be that the private sector has a number of advantages over the public
sector . . .”4 The Report analyses and condemns the growing size of the public
sector in N.S.W. and seeks to lay the general foundations for a rolling back of
the State, what it refers to as . . a signiﬁcant down-sizing» of Government,
based upon a review of the services and activities in which the Government
should be engaged”5 (emphasis added). Key steps in this process involve the
“corporatisation” and “privatisation” of as many areas of existing government
activity as possible. In this context corporatisation is the next best thing to
privatisation, namely the imposition of market discipline on operations of
public authorities.
This leaves 'the question of just what activities remain the legitimate
responsibility of governments and the public sector. The report refers here to
the provision of . . the social infrastructure needs of the community . . .”6
Aside from a number of regulatory activities, in markets which are distorted,
monopolistic, etc., the key role of government remains the provision of “public
goods—goods which cannot be bought or sold in the conventional sense . . . ,
the typical example given by the report being law and order.
The report appears to be quite sanguine about the rising relative
expenditures on law and order and refers in passing to the need for increased
capital expenditures on policing. These increases are understood as the natural
consequence of growing levels of reported crime.7 Most of the agencies of
5 New South Wales Commission of Audit, Focus on Reform: Report on the Slate's Finance. July
1988.
‘ lbid. 69.
-‘ [bid. 65.
6 ”mi. 67.
lbia'. l8-l9.q
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criminal justice are exempt from the demands of efﬁciency and effectiveness
that are applied to other areas of state administration. The exceptions are
“. . . ‘soft’ areas . . .” such as legal aid where the report concludes . . a
lax approach has developed in the control of expenditure . . 3’3 Detailed
recommendations were made to reorganise the management of the Legal Aid
Commission and to restrict legal aid expenditures, by introducing stricter means
tests, requiring contributions and imposing merit tests on applications for legal
aid.9 The report also suggests that “. . . expenditure on rehabilitation of
prisoners . . .” could be reviewed.'0
The Curran Report and its place in the strategy of the Government is
consistent with a general conservative shift in the politics of the capitalist
democracies, which masquerade under a variety of banners—monetarism, free
market economics, economic rationalism, new right, nee-conservatism, etc. To
varying degrees such political tendencies involve curtailing the role of the state
in a range of areas of social and economic policy in favour of private market
forces, the family and voluntary organisations. All these features are apparent
in N.S.W. at the present time. The notion of a “free economy”, however, does
not imply hostility toward the creation of a “strong state.”” On the contrary,
as the experience in Britain has shown since 1979, a growing authoritarianism
has been precisely one of the conditions for the freeing of market forces.'2 Free
market ideologues all agree that the state retains as its primary role that of the
maintenance of law and order. The state retains the monopoly over the
legitimate exercise of force in order to secure the conditions of freedom within
the market and civil society. Its role is to provide a general framework of rules,
equally applicable to all, within which market freedoms may be exercised. And
indeed as the market is extended into more and more spheres of activity and
state services and provision curtailed, law and order may assume a more
prominent role to contain the effects of, and resistance to, monetarist social and
economic policies.
What, if any, are the particular implications for sentencing and
punishment?
The Government, like its predecessor, has at no time articulated a
detailed and coherent penal policy. Its various slogans—“truth in sentencing”,
“ensure the punishment ﬁts the crime”, “. . . restoring public confidence”—
‘ reﬂect a traditionalist mix of retributive, deterrent and denunciatory concerns
and objectives. They appear to be allied, albeit implicitly, to a number of other
related aspects of punishment and sentencing philosophy, namely the
independence of the judiciary in the sentencing process and the curtailment of
executive discretion in favour of publicly known and determinate sentences
which are proportional to the seriousness of the offence committed. Some see
this retreat into traditionalist ideas about punishment, which is by no means
confined to N.S.W. or Australia, as an effect of a general crisis in penal ideology
" lbid. 58.
9 Ibid. Appendix C I. See also Report to the New South Wales Commission ofAudit on the Legal
Aid Commission of New South Wales. by Touche Ross Services Pty Ltd. June, 1988 (known
as Touche Ross Report).
'0 lbid. l9.
" A Gamble (1979). ‘The Free Economy and the Strong State‘. in R. Miliband and J. Saville
(Eds). Socialist Register. 1979. Merlin, London.
'3 P. Hillyard and .l. Percy-Smith (1988) The Coercive Stare. Fontana, pp. 236—320.
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arising out of the growing disenchantment with notions of reformation and
rehabilitation. It has been hailed as the return to “a justice model“ of
punishment within which utilitarian considerations (such as deterrent effect and
rehabilitation) are relegated to a secondary, if any, role and the focus is restored
to the fundamental question of the justiﬁcations for punishment.
There are a number of problems and tensions within these tendencies
in penal and sentencing policies.
“Truth in Sentencing”
There are more than a few echoes of liberal philosophical debates about
punishment in the catchcry “truth in sentencing”. It represents a return to
punishment as primarily an end in itself—as, in theory, a precise, determinate
quantum of pain inﬂicted on the wrongdoer in exchange for the offence, and
hence also in proportion to its seriousness.” The requirements of determinacy
and proportionality imply also the necessity of quantifiability in penal measures
(usually in terms of time or money). The appropriate locus of punishment is
the free and responsible individual of classical liberalism. Individualism in the
market (freedom, incentive, reward) is matched in the individuation of legally
recognised and imposed responsibility for infringements of legally prescribed
rules. The individual is the taken-for—granted object of debates about crime and
punishment.
With the return of the justice model these matters have been absolutely
central to recent debates about sentencing and punishment, whether in the realm
of day-to-day politics, law reform or more academic and philosophical
discourse. Debates about licence release, remissions, parole and sentence
maxima reﬂect the centrality of determinacy, proportionality and quantiﬁability
to penal discourse and are almost invariably discussed at the present time in
these terms rather than by reference to other possible objectives.
These concerns are not confined to politicians or popular debate,
Sentencing inquiries such as that of the Australian Law Reform CommissionM
and the Victorian Sentencing Committee” also opt for a justice or desert-based
conception of punishment, for “truth in sentencing” and the curtailment of
executive discretion in the penal system through, in particular, the abolition,
phasing out or restriction of remission systems.
A critical point about such general conceptions of punishment and the
philosophical foundations upon which they rest is that they do not specify in
any detail either how we should punish or how much. Thus many sentencing
.inquiries and commentators in countries like Australia, Britain and North
America in, recent years have argued for ﬁxed and determinate sentencing with
much reduced sentence maxima for all or most categories of offence. Others—
academics, commentators or politicians—agree that there should be truth‘ in
sentencing, but that sentence maxima should be increased. The demand for
“justice” does not in any sense resolve these fundamental ideological differences.
“Truth in sentencing” focuses attention on, and upholds, the role of the
judiCiary in the sentencing process. The court determines and pronounces
'3 B. Hudson (I987), Justice through Punishment, Macmillan. pp. 37—58.
" Australian Law Reform Commission (I988). Sentencing. Repon No. 44, p. 35.
'5 Victorian Sentencing Committee (I987), Victorian Sentencing Discussion Paper, Melbourne.
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sentence; it is for the executive (the penal authorities) to implement the sentence
of the court. Much criticism has been directed at what is regarded as
administrative interference with the sentence of the court. Of course, in practice
such concern has been limited to only some areas of executive discretion,
primarily those affecting the length of time persons serve in prison
(i.e., remissions, licence release and parole). The meaning of the sentence for
judicialand other critics of penal administration is to be understood essentially,
if not exclusively, in terms of its quantitative aspect—the period of time for
which an offender is deprived of his/her freedom by incarceration.
The qualitative aspects of the sentence seem to occupy the minds of such
critics to no great extent It might be thought, for example, that whether a
prisoner serves a sentence in maximum or minimum security, crowded with
one or two other persons in a small one person cell, or in protected segregation,
'makes a material difference to what a sentence of imprisonment means and how
it is experienced. In focusing on the quantitative aspects of prison sentences,
the proponents of “truth in sentencing” have basically ignored some other truths
about sentencing—the conditions under which sentences are served and their
effects on prisoners and ultimately on the society beyond the walls.
Whilst the conditions under which executive power is usually exercised
.may facilitate corruption and abuse, this has invariably been to the detriment
rather than the benefit of prisoners in terms of the administration of
punishment. One need only consider the history of Grafton Prison in the 30
years prior to the Nagle Royal Commission to grasp the point. “Truth in
sentencing” should, if it is to be anything other than a vacuous slogan,
encompass some concern for the accountability of executive decision-making
generally, including in regard to the qualitative aspects of penal administration.
No guarantee of this lies in the restoration of judicial control over the
quantitative aspect of sentencing.
However, as long as appropriate mechanisms of accountability exist with
regard to executive powers, it does not seem to me that executive powers to
release or modify sentence lengths through remission systems, etc., are
inherently objectionable. The reality is that the executive have the responsibility
to administer important aspects of the penal system within deﬁnite institutional
and resource constraints. Where the pursuit of agreed and articulated
administrative objectives within the penal system or changed circumstances
(e.g. severe overcrowding) warrant decisions that affect periods of incarceration
as nominally provided by the courts this seems to me to be, in principle, a
legitimate exercise of public power. This is especially so where it is directed at
mitigating a harshness that could not have been intended by a sentencing court.
Those who would dissent from this view on the basis that a judicial
sentence should not give way to administrative convenience should more closely
inspect the extent to which this occurs (and unavoidably so) in pretrial decision-
making and the sentencing process already. Proponents of “truth in sentencing”
have been overwhelmingly preoccupied with what they see as illegitimate
interference by the executive in the post-sentence stage. However, to be
consistent it must be recognised that there is a highly selective filtering process
by which persons reach the point of sentence. Of course, limited if any control
can be exercised over the earlier processes such as reporting and detecting crime.
However, decisions as to charge and prosecution directly affect the sentencing
process and are routinely inﬂuenced by myriad factors bearing little relation to
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the offence in question. Thus granting indemnities to informants (and its more
informal and less visible variants) and charge and plea bargaining all infringe
any pure conception of “truth in sentencing” in the interests of other law
enforcement objectives. This continues in the courtroom itself where sentencing
discounts for pleading guilty and for providing information to police or
prosecution authorities reﬂect a concern for other objectives, such as reducing
court delays, etc., over and above “truth in sentencing” proportionality, etc.
Many of these practices and the objectives they serve are sanctioned by.
the courts, openly or implicitly. Moreover, many of the areas in question are
probably less publicly accountable than decisions in the post-sentence stage. The
various practices and objectives apparent in the latter can hardly be regarded,
as a matter of general principle, as less valid and justifiable than those operative
at other stages of the criminal process.
Although legal punishment in our society consists of a heterogeneous
range of penalties and concrete practices the debate about “truth in sentencing”
tends to focus almost exclusively on the deprivation of freedom through
incarceration for a precise quantum of time. There is an ambivalence about
supervised release which is often treated as simply “freeing” persons from the
actual punishment given by the court. Of course, others, mainly radical critics,
see all forms of community surveillance as, on the contrary, an extension of
state control.'6 The important point lies less in the speciﬁc characterisation than
in the tendency to conceive the problem in terms of a bipolarity between
punishment (or control/coercion) and freedom, each of them being understood
in abstract general terms. ~
Freedom here is conceived as the absence of external coercion and,
conversely, punishment hypothesises its object in terms of the otherwise free
and responsible individual for whom deprivation of freedom for a given time
represents a punishment. This implicit conceptualisation of punishment returns
us to the liberal philosophical debate about punishment within which the central
question is the right of the state to punish. This issue is critical for liberals for
it deals with the conditions under which the state is entitled to coerce otherwise
free individual subjects, i.e., the boundaries demarcating state compulsion and
the sphere of freedom known as civil society. Recent restatements of liberalism
seek to expand the sphere of market freedoms and limit the role of the state to
largely protective functions, as the discussion of the Curran Report indicated
earlier. Punishment in the liberal schema is understood as the negation of
freedom; it is simply something negative that is done by politically constituted
authority to proven wrongdoers in accord with specific legal regulations (as to
quantum, etc.). >
Many liberal understandings of punishment (especially those becoming
popular again under the banner of the justice model) see this conception of
punishment as non-utilitarian and its defence as obviating any need to prove
positive consequences in terms of reduced law breaking. However, this is not
absolutely so. As Paul I-Iirstl7 points out, it presupposes at a minimum that
concrete practices intended to punish actually have this effect, are indeed penal
in nature; that the free individuals of liberal market society are deprived of their
”' S. Cohen (1985) Visions ofSocial Control, Polity Press. ch. 2.
'7 P. Hirst. (I986) ‘The Concept of Punishment' in Law. Socialism and Democracy, Allen and
Unwin.
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‘freedom’ by sentences of imprisonment. Whilst this may seem obvious. it
remains a largely unexplored issue in penology's. Again analysis of concrete
penal practices and their effects is subordinated to general and abstract
propositions about punishment.
Some recent research aimed at exploring the deterrent effect of the threat
of punishment is suggestive with regard to this issue. Some interviews with
convicted armed robbery offendersl9 that I was involved in a few years ago were
directed at exploring the relationship between offending behaviour and offender
beliefs about the potential consequences of offending. The approach was
inﬂuenced by a similar study of convicted burglars conducted in Britain”. What
both studies seemed to indicate is that the majority of offenders did not think
about the consequences of offending at the time of committing speciﬁc offences,
although most generally believed that they would eventually get caught. Bennett
and Wright concluded that there is a “. . . complex relationship between beliefs
held and beliefs used in decision-making . . .”2', such that offenders may
consciously choose to dismiss the possibility of arrest on particular occasions
to enable them to actually commit the offence. For those concerned about the
deterrent effects of punishment these ﬁndings are of some importance.
More interesting and surprising though was that several of the robbery
offenders interviewed described in various ways the relief they felt when they
got caught. A couple of those who had a heroin dependency regarded it as
simply a question of whether they would be caught before they killed themselves
with an overdose. And Bennett and Wright found the same with some of the
burglars interviewed. I would not suggest that these are in any sense
representative ﬁndings, although it is interesting that they emerged, quite
incidentally, in studies of what many would regard as typically instrumental
crimes. My point is only that they may suggest that many of the assumptions
that are made about the essentially penal nature of state imposed penalties may
not coincide in any simple way with the experiences of criminal offenders
themselves.
It is also worth noting in this context the ﬁndings of a study done by a
Probation and Parole Ofﬁcer on deaths of persons under the supervision of the
N.S.W. Probation and Parole Service“. The majority of the deceased were on
adult probation although about a ﬁfth were on parole. The study found that the
mortality rate amongst the supervised population was at least six times that of
the same age group in the general population. The principal causes of death
were suicides, road accidents, diseases and drug overdoses. If mortality rate can
be treated as one general indicator of the quality of life, of the nature of the
‘freedom’ enjoyed by the so—called ‘clients’ of our penal system, then perhaps
we should pause before we conclude that ‘freedom’ and ‘punishment’ are simple
polar opposites in our society.
We have a pretty good idea of who goes to prison in this country. The
prison population is disproportionately male, young, Aboriginal, poor,
unemployed, etc. However, little attention is paid to the meanings of
”‘ Compare with N. Christie (1981) Limits to Pain, Martin Robertson. pp. 9—l0.
'9 N.S.W. Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (1987). Robbery. Sydney.
’0 T. Bennett and S. Wright (1984) Burglars on Burglary. Gower.
1' ibid. p. 143.
33 R. Haege (undated) A Review of Deaths of Persons under Community Supervision by the New
South Wales Probation and Parole Service July l982—December I983. p. l5.
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imprisonment for the people who experience it. Within liberal theories of
punishment these particularities (of class, race, culture, age, etc), are less
important than the abstraction that unites all the objects and potential objects
of punishment, namely their status as free and responsible legal subjects. The
point I want to make here is not that the conditions and pains of imprisonment
are not frequently appalling for prisoners, but rather than for many of them so
much of the rest of their lives may have been too. The discontinuity between
life on the outside and life in prison may, for a vast range of differing reasons,
not be so obvious or dramatic for many offenders as we tend to assume.
A long history (dating at least from the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act
(UK) and the 1835 Prisons Act (U.K.), of concerted attempts to ensure that
. the conditions prevailing in institutions like workhouses and prisons were “less
eligible” than those confronting the most lowly paid “free” labourer have by
and large made our institutions pretty tem’ble places, but it just may be that
for many people in our society their particular conditions of “freedom” are no
less terrible.
“Restoring Public Confidence”
The other major cornerstone in the Govemment’s approach to law and
order is that of “public confidence” in the justice system. The Premier was
quoted in May as saying—“. . . ultimately, if in order to have a system of
justice which makes sense to the people you have to have more jails, then we
will have more jails.” (Sydney Morning Herald, 4/5/88). This emphasis has some
afﬁnity with denunciatory conceptions of punishment, the view that it is
necessary to punish as a means of “. . . channelling and expressing society’s
condemnation of the offender’s behaviour”,23 and reinforcing the morale of
those who respect the law. Punishment is a symbolic reafﬁrmation of the law
and social order:
The assumption seems to be that a certain level of sentences is needed in
order to reinforce social values, to ensure that they do not wither away
and to create the conditions in‘ which they are transmitted from generation
to generation; moreover, it is assumed that sentencers are able to interpret
and weigh these social values.
However, as Ashworth also points out . . this begs a whole range of
questions about the effect of sentencing practices upon people’s attitudes and
behaviour. How much do people know about sentencing practice?”24 It might
be conceded that some level of sanction is an unavoidable dimension of legal
ordering, but the denunciatory objectives of sentencing and punishment fail to
provide any real basis for determining the means or quantum of such
sanctioning.
“Public conﬁdence” or “morale” are highly nebulous concepts. In
complex, pluralistic and socially segmented societies they can hardly be said to
have any spontaneous existence, whether related to punishment or anything else.
Rather they are as if shaped, consulted and represented within the dominant
organs of public-discourse itself, namely the mass media and the views of
politicians and other public commentators.
33 A. Ashworth (I983). Sentencing and Penal Policy. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p. 300.
1‘ Ibid. p. 30L
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There is a grave danger that invoking “public conﬁdence” as a yardstick
of, and guide to penal policy, without confronting the means of its construction,
and in particular its dependency precisely on the terms of political discourse
on penal matters, risks setting in train spiralling “public demands” for more
punishment. If public conﬁdence in criminal justice depends upon meeting a
set of expectations with regard to crime that simply cannot be met by punishing
individuals then a self-perpetuating cycle may be initiated in which the demand
for more punishment is generated by its own failure.
In N.S.W. the Government feels compelled by political and public
pressures to articulate a tougher stance on sentencing and punishment—longer
maxima, more gaols, etc—although there is clearly a concern about the ﬁscal
implications of this. One way of seeking to resolve this is to increase sentence
maxima, such as they are doing with regard to car theft, in the hope perhaps
that the actual sentencing practices of the courts do not alter signiﬁcantly. That
way the rhetoric and symbols of toughness can be sustained and public
conﬁdence claimed without bearing all the costs of a substantially increased
prison‘ population. Of course, with such changes the Government may be
backing itself into a corner. It can hardly complain if the courts begin to hand
out longer sentences, but if so it may confront a crisis of massive proportions
in the prison system which any ﬁscally feasible prison building program would
not relieve. What it does about the whole question of remissions and parole,
therefore, will be of utmost importance to the outcome of these contradictory
aspects of its penal policy. We could hardly be surprised if “truth in sentencing”
is the major casualty in this process. The Government would then ﬁnd itself
publicly articulating a tough symbolic stance focussed on sentence maxima, etc.
whilst busily ﬁnding ways of mitigating its effect via less visible forms of
executive action, just as the former government did.
If these tensions and contradictions are to be avoided or lessened it will
be necessary to begin to develop a different law and'order politics—a different
language and different strategies.
Some Conclusions
Perhaps we have been so singularly unsuccessful in dealing with the
problem of crime because we have simpliﬁed it to the problem of the
criminal. In other words, remedies have been sought within the existing
systemic structure, rather than in an open system. Beliefs in the necessity
and utility of punishment are so strong that they not only inhibit, by
absorbing available resources, a wider search for remedial measures, but
also put a cloud of suspect morality over any such activities. Punishment,
it is thought, contains all or most of the elements of remedial measures
required for dealing with criminal activity. This assumed linkage is
unsupported by evidence (no useful correlations which would support this
view have yet been found) and its persistence disturbs the whole framework
within which punishment is considered. If the thinking about the need to
provide remedies were (notionally) separated from the demand for
punishment, a new perspective might arise in relation to both punishment
and remedial measures.25
’5 L. Wilkins (l984) Consumerist Crimono/ogv, Heinemann, p. 71.
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The Government may survive to regret the lack of attention shown by
the Commission of Audit to questions of efﬁciency and effectiveness in
punishment and policing. The implication of much of the foregoing is that crime
is not primarily a criminal justice or penal problem and that persistence in
treating it as such will prove enormously costly—socially, economically and in
terms of the quality of our public institutions.
, The Australian Institute of Criminology recently concluded after
carefully considering all the available data regarding the incidence of criminal
activity and the role of the criminal justice system that if the rate of
imprisonment was doubled in Australia it would affect one ﬁfth of one per cent
of criminal offending.26
This is not to hold out the utopian prospect of abandoning punishment
completely. The infliction in some form and degree of legal punishment is a
necessary aspect of any legal system. Thereafter, how we punish and how much
are questions that are going to be largely determined, not by the interminable
philosophical debates and slogans that we are so familiar with, but by political
conditions—the programs and strategies of political organisations, the demands
of “the public”, the role of the news media in dealing with these questions, etc.27
Foremost amongst the political tasks of those concerned about the
direction of law and order debate and the disproprotionate weight given to
punishment in this debate is to shift its terms in the direction of the sorts of
policies that might reduce crime. For the most part these policies lie in areas
like employment, urban planning, child care, youth, housing, etc. As Wilkins
suggests in the above quote, such talk is often treated as indicative of moral
equivocation about crime and the blameworthiness of individual offenders. This
-need not be so. We can blame and sanction offenders whilst simultaneously
recognising that, as Wilkins also suggests, other measures are necessary to reduce
crime. Concern about victims and potential victims, rather than any particular
sympathy with offenders, provides good grounds for pursuing strategies which
would reduce crime. Equal access to personal security cannot be provided
simply through a framework of protective criminal laws and punishments
directed at actual and potential offenders. In this crucial respect the classical
liberal promise that the state is to provide the conditions of freedom cannot be
met whilst ever that freedom is conceived in negative terms as the absence of
positive and speciﬁcally directed State provision. The necessary conditions for
the actual exercise of concrete, speciﬁc and meaningful freedoms—such as
freedom of movement, for example—cannot be provided by a system of
punishments, however, ‘just’, draconian, etc., they might be. Ironically, at the
present time the rhetoric and avowed political commitment to do something
about crime has reached some sort of pitch whilst many of the forms of social
provision that are most likely to inﬂuence it are being increasingly questioned
and rOlled back in the name of the free market. For adherents to such forms of
liberal individualism and free market economies there is little alternative but
to fall back on punishment as the solution to crime. '
2“ S. Mukherjee. T. Psaila, J. Walker, A. Scandia and D. Dagger (I987). The Size oflhe Crime
Problem in Auslralia. Australian Institute of Criminology.
17 see Brown (footnote 2) for a more detailed analysis of these issues.
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I have challenged the view that freedom and punishment should be
understood in simple dichotomous terms, and that freedom should be
understood simply as the absence of coercion. These claims leave open the view,
an increasingly unpopular one in recent years, that punishment need not simply
be treated as entirely negative. Perhaps the state can punish whilst also seeking
to enlarge some opportunities, some freedoms, for individual offenders.
Some alternatives to custody, such as probation and community service
orders, could have this effect. However, the resource commitment in such areas
is limited by comparison with prisons. Where they are given attention it is
largely as cheap alternatives to gaol rather than as viable penal measures in
themselves. Data collected by the Australian Institute of Criminology indicates
that in N.S.W. the estimated average per capita costs per annum of
imprisonment is over twenty times that of non-custodial orders and post-prison
orders.28
Certainly, the post-custodial supervision and support of offenders could
be enhanced if more resources were committed to them. Many commentators
have noted the absurdity of a penal policy which removes persons from the
community, sometimes for long periods of time, and then invariably places
them back in precisely the same, or a worse, situation as that in which they
were offending before. Quite apart from the effects of imprisoment itself, very
little is done to inﬂuence or change the immediate material features of the
environment into which prisoners are restored. Prisoners tell you time and time
again that the first three or four months after release are a crucial time. You
would not know this from examining government penal policies.
A further reorientation in penal policy is worth pondering. There have
been announcements suggesting that home detention and related forms of
community surveillance are likely to be introduced in N.S.W. soon. There are
quite a few problems and legitimate concerns with such proposals, but apart
from anything else they demonstrate a lack of imagination. Such strategies might
operate as a more useful and less socially costly alternative to imprisonment if
they were directed at creating zones of exclusion rather than zones of detention.
Rather than seeking to keep persons within confined spaces or operate a
generalised surveillance why not operate prohibitions directed at precisely those
activities, places, times, etc., that are most related to their particular known
patterns of offending. l have grave misgivings about electronic surveillance. If
it were to be implemented though let us think more creatively about its possible
uses. It might be able to be used for example to protect victims of domestic
violence. Rather than the object of the surveillance being to ensure that the
offender does not leave a certain area (home, etc), why not seek to use it to
ensure that the he/she does not approach a certain place or persons. An order
that a violent husband and/or father stay away from his family could be backed
up by a form of surveillance aimed at securing speciﬁc effects whilst minimising
the degree of control over other aspects of the life of the offender.
Whatever, the specific problems I think the point is that it is time to
think more imaginatively about how some penal interventions at least might
function constructively and remedially, to use Wilkins’ term.
1" Australian lnstitute of Criminology U988): Adults under Supervision and Detention Orders.
Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No. I4.
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At the same time the law and order debate needs to be somewhat
broadened to encompass more than a concern with punishment (and policing)
if it is to lead tochanges that will actually reduce crime.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Russell Hogg
My paper is less concerned with the internal aspects of sentencing than it is
with the political context of sentencing and punishment in New South Wales
at the present time. 1 apologise for covering some of the same ground as Paul
Ward although some of these things cannot be said often enough. I do not
apologise for the essentially polemical nature of what I have to say.
I want to begin by stating some general propositions. I then want to go
on and consider a few of their implications for contemporary penal debate and
proposals in New South Wales.
The ﬁrst proposition is that so far as sentencing and punishment is
concerned there is not much new under the sun. The penal debate is pretty
much characterised at the present time, it seems to me, by monotonous
repetition of fairly familiar philosophies, themes and ideas. We have a wide
spectrum of possible ways of punishing available to us and there are not going
to be any miraculous discoveries. ~
The second proposition is that there is a demand, at least, for some level
of sanctioning through punishment and it is utopian to expect that a legal
system can operate without coercive sanctioning of some kind and degree. That
is not a view that I used to have.
Thirdly, and this is perhaps a little more controversial, it is pretty clear
that within any conceivable limits as to how we might punish and how much
we might punish what can be achieved by such punishments by way of
positively inﬂuencing the conduct of offenders and would-be offenders is very
limited. Researchers at the Australian Institute of Criminology concluded that
if we doubled the rate of imprisonment in Australia it would affect about one
ﬁfth of 1 per cent of criminal offending, i.e., 0.2 per cent of criminal offending.
Even if we assumed that this understates the effects of changing the
imprisonment rates on crime, there is little doubt that these effects within any
feasible policy for increasing the use of imprisonment are going to be minimal.
There is a wealth of evidence from other sources which supports this conclusion.
The ﬁfth proposition which I draw from this is that we should be ﬁnding
ways to reduce to a minimum the amount and cost of punishment.
Finally and most importantly this in my view is largely a political task.
Far more attention needs to be given to the conditions for actually affecting
signiﬁcant changes to the organisation of punishment. These conditions are
social and political and not __ philosophical and logical. They concern the
processes of judicial practice, public opinion formation, party political policy
development, and so on. Of central importance here is the need to begin the
task of reconstructing the terms of public and political debate around law and
order so that punishment no longer occupies the central place, so that it will be
commonly understood that punishment does not reduce crime, that we can
afford to punish less and that we must turn to other measures and strategies to
combat crime.
The recent experiences in Britain'and North America pr0vide some
lessons for us to ponder at a time when it appears that we might be following
in their footsteps, as has been so often the case in the past. Both countries have
experienced since the early ’705 rising imprisonment rates and a greater
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proportional use of prison as a penalty for convicted offenders. In Britain in
the ’805 the average daily prison population has increased by 20 per cent and
receptions into custody by over 30 per cent. As of 1987 approximately 18 500
prisoners—more than a third of the prison population—are being held or were
being held two or three to a cell assigned for one person. The US. is probably
the most punitive country of any in the western industrial world when it comes
to formal punishment. It has consistently had one of the highest imprisonment
rates and yet since the early ’705 it has more than doubled its imprisonment
rate so that now more than 250 of every 100 000 Americans are inprison. This
is three to four times the rate of imprisonment in New South Wales and
Australia.
Also during the same period in the United States capital punishment
has been re-introduced in the majority of States. In both Britain and the US.
expansionist prison policies have been politically legitimized, encouraged, and
facilitated by a punitive political rhetoric on law and order. Yet increasingly
the crisis in conditions and resources that this has produced has forced
correctional authorities to not only build more gaols, in the case of Britain the
biggest prison building program since the mid 19th century and the birth of
modern penitentiaries, but it has forced governments and penal authorities to
seek less costly altenatives in the community: the ideas of home detention and
electronic surveillance being amongst the principle measures directed at coping
with the penal crisis at the present time. It is also in this climate that the idea
of privatising prisons has also found favour. As Paul Ward has indicated, at
least in respect of America, steeply increasing imprisonment rates have,
however, also been accompanied by steeply increasing ofﬁcial crime rates.
In Britain serious crimes known to the police have risen by over 50 per
cent in the 19805, and that is in the face of a fierce law-and-order rhetoric and
steeply increasing use of prison. There have been, at least, for the post-war
period unprecedently growing crime rates in Britain. Considering the case of
Britain only, what stands out, after almost ten years of an avowedly tough law-
and-order government, is perhaps the futility and dangerousness of the law-and-
order rhetoric which helped launch such an era in 1979. For myself, I have little
doubt that the social upheaval in Britain in the ’805 is straighforwardly the
principal cost of the type of economic order that that government has sought
to entrench in Britain but, that aside, the commitment to economic
individualism and rolling back the welfare State means that the natural
explanation for crime has been sought in individual failing and its suppression
in an intensification of punitive control. To acknowledge that rising crime rates
might have something to do with poverty, unemployment and the creation of
an urban under-class with very little investment in the society they inhabit
would be to make concessions to an understanding of the working of society
and the role of government that wholly contradicts the tenets of Thatcherite
conservatism. At present the conservative government is caught within a
contradiction of its own making. Its rhetoric has unleased a constant and self
perpetuating demand for more draconian measures which feeds off the very
failure of such a rhetoric to deliver the goods on law and order. Forced to keep
faith with such a rhetoric it has to pour more and more money into what is
effectively a bottomless pit, a law-and-order abyss, and anybody who read the
reports of the recent Tory conference in Brighton just this month, in fact, will
see that very much in evidence. Over 200 motions on law-and-order and over
20 motions demanding the reintroduction of capital punishment, more and
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more punishment in the context of an already very tough law-and-order policy
which has basically been shown to be poverty stricken, as a means of reducing
crime levels in that country.
Unlike Britain and the U.S., New South Wales has not generally opted
for an expansionist prison policy over the ’705 and ’805. Like Britain and the
US. though it has experienced generally increased ofﬁcial rates of serious crime.
The comparison suggests however that a commitment to more punitive penal
policy in New South Wales, as Paul Ward has said, would have done very little
if anything to reduce crime rates.
I refer to these developments in Britain and the US. not simply because
in New South Wales we now have a new government of the right which is
implementing and proposing similar sorts of penal and social policies but
because of the more general tendency in popular discourse and in the
programmes of both left and right to seek solutions to crime problems through
tougher penal policies. At the state election earlier this year both parties
promised tougher policies on law-and-order, more prisons, harsher penalties,
and so on. (There is more detail given in the written paper, pages 72—74.)
In the paper I have sought to examine critically some of the major
themes within contemporary New South Wales penal politics; in particular, the
promise to restore truth in sentencing and restore public conﬁdence in the
criminal justice system. There has been a lot of talk about ‘restoration’. This is
a familiar theme in law-and-order debates. It presupposes some golden age of
social harmony, legal integrity, and widespread respect for authority. In reality
this is a distortion of the past, and rather a major simpliﬁcation of the problems
and tasks that confront us in the present. As I will attempt to show at least, in
a little detail the problems and pressures surrounding sentencing and the penal
system have been perennial ones.
A major cornerstone in the Greiner govemment’s approach to law-and-
order is that of public conﬁdence in the justice system and the Attorney General
reiterated this in his opening remarks. The Premier' was quoted in May as
saying, and I quote him:
Ultimately, if in order to have a system of justice which makes sense to
the people you have to have more gaols, then we will have more gaols.
However, I would like to suggest that public conﬁdence is a highly
nebulous concept. In a complex pluralistic and socially segmented society it can
hardly be said to have any spontaneous existence whether related to punishment
or any other issue. It does not materialise independently of its construction and
representation within the dominant organs of public discourse: the news media,
the entertainment media, the views of political parties, politicians, and other
public commentators. There is a grave danger that in invoking public conﬁdence
as a guide to penal policy without confronting the means of its construction
there will be set in train spiralling public demands for more punishment. If
public conﬁdence in criminal justice depends upon meeting a set of expectations
with regard to crime that simply cannot be met by punishing individuals, then
a self-perpetuating cycle may be initiated in which the demand for more
punishment is simply generated out of its own failure.
' Sydney Morning Herald. 4th May. 1988.
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In New South Wales the government appears to feel compelled by
political and public pressures to articulate a tougher stance on sentencing and
punishment, and that is true of the former government at least in the latter years
of its time in power. This is reﬂected in the commitment to longer sentence
maxima for some offences such as car theft, the proposed abolition of remissions
off the non-parole period, the proposed across the board increase of the non-
parole period to 75 per cent of the head, sentence, the proposal to ensure that
all life prisoners serve substantially longer periods in custody, and, of course,
the proposal to build several new prisons. Despite these proposals there is an
obvious concern about the ﬁscal implications of penal administration in New
South Wales at the present time. I will return to that issue after considering
what I consider to be the other core theme within the govemment’s penal policy,
that of ‘truth in sentencing’.
Central to the restoration of public conﬁdence in the justice system is
held to be the idea of ‘truth in sentencing’. (Whenever I use that term I use it
in inverted commas.) This represents a return to punishment as primarily an
end in itself, as in theory a precise determinate quantum of pain inﬂicted on
the wrongdoer in exchange for the offence and hence also in proportion to the
seriousness of that offence. With the return to what is often referred to as the
‘justice model of punishment’ these matters have been absolutely central to
recent debates about sentencing and punishment whether in the realm of day
to day politics, law reform, ormore academic and philosophical discourse. That
was apparent in George Zdenkowski’s paper, as being the case with respect to
the current proposals by the Australian Law Reform Commission. Thus debates
about licence release, remissions, parole and sentence maxima, reﬂect the
centrality of determinacy and proportionalin to penal discourse and are almost
invariably discussed at the present time in these terms rather than by reference
to other possible objectives.
‘Truth in sentencing’ focuses attention on and upholds the role of the
judiciary in the sentencing process. The court determines and pronounces
sentence, it is for the Executive, the penal authorities, to implement the sentence
of the court. Much criticism has been directed at what is regarded as
administrative interference with the sentence of the court. The apotheosis of
that in New South Wales being the scandals over the early release scheme when
Rex Jackson was Minister for Corrective Services. But it is important to note
that in practice such concern with administrative interference has been limited
to only some areas of executive discretion. Primarily those affecting the length
of time persons actually serve in prison, i.e., they focus on things like,
remissions, licence release, and parole. The meaning of the sentence is to be
understood essentially in terms of its quantitative aspect, thus, the period of
time for which an offender is deprived of his of her freedom by incarceration.
The qualitative aspects of the sentence are given very little attention at all in
this debate. It might be thought, for example, that whether a prisioner serves a
sentence in maximum or minimum security, crowded with one or two other
persons in a cell designed for one person, or in protective segregation, makes
some material difference to what a sentence of imprisonment actually means
and how it is experienced. In focussing on the quantitive aspects of prison
sentences the proponents of ‘truth in sentencing’ have ignored some other truths
about sentencing in New South Wales. For example the severe overcrowding
of our gaols, the appalling conditions of many of them including levels of
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violence and a mortality rate many times that that exists in the general
population. It goes without saying I think that these conditions are not Without
their effect on the outside world.
Whilst the conditions under which executive power is usually exercised
in the penal system may facilitate corruption and abuse at time, this has
invariably been to the detriment rather than the beneﬁt of prisoners although
you would not actually know that from the terms in which ‘truth in sentencing’
is actually discussed. ,One need only consider the history of Grafton prison in
the 30 years prior to the Nagle Royal Commission to grasp the point. ‘Truth
in sentencing’ should, if it is to be anything other than a vacuous slogan,
encompass some concern for the accountability of executive decision making
generally, including in regard to the qualitative aspects of penal administration
and not simply the quantitative ones. No guarantee lies for this in the
restoration of judicial control over the quantitative aspect of sentencing.
But I would go much further than this. Janet Chan argued in a paper
given at the ANZAAS Conference earlier this year that there never has been
such a thing as ‘truth in sentencing’ if by that is meant the absence of any
executive role in the determination of the periods of incarceration. She suggests
that remission and conditional release are in fact two of the oldest institutions
of prison management in this State. The ticket-of—leave system for example was
a key institution in the early development of the British colony in Australia.
The ticket-of—leave and subsequent forms of executive release served a number
of functions including the relief of the State revenue, the provision of positive
incentives to good conduct, and also the rewarding of police informants and
then as now there was much criticism of this alleged leniency. However the
unchanged and I think the unchanging reality is that the executive, i.e., the
Department of Corrective Services in this State, has the responsibility to
administer important aspects of the penal system within deﬁnite institutional
and resource constraints. Penal management is both a ﬁscal and administrative
enterprise and entails, of necessity, a degree of autonomy. What is needed, it
seems to me, is a substantial enhancement of the mechanisms of executive
accountability, not an ostrich-like evasion of the real problems it poses in the
name of ‘truth in sentencing’. This is becoming more vital as the recurrent
tensions grow between on the one hand the ideological commitment to tougher
penal policies and on the other the ﬁscal and administrative constraints on their
implementation. The New South Wales Minister of Corrective Services has
recently mooted various methods of coping with these contradictory pressures
whilst not resiling from commitments on parole and life sentence prisoners. He
has suggested that more use ought to be made of alternatives to custody
exploring the possibilities of home detention coupled with electronic
surveillance appears as one option. However, quite apart from the many other
objections that might be made to electronic surveillance it is by no means clear
that the types of offenders for whom it is being suggested, and indeed it is being
used in some US. jurisdictions, would actually contribute to the overall rate of
imprisonment to any great degree. It may, like so many other so—called
community alternatives before it, serve as an alternative to existing alternatives
rather than as an alternative to imprisonment itself.
The privatisation of prisons has also been suggested. There is nothing
new about private prisons. Their history goes back at least to the 17th and 18th
centuries. No evidence exists from the past or current experiments with
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privatisation in the US. which suggests that they will contribute to solving the
fiscal or administrative problems attending penal administration at the present
time. In the US. less than 1 percent of State and Federal prisons are under
contract to private ﬁrms. Most of those that are tend to be low security
detention facilities for juveniles or illegal immigrants which provide dormitory
type accommodation. Privatisation of prisons is another short term ideological
diversion from the basic problems it seems to me.
I would like to conclude by returning to one of my initial propositions.
I have said that it is necessary to recognise that ultimately the question of the
social organisation of punishment is not primarily a matter of adopting the
correct penal philosophy, good ideas, or rational blueprints for change, but
rather a question of what the political trafﬁc will bear at any given time.
Governments and public bureaucracies act within definite constraints which
they have limited power to modify but I have to reiterate that a start must be
made by adopting an explicit policy of keeping imprisonment down and seeking
to secure public legitimacy for this particular objective. The overwhelming
danger of a populist commitment to tough penal policy is that invariably it will
result in the government thereafter pursuing, surreptitiously, policies which will
mitigate the intolerable ﬁscal and administrative consequences of those public
commitments. I think that is the experience of the last government, and I
honestly cannot believe that it will not be the experience under the present
government if it continues with its commitments to substantially lengthen the
sentences of many categories of offender.
I have suggested in the written paper that there is a need to reconstitute
the terms of political and public debate about law-and-order (page 82). An
effective law-and-order strategy must address far greater attention to crime
prevention through social policy in areas like employment, youth policy, urban
planning, industry policy, child care, and the like rather than simply relying
upon the penal system. But, of course, I think such changes will not occur in
an institutional and political vacuum. In New South Wales, even more than in
other places, I think there has been a powerful political ethos of ‘government
by stealth’. It is not the property of any single political party and it has been
especially marked in relation to criminal justice matters. It has invited I think
a corresponding ethos outside government of seeking to bring about change by
scandal and expose.
Throughout all the recent debates about corruption and the lowly
standards of public administration in New South Wales, including the early
release scheme, too little has been said about the basic and routine organisation
and processes of government in New South Wales as against the problems
presented by corrupt individuals and the need for special investigations and new
agencies, usually with extraordinary powers. The instinctive response has been
to establish a special inquiry or create yet another powerful executive agency
such as the Independent Commission against Corruption. We find ourselves in
the ironic situation of checking executive power, not by extending democratic
processes, but by enhancing the executive itself, by extending or creating ,,
powerful and sometimes even more secretive executive agencies. It has also
meant that public debate and scrutiny of state institutions and practices tends
to occur in the context of sensational events, prisoner escapes, tragic events such
as the Jamie Partlic bashing, and so on. Thus what is generally, I would argue,
a diverse, unsettled and fragmentary public opinion is shaped in the context of
extreme events and by reference to the exceptional and unrepresentative case.
92
If sound democratic administration depends on the dissemination of
information and the active promotion of debate then it should be recognised
that the level and quality of routine public reporting by law-and-order
bureaucracies in New South Wales is generally very poor both in content and
in presentation. I refer to things like basic information in relation to policing
and corrective services, such as deaths in custody, the number of people who
are killed in high speed car chases, basic information about the levels of escape
and so on. These things do not appear in the basic reporting mechanisms of
our law-and-order bureaucracies. We lack basic data about the functioning of
these agencies. More importantly, the role of the democratic processes of
governmenta—I am referring to the Parliament and parliamentary processes——
is limited with regard to matters of State administration including penal
administration. This is a consequence I think, on the one hand, of the
subjugation of the democratic arm of government to the executive and, on the
other, the use of parliamentary processes for purposes of generalised combat
between the government and the opposition. The concern to debate and
disseminate that information and ideas about speciﬁc issues and matters of
policy tends to be rather marginalised. For example, in New South Wales there
is no extensive committee system and in general a sparing use of the
parliamentary process is actually made to actively and genuinely check and
debate matters of public administration in all their facets as against simply
embarrassing the government of the day. The Public Accounts Committee deals
with some aspects of public administration but there is room for a much more
extensive parliamentary role in addressing the issues and dilemmas posed by
law-and-order and penal administration and I would suggest especially by the
extension of all party parliamentary committees. The British Parliament, for
example, has an all party committee on penal affairs which looks at issues like
privatisation, for example, or the use of electronic surveillance. It conducts
lengthy investigations and that serves, though this may seem very mundane, (I
am trying to concentrate on things which I regard as realisable changes which
would contribute to a more informed debate about these issues) an important
educative function in relation to parliamentarians themselves. My experience
in and around the bureaucracy leads me to conclude that many politicians are
profoundly ignorant of issues like those connected with law-and-order and penal
administration. I do not think that is their fault, I think it is in effect a very
structural facet, basically a sort of ‘mushroom treatment’ that they are subjected
to in the context of the cabinet system, and the type of political ethos and
political culture that dominates the political process in New South Wales, but
if we are going to seek after a more informed, more critical public debate and
public opinion around these issues then it is not simply a question of good ideas,
it is a question of actually addressing some of the institutional conditions which
will contribute to a process by which we do attain a greater level of critical and
informed discussion particularly around law-and-order issues since that is an
area where in the absence of such critical debate there is a readily available
moral and highly emotive rhetoric which tends to govern the direction of
government policy on such matters.
In concluding, though these might seem like fairly modest points, I am
deeply committed to the view that ultimately the quality of public debate and
understanding and political administration with regard to law-and-order issues
depends upon some of these more routine features of our public institutions
than it does upon episodic scandals and public enquiries of the type that we
have experienced in recent years.
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DISCUSSION PAPER 1
TRUTH IN SENTENCING: TRUTH OR HALF TRUTH
Ann Aungles
Secretary, Children of Prisoners Support Group
We would like to focus on the issue of “truth in sentencing” raised in
the papers by Russell Hogg and the Law Reform Discussion Papers on
Sentencing. In both these approaches there is an emphasis on the difﬁculty of
making the principle operational, of translating the formal principle into
substantive practice.
We would point up a particularly central difficulty in this translation of
an abstract legal principle. In the everyday world offenders are not simply
individuals receiving sentence they are also likely to be people with family
relationships and responsibilities. When an offender is sentenced, two sets of
people share that sentence, the offender and the family outside. Approximately
3 000 children in N.S.W. have a parent in prison. Over any one year
approximately 7 000 children may go through the experience of having a parent
imprisoned, and there is a great deal of evidence that the sentencing of the
parent effectively means a parallel but invisible sentence for the child. Although
the punishment of children of prisoners has been extensively documented, it is
invisible because it is such a well hidden sentence in the world of penal policy
and practice.
For example: of the thirty or more recommendations made by the three
major reports that have addressed the issue of the hidden punishment of
children—the 1975 Nagel Commission, the 1982 Children ofImprisoned Parents
Report and the 1985 Women in Prison Task Force Report—only a small number
have been implemented. Included amongst the majority that have been ignored
are: ,
0 opportunities for quality contact between prisoner-parents and their
children must be increased and given high priority in budget
allocation and policy decisions;
. visiting rights should never be suspended as a disciplinary measure;
0 provision of both indoor and outdoor visiting areas in all gaols, each
with facilities, equipment and toys suitable for children;
. extended visiting hours to allow for after school visiting;
o the extension of Family Support Centres to major gaols other than
Long Bay;
0 prisoners to be allowed unlimited visits with their dependent
children.
These recommendations stand in marked contrast to the actual
experience of the conditions under which children are in contact with their
imprisoned parents in N.S.W. today.
The hidden shadow of sentencing, the parallel punishment of children
of prisoners, breaches the principle of speciﬁcity of punishment upon which the
policies of “truth in sentencing” and “back to justice” rest. Advocates of these
policies thus have a choice: the ﬁrst choice is to continue the pretence that
imprisonment is a sentence that punishes only the offender. However, in this
case “truth in sentencing” is only a half truth. In the second choice the actual
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shadow sentence imposed on children of prisoners can be recognized and we
can begin to address the severe problems of children presently victimised by
sentencing policies that centre on imprisonment.
95
PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Ann Aungles
I would like to pick up some of of the ideas that are coming out of Russell
Hogg’s paper particularly, but also from the Law Reform sentencing paper, and
that is the issue of “Truth in Sentencing” and the problem of translating that ,
formal principle or formal slogan into substantive practice. Children of
Prisoners Support Group would like to point up a particularly central difficulty
in the translation of an abstract legal idea into the everyday world, because in
the everyday world offenders are not simply individuals receiving sentences they
are also likely to be people with family relationships and with family
responsibilities. There is a great deal of evidence, indeed if you do a data bank
search you are likely to come up with about one hundred or more studies,
indicating that there are major parallel punishments—in other words a shadow
sentencing of children. And yet we call this a “shadow sentence” and a “hidden
punishment” because although it is very extensively documented it is very
hidden in terms of penal policies and practices. For example, there have been
three major reports in New South Wales which have tried to address some of
the problems of hidden punishments:—the Nagel Report, the Children of
Imprisoned Parents Report, and the Women in Prison Task Force Report.
Between them they have made over thirty to forty recommendations to try and
put right some of the aspects of the shadow sentencing of children. Only a bare
minimum of those recommendations have been implemented. Amongst some
of those that haven’t yet been addressed are these fairly straightforward ones:
opportunities for quality contact between prisoner parents and their children
must be increased; visiting rights should never be suspended as a disciplinary
measure; provision of both outdoor and indoor visiting areas. in all gaols, with
facilities and equipment and so on suitable for children—a rather mundane
issue but a very serious one in terms of maintaining quality contact between
children and their parents and putting right the shadow sentencing of children.
Prisoners, for example, to be allowed unlimited visits for their dependent
children or even extending visiting hours so that children who are at school can
visit their parents. These recommendations stand in marked contrast to the
actual experience of conditions under which children are in contact with their
imprisoned parents today.
The point we want to make is that the hidden shadow of sentencing,
the parallel punishment of children of prisoners, breaches the principle of
specificity of punishment upon which the slogans or philosophies of “truth in
sentencing” and “back to justice” rest. Those advocates of these policies have
a choice—to continue the pretence that imprisonment is the sentence that
punishes only the offender, however, in this case “truth in sentencing” is only
a half truth, in the second choice the actual shadow sentence imposed on
children of prisoners can be recognised and we can begin to address the severe
problems of children presently victimised by sentencing policies that centre on
imprisonment.
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DISCUSSION PAPER 2
JOINT CHURCHES STATEMENT: PRISON. THE LAST RESORT
Chris Budden
Secretary, Joint Churches Social Justice
Sunday Drafting Committee
In September this year the Social Responsibility and Justice
Commissions of the Anglican, Catholic and Uniting Churches and of the
Australian Council of Churches released the report “Prison. The Last Resort”.
The report was prepared after a year of research, public hearings, reception of
submissions and wide consultation about the prison system, who is caught up
in the system and alternatives which might be developed to the prison system.
The report concludes that, despite the existence of crime across all social
classes, those who are young, single, unemployed and poorly educated are in a
majority in the prison system. Aboriginal people are over-represented, as are
young people. There is evidence that women are discriminated against in the
sentencing process. '
The report also concludes that, despite similar crime rates in each state,
the prison rate varies enormously between states. There is also a fair degree of
variation in sentencing between various regions within the same state.
None of this is new, for the information has been drawn from readily
available research.
What is new is the involvement of the churches in this issue, and the
strong recommendation that such is the nature of the prison system that it
should only be used as a last resort. The report encourages State governments
to actively pursue alternatives to the prison system.
It also suggests that there is some confusion in the minds of the judiciary
as to why people are sentenced and, thus, what is an appropriate sentence. It
says:
To some extent, the possibility of reducing the prison
population will depend on increased clariﬁcation of the purpose of
imprisonment, its place in the punishment system and its effects on
repeated criminal behaviour. (page 18).
The full document Prisons: The Last Resort was available at the seminar.
[1 can be obtained from: ,
Australian Council of Churches, 373 Kent Street, Sydney, N.S.W.,
2000, Australia.
Anglican Information Office, St Andrews House, Sydney, N.S.W.
2000, Australia.
Australian Catholic Social Justice Council, 17 Little Abion Street,
Surry Hills, N.S.W. 2010, Australia.
Uniting Church, 222 Pitt Street, Sydney, N.S.W. 2000, Australia.
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Chris Budden
The purpose of drawing the document “Prisons: The Last Resort" to your
attention in this context was I think ﬁrst of all to indicate that the churches are
at last making an effort to bring out in a popular level many of the issues that
have beensaid in the papers presented, and to enable them to be debated within
the community, and to at last begin, at least within the churches, to encourage
the kind of debate and maybe contribute towards the kind of climate in which
reforms of the prison system can occur. One of our commitments, and it has
been made a number of times by the speakers, is that the,possibility of reform
in terms of sentencing and particularly in the use of prisons or the overuse of
prisons in sentencing will only come about when there is a change of climate
‘of opinion in the community.
To make several points from the document. First, is the commitment
which is reﬂected in the title, and the comment has been made a number of
times that prison really ought to be the very last resort if only because, in terms
of the first paper, while prisons may be understandable they are far from being
fair or effective in most cases, particularly in terms of sentencing. Secondly, to
raise the questions the document raises about whether the shift back to ‘just
deserts’ is really an appropriate way in which to move. The question of ‘just
deserts’ occurs for three reasons; theﬁrst is that, if the sentencing process and
the whole criminal justice system is concerned for more than individuals but
is concerned for the whole fabric of society and for the brokenness that occurs
when criminal activities happen then there should be concern for more than
‘just deserts’ or for some punishment as an end in itself. There needs to be some
action taken to enable the brokenness of the community to be restored. Prisons
in particular do not do that nor does a system that concentrates on ‘just deserts’.
The second point we want to make in that regard is that in a morally ambiguous
world, and that has been brought out particularly in terms of children caught
up in the system, it seems to us that a ‘just deserts’ process only continues that
moral ambiguity it does not help in any way. And the third question is that if
you have ‘just deserts’ who is going to decide what is just and appropriate given
particularly the history of our system where the system has been used as a form
of social control.
My ﬁnal point is this. The churches which are involved in this
document—the Catholic, Anglican, Uniting and the Australian Council of
Churches—are seeking ways with people such as yourself, who are involved in
this process, to work out ways we can co-operate and share in the shift of.
community attitudes to enable some forms of reform.
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Mark Robertson, Director, New South Wales Probation and Parole Service
I would like to bring up a couple of fairly mundane matters, that are important
to some of us anyhow. In Mr Zdenkowski’s papers on page 22 he refers to the
Report.
[recommending] an automatic date of release upon parole, speciﬁcally after
completion of 70 percent of the total length of the sentence imposed
subject to allowance of earned remission not exceeding 20 percent of the
total length of the sentence.
That 20 percent of the total sentence must apply to the non-parole
period, otherwise it makes mathematical nonsense because you would never get
any remission at all. If you take a 100 days sentence you apply a non-parole
period of 70 days, and then you take off 20 days for maximum remission you
get down to half the actual sentence delivered in the court. That is my reading
of it. I think it makes sense that way but I do not know how far that goes to
deal with this question of “truth in sentencing”. It seems to me to leave us with
all the problems that we currently have. I can see the press making just as much
fuss about somebody getting out after 50 percent of their sentence as they are
making about the present situation.
The other comment I would like to make is in respect of page 23 where
the Commission feels that the quality and reliability of reports about offenders
should be improved. Pre-sentence reports constitute one of the major reports
received by the courts about an offender. Such one liner critiques are difﬁcult
to deal with and it is also difﬁcult to avoid paranoia. I hope I am, in saying I
think there is an explanation to be given here. The probation and parole systems
operating in the Commonwealth of Australia inherited their system and their
ethos from the English system—and the English system is still operating very
much as it was early in this century, in that probation and parole ofﬁcers
prepare reports as individuals and there are no procedural checks to ensure the
reliability of the information put before the court. I was interested to note that
legislation in Tasmania requires the court to treat a probation and parole
ofﬁcer’s pre-sentence report as if it were primary evidence, not hearsay evidence,
which seems to me as a layman to be an extraordinary provision. However, I
want to say as far as the Probation and Parole Service in New South Wales is
concerned that while we are dealing with hearsay evidence, there is an obligation-
on every probation and parole ofﬁcer to verifying the information contained in
that report. There are a whole series of investigations to be made. The offender
presents his picture to the probation and parole ofﬁcer, the probation and parole
officer then has an obligation to go and check with other signiﬁcant persons in
the life of that offender to attempt to evaluate the information put forward by
the prisoner.
If they find contradictions they then have to go further in an effort to
ascertain the true state of affairs. We have a checking mechanism in that as
every pre-sentence report prepared by a probation oﬂicer must be considered
by that ofﬁcer’s senior ofﬁcer. The senior ofﬁcer goes through the whole process
of checking through that report to ensure that the ofﬁcer has made all the
necessary inquiries to support the picture that he is presenting in the report,
and to ensure that the report is properly based upon the investigations made
and represents conclusions that are logically drawn from the investigations that
have been made.
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We have 400 probation and parole officers in New South Wales, so there
is necessarily going to be a range in the quality of work. I agree that the quality
and reliability of reports does need to be improved. Until we reach the state of
perfection that will continue. But I want to make it clear that often sentencers
and other people involved in the criminal justice system seem to be under the
impression that what you get in a pre-sentence report is nothing more than the
offender’s presentation of himself. We are dealing with hearsay evidence, but
we go to considerable pains to verify. The probation and parole officer making
these investigations must record them in a case history that is inspected by the
senior officer when the pre-sentence report is being vetted before presentation
to the court. I would invite sentencers when they feel some infomation in that
report is vital to the decision that they want to make to say to the presenting
probation and parole oﬂicer “Can you explain to me how you veriﬁed the
information in that section of your report?”.
As the presentation of papers has proceeded we seemed to have become
progressively more pessimistic. Believe me, in our game if you are not a born
optimist you should quit. I see a possibility for positive development in this
whole problem area of sentencing. It is interesting to note that the Melanesian
culture deals with offences by taking steps to restore the balance that has been
upset in society by the offence of the offender. Now, this is not necessarily a
humane sort of thing. Sometimes it meant strapping somebody to a tree on the
border with the next tribe so that that tribe would kill him. It is this principle
of restoring the balance, of restitution, recompense, making up for the damage
that has been done to that society by the offence of the offender that now seems
to be coming into some prominence in western culture. It is interesting to note
that in the literature and in the aspirations of correctional administrators
throughout the western world, there has been this move towards introducing
more and more of this compensation reconciliation factor in dealing with
offenders, i.e., the offender doing something to recompense the community for
the damage that has been done to the community by that offence, or
recompensing the victim. I see work orders, i.e., the involving of the offender
in some kind of a work programme, as becoming an increasingly popular
sentencing option. I would like to see offenders paid award wages and out of
that wage meet their obligations, pay their compensation, pay their ﬁne, support
their family, and remain in the community in all cases where that does not put
the community at risk of further serious violence
Paul Byrne
If I can just take up the ﬁrst issue that you raised about the Australian
Law Reform Commission’s proposals regarding non-parole periods and
remissions from non-parole periods and your point that that appeared to be in
conﬂict with their stated overall goal of achieving some form of “truth in
sentencing”. The point I think you make is if you can be released on parole or
you are qualiﬁed for release on parole when 70 per cent of your sentence has
expired and you are entitled to earn maximum remissions of 20 per cent then
a lot of people will qualify to be released half way through their sentences. If I
could just compare that approach with what the Canadians and the Victorians
have recommended. The Canadians have said that parole should be abolished
completely and that there should be a system of earned remissions. Their
proposal is that the maximum amount of earned remissions should be 25 per
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cent of the overall sentence. The Victorians have recommended that remissions
be abolished completely. What would happen if, in the current system in New
South Wales, as is not unusual, somebody was sentenced to a period of 10 years
imprisonment and with a non-parole period of 6 years speciﬁed? Under the
current system that person would be entitled by way of automatic remissions
on the non-parole period if he/she was a first offender to be released after a
period of 4 years. When you take into account earned remissions the person
might be eligible for release perhaps after a period of 3V2 years even though the
nominal head sentence is one of 10 years. What the Canadians and the
Victorians say elsewhere in their reports and emphasise very strongly is that
the sentences imposed by the courts should be, in general, the sentences that
are served by the people on whom they are imposed. They would suggest that
instead of imposing 10 years on a person when the person is likely to serve 3V2,
the sentence should be something in the order of 3V2 years or less. Overall
sentences would be reduced dramatically but they would reﬂect much more
accurately and with a pretty reasonable degree of honesty the amount of time
that the person might be expected to spend in gaol. It has also been suggested
that remissions are a way of giving incentives to people to behave in prison.
That is put forward as one of the great benefits of the remission system—that
it controls the behaviour of prisoners.
Although that has been called into question, there should be something
to provide an incentive to people to encourage good behaviour or to reward
good behaviour. Instead of the practice of releasing people early from sentences
which ultimately has the effect of increasing the sentences that the courts impose
in the ﬁrst place, it would be preferable to, in effect, ameliorate the conditions
that people serve their sentences under. What is suggested, in that regard, is
that people should be moved from maximum security to lesser security gaols
to institutions which are more in the nature of prison farms and ultimately to
perhaps qualify for something like home detention. I appreciate the comments
that Russell Hogg has made about home detention, but it seems to me that if
it is used in relation to people who are already prisoners there is no risk that
it is going to be used as an alternative to the alternatives to prison, as he puts
it, and that it may be used as a reward for good behaviour in prison or an
incentive to good behaviour.
The general scheme of those other reports I have mentioned is that the
sentence that is to be imposed is more or less the time that is to be served. If
such a scheme were to be introduced in New South Wales, it would involve a
dramatic reduction in the sentences that are imposed but it would be more or
less the time that people are actually spending in custody.
David Brown, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of New South
Wales.
I would also like to make a few comments about “truth in sentencing”.
I think there is a too ready, uncritical acceptance of that notion which is
reﬂected to an extent in the Australian Law Reform Commission Report, and
indeed in a lot of popular perceptions and in some of the comments that have
been made by Mr Robinson and in Paul Byme’s statement about the Victorian
and the Canadian reports. I think those assumptions are, as Paul Byme just
said, that the sentence passed by the judge is actually the time served. That is
one of the assumptions behind the notion of “truth in sentencing” and I think
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we need to get over much more clearly the notion that a sentence can be divided
up into many different components. That is not just a question of freedom on
the one hand or imprisonment on the other, but that a sentence can be served
in different contexts and under different conditions. Some of those conditions
can be under an imprisonment context and under other conditions it can be
under some form of community supervision. I think it is important to keep
making that point. The sentence should be looked at in a much broader way
and not equated with imprisonment.
The second major assumption I think that is very common in a lot of
the debates around “truth in sentencing” is the notion, as Russell Hogg so
correctly pointed out, that sentencing should be the sole prerogative of the
judiciary. Obviously it is important not to be involved in some sort of
deception, but on the other hand it is also important to recognise that sentencing
is a social and political function—we are talking about the utilisation of public
resources. Secondly, the key issues really to my mind are questions of the quality
of the decision making; its openness, its accountability, its defenceability on
openly and clearly articulated criteria. So the point is that it is not something
that goes to the location of any particular social agency, whether it be the
judiciary, the Corrective Services Department, the Parole Board, the legislature,
or whatever. The point is the quality of the decision making rather than the
assumption that the sentencing function is automatically the prerogative of one
particular social agency. To that extent Don Weatherburn’s paper is a more
careful scrutiny of the adequacy of the traditional legal claims about the role'
of the Court of Criminal Appeal in providing sentencing principles.
And if I might just add a passing note about the practice of research. I
think that debunking, evaluative research which is empirically based but which
is also fairly critical and conceptual is important, and I think there is a worrying
trend in the current climate to argue for a reduction in that kind of conceptual
or evaluative work in favour of return to empiricism. The notion that criminal
research agencies should merely be dishing up ‘the facts’ to government, without
any commentary or evaluation should be rejected. It is of little use to
governments of whatever complexion and I think it makes little contribution
to responsible debate.
I think one of the major things I would like to stress is to support Russell
Hogg’s argument that we are talking about reconstructing the social and political
terms of the debate. It is a pity that Mr Yabsley did have to leave and I hope
that he will read Russell I-Iogg’s paper in time. Certainly he is very much caught
in the Contradiction between on the. one hand the inﬂationary effect of the law-
and-order rhetoric that Paul Ward talked about, of which as is pretty well
known, Mr Yabsley is a prime exponent, and also the ﬁscal concerns to cut back
on public expenditure, and clearly imprisonment is a very expensive utilisation
of public resources. The recent Australian Institute of Criminology figures
suggest that to keep a prisoner in New South Wales for 1 year costs around
about $40,000. A number of ex-prisoners that I know say they would stay out
for half of that! Now, that is a joke at one level, but also it is a serious point
as well that goes back to some of the points that Paul Ward was making—it
may well be that it is precisely in the area of income maintenance, job creation
programmes, and so on, and in particular the provision of some realistic
material support for prisoners when they come out. After all most of the
criminological studies show very clearly that it is in the three months post
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release that most people, if they are going to re—offend, do re-oﬂ‘end and it is
precisely that period where they are largely abandoned to any kind of
meaningful assistance in terms of housing or income maintenance to tide them
through that period. I think it is all very well for the Attorney General to say
that his government has a commitment to imprisonment as a measure of last
resort, but there is a whole list of government policies that they are promising
to enact which run completely contrary to that. That makes such a commitment
vacuous and irrelevant and I think shows very clearly the dangers of allowing
the debate to remain at these levels of general principle.
Colonel L. J. Young, Chief Legal Ofﬁcer, HQ. 2 M.D., Victoria Barracks,
Department of Defence, Army
I think both Paul Ward and Russell Hogg have captured the real essence
of this debate: it does need to be broadened. The emphasis on reducing crime
is in the wrong place, sending people to gaol does not reduce crime. I doubt
though, in the short term, that y0u will convince the public of that, and this
book on Prison: The Last Resort because it is distributed at the local parish level
and ordinary people are likely to read it is important. I think if they knew, for
example, the daily timetable at Pentridge was breakfast at 7.45, lunch at ll,
evening meal at 3.15 they would be quite surprised. If the public won’t be
convinced in the short term, I do not believe the politicians will pick up the
theme about doing something about employment, youth, child care centres and
the like. It will take a brave politician to do something if he-does not think the
public will be behind him. I would like to commend this seminar for raising
the matters and I think, particularly, if the two politicians who were here earlier
read the seminar papers with interest they will get a lot from them and go part
of the way to improving and reducing the crime rate.
Pauline Lewis, Volunteer Counsellor
I have worked in civil rehabilitation in the Family Support Centre at
Long Bay and I find that our sentencing seems to be quite ﬁne, but it is just
that the prison system does not seem to follow it. Neither the prisoners nor the
prison seems to know what goes on. What I ﬁnd amongst the families is the
ﬁnancial concern of what takes place when the husband, or the breadwinner.
goes to prison. There does not seem to be very much assistance, and prisoners
do not even receive the dole or any such other similar support when they are
not working, and as I understand they are not required to work, or encouraged
to participate in their own rehabilitation programmes within the prison system.
As a citizen I would like to speak about parole. I think its failure has
been due to the overload on parole officers because of the extreme number of
people they have to deal with, including liaison with parents and employers.
That section of Corrective Services, rather than being abolished, should really
be increased. Employers look to some kind of tangible resource in handling a
prisoner coming into their workplace and in my experience, feel a lot more
confident if they have someone to turn to, but parole officers just don’t have
the time. I have discovered that.
Charles Goldberg. Solicitor
Firstly might I commend those gentlemen in respect to the papers that
we have had presented at this seminar.
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I would like to make comments now in respect of those papers.
In respect of the paper prepared by Mr Zdenkowski I was interested to
see the comment relating to the public perception of the sentencing process and
the public opinion and media aspect. I have taken the view that the public only
gains its concept of any matter by virtue of what the media are prepared to
print or present, and we all know that the media have one aim and that is to
sensationalise the material to the extent that they will sell newspapers or attract
attention on the radio or television stations.
I am very conscious of a matter that occurred some two years ago when
the Anita Cobby trial was either about to commence or it might have been the
committal proceedings had just been completed. The then Premier, Mr Wran,
took it upon himself to indicate that it was appropriate that the sentencing
situation be looked into again and be reformed, and I noted at the time that
there was an article in the Sydney Morning Herald by John Slee which was
pertinent and to the point. It indicated how politicians are always candidates
for that aspect which promotes them. In other words, it was appropriate at the
time for the Premier (and he may have been very well meaning, I do not deny
that) to raise at the time of an incident in the Cobby murder what was going
to happen to the sentencing situation, and that is, as I understand it, what this
seminar is about—the sentencing procedure.
Those of us .who appear in the courts are all very conscious that some
judges are heavy in sentence, some are light, so we do have the doves, and we
are all accustomed, or have been in the past in seeking to appear before those
judges who would look to us to be more compassionate, perhaps be slightly
lighter in their dealing of the particular matter. From a practitioner’s point of
view it became far easier at those times to draw the accused or the defendant
to a more realistic approach, and I am sure that the Court of Appeal has said
on numerous occasions that practitioners tend to waste the court’s time. There
is an answer to this. It has always seemed to me that it would be more in
keeping with the respect that is due to members of the judiciary if there was a
criminal division established. It is easy, in the sense of Mr Zdenkowski’s
comments and the Law Reform Commission to indicate potentially the
establishment of a body to educate members of the judiciary in relation to
sentencing. With great respect, I would submit there is only one way you learn
what sentencing is about and that is to go to court and be there. Speak to the
individual who is coming before the court, listen to what the old time judges,
the prosecutors, and the probation ofﬁcers have to say about matters as the case
proceeds. We can all of us look at the legislation as it is set down. It has, of
course, this concept of maximum sentence without any real indication of what
should be appropriate. There is an answer in regard to attack on judges’
discretion or on their ﬂexibility merely by maintaining the head sentence but
give the presiding judge the real opportunity, because he is the one who sees
,the accused or the prisoner as he then might be, and makes his own personal
estimation. There is the opportunity for that judge to set the appropriate non—
parole period and that non-parole period may well be more in keeping with a
lower period than the concept that has been adopted, particularly in courts in
the last few years of increasing non-parole, so that one can establish a non-parole
period by ascertaining what remissions the prisoner would receive from the head
sentence by virtue of his past record. That is not good enough. Subjective factors
should always be taken into account and it seems to me that that was brought
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in the Williams case when the Chief Justice, Sir Laurence Street, that no change
was to be made in the penalty that was imposed on Williams because he was
conscious that subjective factors had greatly inﬂuenced the sentencing judge.
My recollection of that particular case was whether it was the course adopted
by the trial judge that was manifestly inadequate. It seems, and I submit this
without reservation, that in the absence of the appellate court hearing from the
individual, one cannot consider that the appellate court can obtain maximum
advantage just by use of the written word. It is a matter that does cause me
considerable concern.
Finally, I would like to add one other aspect on those persons who are
sentenced. I am very conscious of what Mr Robertson and some of the other
speakers said about what should happen to people in gaol. I am greatly in favour
of the opportunity of persons working and ﬁnding some form of restitution, but
let me suggest to you the early release scheme which fell into disrepute after
the Rex Jackson regime should be reconsidered because the problems that seem
to confront most prisoners after their release is obtaining employment. What I
would put to this meeting is that work release should be encouraged, encouraged
to the extent that we are then putting the prisoner into a responsible situation,
giving him an opportunity of returning to the workforce as an employee. If one
looks at the average prisoner who leaves gaol with $60 or $100 in his pocket,
after he had paid his rent, bought his ﬁrst meal, basically he was broke, so what
does he do? He went back and committed similar sorts of offences and came
back before the courts. If we are going to reject the concept of encouraging these
men to work, then it seems that we might as well go back to that old time
concept of transportation or putting them on prison ships because there is not
much purpose in trying to rehabilitatea man if we are going to send him back
into the community as a potential offender again.
Vivian King, Probation Officer, Newcastle
I have been concerned about a ﬂavour of cynicism that I detect in some
of the comments that have been made about gaol as a rehabilitative experience
for the prisoner. In general, I would agree with that, but I think there is one
particular area where 'we could improve in line with some of the comments
people have made about achievable reforms. I think achievable reform is
incorporating education into the remission system. I have seen very good results
with prisoners who have undertaken quite different courses. For instance, a long
term prisoner commenced a University degree at Newcastle University from
Cessnock Prison and I believe he has kept himself substantially out of trouble
since release because of that. I have also seen a young boy who was a shocking
recidivist traffic offender go to Cessnock Gaol, do a forklift ticket and he now
has a legitimate outlet when he returns to the community for driving a vehicle
on private property within the letter of the law. These are two quite polarised
examples but I do think we are not emphasising the potential of education in
the gaol system as we should. I think New Zealand does a much better job than
we are doing at present and I think it is virtually a scandal in Australia with
our long history of public education that we should deny education to our
prisoners.
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J. S. Williams, Magistrate
Prison: The Last Resort is a very interesting publication and it has been
referred to by a number of speakers, and I agree with it. Prison should be a last
resort. Of course, I think the public perception of prison quite often is that it
is a ‘resort’. 1 have been in the situation where people who have visited prison
with me and seen what things are like out at the Central Industrial Prison, and
similar places, yet are still quite concerned that prisoners receive ice cream for
tea and things like that.
I think the big problem that we all face with regard to dealing with the
question of imprisonment and sentencing is a public education policy, and the
point that has been made is the adverse publicity, given an extremely bad case
like the Anita Cobby case with calls for the death penalty and increasing the
length of imprisonment to 5 years for lighting bush fires. That sort of approach
is very counter-productive. There have to be press releases and publication at
a very significant level by the various government departments involved, to
educate the general public to accept the fact that prison rarely does anyone any
good apart from incapacitating them for a period of time.
The other thing that does concern me is what I might call a progression
of punishments. People who come before the courts as repeated offenders might
start off with a fine for a few times, then they will get a bond, then they will
get community service, and then eventually the general consensus of opinion
amongst most sentencers is “Well, you have had all your chances now. That’s
it—in you go”. I do not necessarily agree with that. I do not see any reason,
particularly for property offenders, where they perform a community service
satisfactorily if they keep offending why they cannot continue to be punished
by repeated community service orders. I was informed by a person who is in a
position to know the incredible statistic that in New South Wales the average
period of time spent in gaol is 12 weeks or 3 months. Of course there are people
serving very long sentences and there are people serving less than that, but the
point he made is what possible good can a period of 12 weeks gaol do to
someone. They are abviously not going to be reformed in that time,'they are
not going to be able to indulge in any education arrangement over that period
of time, and it is costing the society an enormous amount of money.
Another thing that tends to be forgotten is that sentencers are not experts
in the sense that they are not criminologists, they are not sociolégists, they are
not psychologists. They generally reﬂect the opinions of community, perhaps
more on the conservative side. They do need to be as educated and informed
of what is happening with all the things that they are doing as much as the
general members of the public.
I would propose the abolition of imprisonment asan option where the
maximum penalty would involve a sentence of less than 12 months taking into
account remissions and any question of parole for the reason that I gave earlier.
What good can you hope to do anyone putting them in gaol for 12 weeks or a
couple of weeks? You might jerk the occasional offender back into reality, but
a lot of people who are recurrent offenders just do not or cannot adjust their
behaviour at all, and I do not think any good comes of it.
I'suppose I am a bit of a pessimist in that, unfortunately, that there will
always be crime. We are not going to solve the question of crime by any of
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these means. There is always going to be a group in society, or a part of society,
that we or other people judge morally reprehensible. There will always be people
whose moral reprehensibility is so serious that society decides that they have
got to be taken out of society for a period of time. It seems to me that the
measure of our humanity is going to be judged on how we treat those people
who we decide need to be taken out of circulation for a period of time.
Dr Don Weatherburn
Just a very small point but potentially important as the media are
lurking nearby. Before everbody runs away with a panic about the possibility
that the average time spent in gaol is 12 weeks, the fact is you will get a very
different answer depending on whether you sit at the gaol gates and ask people
coming out how long they have spent there, compared to going into the gaol
and asking people who you meet how long they have spent there. Twelve weeks
is generally an average period I would imagine for the volume of people coming
through. If you go into the gaol and ask people how long they are spending 1
think the average would be considerably more than 12 weeks. In effect those
sorts of measures tend to be biased towards the high turnover groups, the ﬁne
defaulters, and so on. I just wanted to prevent an impression developing that
most people being sent to gaol are serving 12 week sentences.
John Maher, President, Probation and Parole Ofﬁcers Association
In a sense I guess it is not terribly appropriate to speak at this seminar
because what I really should be doing is talking to a group of script writers,
because it strikes me and my Association the most effective way to change the
public perception is basically through the ‘soaps’. The visual media is where we
learn so much about what happens in our society, and there is so very little
that is done to get across the sorts of issues in a concrete way that we are
addressing at this seminar. I know that would ﬁll a lot of people with horror
and they would say: “The situation would be worse rather than better” but I
would suggest in fact that the situation is about as bad as it can be in terms of
the presentation of things in the media. It could be a lot better if we had
informed and well formulated material going into the various quality soap opera
productions.
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